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The past few decades have seen the proliferation of regulatory agencies, expert committees, 
and other “non-majoritarian” institutions in Europe. Scholars tend to assume that once created, 
policies corresponding to these institutions persist, disrupting the existing governance 
structure. This thesis instead argues that policy continuity following the creation of agencies 
depends on the locus of regulatory decisions. Specifically, it proposes that the extent to which 
elected politicians are excluded from the decision-making, i.e. their level of “political 
insulation”, affects policy continuity. Where elected politicians are excluded from the 
decision-making, this enables unpopular policy choices. But such choices, once made, 
generate a greater counter-mobilisation, undermining policy continuity over time. By contrast, 
where elected politicians have the final say on decisions, they can prevent unpopular policy 
choices from being taken, which contributes to policy continuity.  
To illustrate these mechanisms, this thesis takes restricting the funding of pharmaceutical 
products by the healthcare system as a case of an unpopular regulatory policy and compares 
its development in England and France. Both countries established regulatory agencies tasked 
to assess the benefits of drugs for funding decisions, but the nations subsequently followed 
divergent trajectories. In England, high political insulation enabled policy choices that 
otherwise would have been too politically costly. Yet these choices, over time, led to a greater 
counter-mobilisation through public and electoral arenas, resulting in a partial policy reversal. 
By contrast, in France, low political insulation allowed ministers to choose not to follow the 
agency’s outputs when they considered them too politically costly; ministers also prevented 
rule changes that might have made more politically-costly outputs possible. The findings 
highlight the endogenous drivers of post-regulatory reform policy development. Contrary to 
the linear trajectory, where “depoliticised” agencies reinforce themselves, the thesis suggests 
that under certain conditions, the policies that accompany regulatory agencies can undermine 
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With technological advances and demographic change, governments across the 
industrialised world have been under often contradictory pressures regarding funding medical 
technologies through public health care systems. On the one hand, they have introduced 
various measures in an attempt at controlling costs, concerned with the fiscal sustainability of 
the welfare state. On the other, they have committed to enabling citizens’ access to 
sophisticated technologies by making them available via public health care systems. To add 
further complexity, the latter imperative of securing access to technologies has often gone 
hand in hand with the goal of rewarding the industries producing them, such as the 
pharmaceutical and medical device industries, which have often been seen as strategically 
important in the knowledge-based economy.  
The focus of the present study is on a particular set of policy responses to these conflicting 
pressures. Most European countries underwent major procedural and institutional reforms in 
the 1990s and 2000s, which involved the establishment or reorganisation of regulatory 
agencies tasked to assess the clinical and cost-effectiveness of medical technologies and 
healthcare interventions. Partly stemming from intellectual movements called Health 
Technology Assessment (HTA) and Evidence-Based Medicines (EBM), the underlying idea 
of such reforms was to base decisions on funding or excluding technologies from health care 
systems – or “rationing” in the popular idiom – more on technical expertise. Rationing is, by 
its nature, a political act: policy decisions to ration technologies inevitably mean some have 
their wellbeing more socially protected than others, and hence have profound implications for 
both individual lives and the allocation of health care resources. With the establishment of 
agencies, experts within them have been seen to play a prominent role in such decisions, in an 
attempt at providing legitimacy based on their technical expertise – and hence providing a type 
of solution to political conflicts arising from the countervailing pressures.  
Yet the establishment of regulatory agencies by no means resolved the conflicting 
imperatives concerning funding technologies. Nor have the agencies yielded uniform effects 
on subsequent developments across nations. Countries have followed divergent policy 
trajectories both in terms of their policy orientation on funding drugs and the patterns of 
institutional modification. Why have countries confronting similar challenges and introducing 
a similar type of institution followed different trajectories? Why did regulatory institutions 






on decision-making over funding drugs through public health care systems, the present study 
investigates how, and under what conditions, policies accompanying newly-created regulatory 
institutions are maintained or changed over time.  
By examining the process through which the development of regulatory institutions takes 
place in the subsequent period, the study situates battles over drug rationing in broader political 
struggles over the transformation of the roles and organisational structures of the state in 
Europe, in particular of what is often called the “regulatory state” (Majone 1994, 1996). In the 
past few decades, regulatory agencies, expert committees, and other delegated policymaking 
bodies have spread across Europe and across different policy areas. Broadly labelled as so-
called “non-majoritarian” institutions – a government entity separate from other institutions 
and neither directly elected by citizens or managed by elected officials1 - the creation of these 
organisations was widely seen as a significant institutional innovation, leading to disruption 
of the existing mode of governance structures and its replacement with a new one (e.g. Majone 
1997; Moran 2003; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). In his seminal article, Majone (1997), 
for instance, has argued that the proliferation of non-majoritarian institutions indicates the 
transformation of the mode of governance, namely, the transformation that is in the process of 
the transition from the “positive state” to the “regulatory state”. He claimed that instead of the 
direct intervention through redistribution that states in post-war Europe once enjoyed, the role 
that states play today has increasingly been becoming one of rulemaking and regulation to 
correct market failure. For him, this shift in the role of the state not only means changes in its 
organisations and instruments, but also leads to corresponding shifts in governance structures 
linking the state with society. The latter shift takes place by replacing corporatist policymaking 
between the state and dominant societal actors with more pluralistic rulemaking by regulatory 
agencies serving diffuse interests. On this account, the spread of regulatory agencies is seen 
as a sign of broader transformation of state-society relations.  
The regulatory state thesis has gained much currency among scholars of European politics 
and public policy (cf. Lodge 2008; Holzinger and Schmidt 2015). Inspired by the delegation 
theory in American politics, a vast research programme has emerged, which examines 
underlying sources and determinants of delegating power(s) to non-majoritarian institutions, 
issues in their institutional design including political control and accountability, and formal 
and actual independence of regulatory agencies; it has also covered a wide range of policy 
                                                     






domains at both national and supranational levels. Scholars have argued that delegation to 
non-majoritarian institutions is driven by the need for technical expertise,2 the necessity for 
credible commitment,3 the problem of political uncertainty,4 and the desire to shift the blame 
for unpopular policy outcomes.5 
While much has been studied about the creation and design of delegated bodies, less 
attention has, however, been paid to political dynamics after delegation. A particular lacuna is 
whether and how the creation of regulatory institutions affects a broader landscape of 
policymaking and political struggles where the state and society interact. This is despite 
Majone’s original thesis that the proliferation of independent agencies does not end in itself, 
but transforms the governance structures of state-society relations. The predominant scholarly 
account in this regard tends to see the establishment of regulatory agencies as an ongoing 
march towards “depoliticisation” (Hay 2007; Mair 2013). For instance, in a recent book Mair 
(2013) laments that the spread of non-majoritarian institutions has contributed to the erosion 
of party democracy in Western countries. Policymaking by parties is replaced by non-
majoritarian institutions, whose officials are less often recruited from parties and more 
accountable to judicial and regulatory controls. And with the formation of a network of 
regulators at supranational and national levels with ever more dispersed authorities, “… the 
very notion of accountability being exercised through parties, or of the executive being 
answerable to voters (as distinct from citizens or stakeholders) becomes problematic. Party, in 
this sense, loses much of its representative and purposive identity, and in this way citizens 
forfeit much of their capacity to control policy-making through conventional electoral 
channels.” (69, italics original). The result of loss of parties’ role in democracy is that “… we 
are left with a stripped-down version of constitutional or Madisonian democracy … or other 
post-popular version of democracy … or those systems of modern governance that seek to 
combine ‘stakeholder participation’ with ‘problem-solving efficiency’” (15). 
A problem common to both Majone’s original formulation of the regulatory state and the 
depoliticisation thesis is that they tend to conflate institutional creation with its subsequent 
maintenance. But the former is crucially distinct from the latter. Based on analyses of major 
policy reforms intended to serve diffuse interests in the United States, Patashnik (2008) argues 
                                                     
2 Bawn 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999. 
3 Majone 2001; Levy and Spiller 1994. 
4 Moe 1990. 






that the successful enactment of a policy reform by no means guarantees its durability over 
time. This is because, to make such a “general interest” reform durable, it must disrupt the 
existing coalitions of vested interests while creating new ones. This insight is readily 
applicable to the context of reforms establishing regulatory institutions in Europe, especially 
because at the time of their creation these institutions were often intended to serve diffuse 
interests as opposed to concentrated, particular ones. Hence the creation of non-majoritarian 
institutions may not necessarily lead to their maintenance; the reproduction of these newly 
created institutions remains an open question.  
To be sure, delegation to bureaucrats and non-majoritarian institutions, as Patashnik claims 
(2008, 151-152), may increase the chances of reforms sustaining in the post-enactment phase. 
After all, a delegated institutional design is intended to make it more difficult for future 
politicians to remove it (cf.  Moe 1990). But this safeguard by institutional design is not 
without limits. On the contrary, the very conditions that are said to be behind the delegation to 
non-majoritarian institutions might also generate greater forces to hinder the reproduction of 
the institutions. For this is, after all, an area characterised by technical complexity that requires 
sustained investment in analytical and regulatory capacity, vested interests that politicians 
tomorrow might be tempted to be drawn to, and unpopular policies that attract blame on the 
incumbent government – all should pose significant challenges to the durability of the 
regulatory state institutions. In short, there is little theoretical reason to believe that delegated 
institutions created by reforms are automatically reproduced in the subsequent periods; the 
conditions under which that takes place must be empirically investigated rather than 
theoretically assumed.  
By examining the trajectories of drug funding policies in England and France since the late 
1980s, the present study contends that policy trajectories following institutional reforms reflect 
to a great extent past institutional and policy choices. To understand policy and institutional 
development after delegating reforms, it argues, we need to look at ways in which existing 
institutions produce forces that reinforce and undermine themselves.  
 
Drug rationing policies as a site of inquiry  
Drug funding policy provides an excellent opportunity to develop insights about the post-
reform politics of the regulatory state in Europe for two main reasons. First, it is an area where 






European countries in response to common policy challenges. Moreover, in line with the 
regulatory state thesis, in this area the establishment of regulatory institutions constituted a 
potential departure from existing governance structures – an institutional choice that some 
scholars have considered as a transition towards the “regulatory health care state” 
(Hassenteufel  and Palier 2007; cf. Moran 2003). At least until the mid-1980s, doctors had sole 
discretion over treatment choices. Rationing typically took a “hidden” form, such as “bedside 
rationing” by individual clinicians (cf. Klein 1993; Mechanic 1995). The delegation of clinical 
governance to the medical professions was underlined by their political power as a vested 
interest, which, according to some scholars, reflected historical bargains struck between the 
state and medical profession over the latter’s clinical autonomy in exchange for expanding the 
popular coverage of health care (Tuohy 1999). Another feature of traditional governance 
structures, especially in Europe, is a relatively lenient drug approval regime - a characteristic 
related to another vested interest: drug companies. In European countries, post-war drug 
approval regulation was favourable to manufacturers, especially compared to the United States, 
due to a less stringent approval process and regulatory bodies lacking expertise and 
independence from the pharmaceutical industry (Hauray 2006; Carpenter 2010, chapter 9). It 
was only after the late 1980s that this feature began changing, with the creation of the European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA, later renamed the European Medicines Agency, or 
EMA) and concomitant developments of independent approval agencies at the national level. 
Even after these developments, however, drug approval has its own limitations. It is typically 
based on randomised-controlled trials compared with placebo to demonstrate its safety, 
efficacy, and quality; once a drug obtains approval few rules and little information have existed 
to evaluate whether it is effective in real-world settings, let alone whether it is more clinically 
or cost-effective compared to other interventions. 6  With the absence of guidance and 
information, doctors have often relied on drug companies as the bases of their clinical 
judgements.7  
Reforms to establish regulatory agencies that assess the clinical and cost-effectiveness of 
drugs, and explicit decisions for drug reimbursement based on such assessments thus 
represented a potentially significant break with the traditional governance structure dominated 
                                                     
6 Scholars and practitioners alike distinguish the term efficacy, understood as “the extent to which an 
intervention does more good than harm under ideal circumstances” from effectiveness, which means 
“the extent to which an intervention does more good than harm when provided under the usual 
circumstances of health care practice”. The European Commission, 2008, 58. 






by clinicians and the pharmaceutical industry. Since the 1990s, agencies in charge of 
assessments of drugs’ benefits spread rapidly across European countries. 8  While these 
agencies vary in their missions, structures, processes, and methods, they are active at both 
national and European levels. At national level, they play a role in drug reimbursement 
decisions, informing decision-makers or making decisions. At EU level, through a network of 
the regulatory agencies, they engage in collaborative projects by identifying “best practices” 
and sharing information about methods and assessment tools.9  
The move towards agencies in drug benefit assessment was closely linked with the growing 
currency of HTA as an intellectual movement among policymakers in Europe. HTA involves 
a systematic evaluation of impacts of the use of health care technologies within health care 
systems, from medical, economic, and social perspectives.10 The agencies use various methods 
of HTA to assess a drug’s benefit, with varying analytical frameworks and criteria across 
countries. A cost-effectiveness analysis compares costs and benefits of drugs to derive a “cost-
effectiveness ratio” -- the incremental cost of an intervention with the corresponding 
incremental improvements. It thus uses economic models to evaluate the drug’s benefit. In 
addition to drug reimbursement and pricing, the agencies use HTA for other policy 
programmes, including clinical practice guidelines and public health programmes.  
Policymakers and academics alike have given several rationales behind the use of HTA for 
reimbursement decisions, all against the backdrop of rising health care costs. Indeed, while 
those advocating HTA for policy-making often attribute its origins to the US Congress’s 
Office of Technology Assessment in the early 1970s, domestic health policy debates also 
stimulated the growth of institutions dedicated to HTA in Europe .11 First, the use of HTA was 
justified on the ground of concerns about impacts of high-tech medical technologies on health 
care expenditure and about the medical practices that lacked evidence of clinical effectiveness. 
HTA was also considered to inform rationing decisions to achieve efficient resource allocation. 
Assessing “value for money” of a technology, hence, aids priority-setting to maximise 
                                                     
8 16 out of the 28 (12 out of the 15 pre-2004) EU member states had established HTA agencies by 2011. 
Löblová 2016, 257.   
9 Garrido et al. 2008, 38ff. 
10 For an overview of HTA, Sorenson et al. 2008, 3-8; Garrido et al. 2008, 31-51. A related but distinct 
intellectual movement is Evidence-based Medicines (EBM). Whereas HTA is to support decision-
making at policy level, EBM aims to support decision-making at the individual clinical level. Garrido 
2005, 3; Luce et al. 2010, 269.  






healthcare outcomes from the available resources.12 Finally, the use of HTA for rationing 
decisions was linked with the rationales for evidence-based policy-making and transparency 
in the policy-making process.13 In short, it has been widely recognised that the creation of 
regulatory agencies that use HTA for drug funding would potentially yield impacts on clinical 
practices, rationing decisions, and resource allocation.14 These potential impacts, in turn, have 
political implications – by disrupting the traditional governance structure and altering the 
power balance between the state, drug companies and clinicians. Examining policy 
development will thus shed light on conditions under which policies corresponding to the 
transition to the regulatory state reproduced or changed over time.  
Another, no less important, reason for studying battles over drug rationing is that policy 
choice in this area highlights a tension, perhaps in its starkest form, between democratic 
governments and non-majoritarian institutions, due to its core attribute: a policy choice to 
explicitly exclude drugs from reimbursement is highly unpopular. The policy choice can 
impose significant, visible losses on both powerful organised interests and the public with only 
diffuse policy benefits and beneficiaries. It is somewhat counterintuitive that a risk-averse 
democratic government chooses to make such a decision, which is not only morally 
controversial but also predictably results in real-world contestation. Moreover, while this 
unpopular nature of the policy choice should generate a stronger incentive for politicians to 
shift the blame to a regulatory agency, the same attribute may also imply that there is a 
potential for greater societal forces that put politicians under pressure to undermine the 
functioning of the regulatory institutions. Exploring the role of these countervailing forces in 
the maintenance of the regulatory institutions in this policy area will thus have wider 
implications for changes in the state-society relations after the rise of the regulatory state.  
Through the study of drug funding policies in England and France, the thesis adds to the 
nascent but emerging political science research on drug pricing and reimbursement policy – a 
subject that has been studied largely by health economists and legal scholars.15 Inspired by the 
                                                     
12 Oliver et al. 2004, 3; Sorenson et al. 2008, 6. Sorenson and Chalkidou 2012, 26. 
13 Sorenson and Chalkidou 2012, 26; Sorenson et al. 2008, 6.  
14 It should be noted that the use of HTA for efficient healthcare resource allocation is different from 
healthcare cost-containment. Deciding to include a treatment that proves cost-effective to the health 
care system may in fact lead to increase in the health care expenditure. Cf. Sorenson and Chalkidou 
2012, 39.  
15 For health economist works that give overviews of drug pricing and reimbursement policies as well 
as HTA in Europe, e.g. Jacobzone 2000; Mossialos, et al. 2004; Sorenson et al. 2008; Kanavos 2011. 
For legal analyses on drug rationing, Syrett 2007. For a notable exception of earlier political science 






proliferation of agencies in charge of HTA, in recent years political scientists are beginning to 
study HTA agencies, which have thus far largely revolved around two issues. A first concern 
is the creation and design of HTA agencies (Landwehr and Böhm 2011). Löblová (2016, 2018) 
highlights the role (and limits) of local epistemic communities in the creation of HTA agencies 
in Central and East European countries. Another is HTA’s knowledge dimension, such as the 
approach and methods used by the agencies. Benoit (2016) shows how the English and French 
states incorporated regulatory concepts originated from outside the state, affecting private 
actors’ practices. By and large, scholars have found continued cross-national diversity in both 
institutions and approach of HTA despite the common pressures that facilitated policy 
diffusion and learning (cf. Klinger et al. 2013; Wright et al. 2017; Hassenteufel et al. 2017).16  
This study seeks to contribute to the literature by focusing on a different aspect. It brings 
distributive struggles over rationing decisions after the creation of agencies to the forefront of 
the analysis. In the end, what makes HTA controversial is less about the knowledge per se than 
how it is used. From the vantage point of the loss-imposing nature of rationing decisions, the 
present study emphasises political contestations over the use of HTA for these decisions. 
Rooted in the very institutional arrangements around HTA agencies, the thesis will show, these 
political contestations have driven drug funding policy development.  
   
The argument in brief 
This study proposes that policy trajectories after regulatory reforms depend on the locus of 
decision-making over drug funding. I argue that the degree to which elected officials are 
excluded from the decision-making – which I shall call political insulation – has major 
implications for the trajectories. Political insulation matters for subsequent policy 
development because it affects policymakers’ ability to make policy choices that impose losses 
on societal actors. These different policy choices, in turn, structure forms of political conflicts, 
including actors’ strategies for mobilisation and the arenas in which conflicts are mediated. 
The varying forms of conflicts, then, affect the persistence of existing policies. By creating its 
own political dynamics, political insulation thus shapes post-reform policy development.  
                                                     
16  On the continuing divergence of drug pricing and reimbursement as well as HTA despite 
Europeanised drug approval regulation, Permanand 2006; Smith 2016, Ch4; see also Hauray 2006 for 
drug approval regulation. On the EU-level HTA regulatory network, Böhm and Landwehr 2014; Greer 






The process that links political insulation with later policy development operates in 
different settings. A high politically-insulated setting enables policymakers to produce policy 
outputs that would otherwise have been too unpopular to enact. But the policy choices create 
a greater magnitude of counter-mobilisation in the public arena, creating an impetus for policy 
change. By contrast, a low politically-insulated setting allows elected officials to avoid making 
costly policy choices. By blocking the opportunity for expanding political conflicts, the policy 
choices contribute to policy continuity.  
The study develops these arguments based on the study of drug funding policies in England 
and France. In England, the establishment in the late 1990s of a regulatory agency assessing 
clinical and cost-effectiveness of drugs created a locus of decision-making highly insulated 
from politicians, with the agency’s recommendation directly becoming a final policy decision 
for the National Health Service (NHS). This institutional arrangement enabled English 
policymakers to produce more decisions to not fund drugs that the regulator judged not cost-
effective. During the 2000s, however, while the agency adhered to the existing policy 
orientation, there was a gradual expansion of policy that allowed for greater flexibility in 
funding that applied to particular types of drugs. The partial policy change occurred through 
various instruments, including a greater use of faster regulatory assessment processes, specific 
regulatory criteria and pricing mechanisms to allow for greater flexibility in assessment of 
drugs for end-of-life care, and perhaps most notably, a specialised fund applied to the cancer 
drugs rejected by the regulator.  
In France, whereas an expert committee, later reorganised into an independent regulatory 
agency in the early 2000s, assessed clinical effectiveness of drugs, it remained the health 
minister who made the final decision on whether a drug should be reimbursed by the national 
health insurance body. This institutional arrangement with low political insulation enabled 
ministers to selectively refuse to follow the regulator’s negative advice, still reimbursing the 
drugs that experts judged not effective. The government used various tactics to avoid total 
exclusion of these drugs from reimbursement, including price reduction, incremental or partial 
reduction of the reimbursement rate and the creation of a new reimbursement rate. It also 
extensively used pricing control to rationalise resource allocation, where traditionally the 
government has held a strong power over the pharmaceutical industry. Policy continuity over 
drug funding largely persisted despite repeated unsuccessful attempts to change the 
reimbursement criteria and despite a major drug scandal which was itself a partial by-product 






These developments had significant (re-)distributional implications. In England, while 
regulatory decisions were driven by rational resource allocation, by allowing flexibility for a 
particular type of drugs the state partially redistributed resources between different groups of 
patients, prioritising some over others based on political considerations. In France, by 
adjusting the reimbursement rate of, or totally de-reimbursing, some drugs while still funding 
others based on political decisions, and by extensively using pricing control as a tool for 
resource allocation, the state has managed to partially shift the costs of policy adjustment to 
both the pharmaceutical industry and the supplementary insurers as well as patients themselves.  
In both cases, distinct political dynamics produced by different institutional arrangements 
have been highly consequential to policy development. For England, this study shows how 
negative policy choices in a highly-insulated locus of decision triggered a broader counter-
mobilisation involving the public and legislative arenas, leading to a partial policy change; 
how and why the partial policy change applied to a particular area, such as cancer drugs, but 
not others; and how the counter-mobilisation ultimately ended up with a “bounded” policy 
change rather than a full-scale reversal, due to the resistance of actors whose positions are also 
shaped by existing institutions. For France, this study shows how in a less-insulated 
institutional setting, ministers who worried about costly consequences of their policy choices 
avoided de-reimbursing the drugs that experts judged clinically ineffective; and how elected 
officials and civil servants prevented repeated attempts at policy changes that would have 
enabled more rationing decisions. These policymakers’ attempts to minimise the possibility 
for rationing decisions facilitated policy continuity, while they tackled fiscal challenges by 
using pricing control as a tool for resource allocation.  
In examining the driving forces of post-reform drug funding politics, the study draws on 
the historical institutionalist literature on endogenous change (Streeck and Thelen 2005; 
Mahoney and Thelen 2010) – a literature that has been separated from studies on the regulatory 
politics. While this study is broadly resonant with the historical institutionalist idea that 
emphasises ways in which institutional reproduction and change take place through its 
distributive consequences, the current literature does not necessarily provide fully-developed 
hypotheses that are specific enough to be systematically tested against the post-regulatory 
reform politics. The study therefore inductively develops propositions that are testable in other 
country settings and policy domains. In fact, one of the contributions that the study seeks to 
make is to examine an underexplored role of political insulation in endogenous development, 







Why England and France? 
This study uses comparative case studies and process tracing to develop arguments about 
the role of political insulation in post-reform policy development. It takes up England and 
France as country cases to examine in detail.17 I have chosen to study these countries based on 
their similarities in a number of respects, on the one hand, and differences in institutional 
structures around drug funding policy, on the other. First, the two countries share several 
background conditions that have put them under pressure regarding drug funding. Both are 
developed democracies with similar demographic trends.18 Moreover, with the establishment 
in 1995 of the EMEA, the drug approval regulator at EU level, the approval process of 
“innovative” medicines was partially centralised, giving the same drugs approval across 
member states. These common characteristics allow me to hold both demographic changes 
and new medical technologies – two major sources of challenges for the health care state – 
largely constant. Second, despite the different public health care financing models (health 
service in England and health insurance in France), in both countries the state has determined 
whether a drug should be covered by public health care systems. Policymakers in both 
countries thus have held the responsibility – or else the blame – for making a drug available 
through the public health care systems. Third, in response to the drug funding challenge, in 
the 1990s and early 2000s both countries reformed their drug pricing and reimbursement 
decision-making process, including setting up or reorganising a regulatory agency or expert 
committees that assess the clinical or cost-effectiveness of drugs. The UK is generally seen 
both as a frontrunner and as a paradigmatic case for the regulatory state thesis (cf. Moran 2003). 
In France, the establishment of the independent regulatory agency in this policy area was 
considered as a convergence towards the regulatory state model in Britain, reflecting a wider 
trend in countries with Bismarckian health care regimes (Hassenteufel and Palier 2007). 
Policymakers in France have, in fact, often made an explicit reference to the English 
experience, both as a model and for lessons to draw from.  
Despite these similarities, the two countries followed divergent trajectories in terms of both 
policy choices over drug funding and subsequent policy continuity. Using variations in sector-
                                                     
17 Due to the jurisdiction of the National Health Service the thesis focuses on England instead of UK. 
18 The share of persons >65yo in the total population (2016): 17.9% (UK), 18.8 % (FR), EU-28 average= 
19.2%; Life expectancy at birth for total population (2015): 81.0 (UK), 82.4 (FR), EU-28 average= 80.9. 






level institutional arrangements around drug funding policy, the study develops arguments 
about how the different institutional structures affect the divergent trajectories.  
An additional methodological merit of studying England and France is based on the fact 
that both countries are located at a stronger end of the spectrum among advanced democracies 
in terms of the degree of executive dominance (cf. Lijphardt 2012). This macro-institutional 
characteristic provides a useful opportunity to develop hypotheses on political dynamics 
involving loss imposition on organised interests and the public, because it is a less favourable 
environment for them to effectively mobilise against state actions. The constitutional structure 
of the French Fifth Republic was famously designed to grant strong powers to the executive 
while deliberately making the powers of the legislative branch weak (cf. Knapp and Wright 
2006, 53f). The French executive branch is known to hold strong powers not only in relation 
to its legislative counterpart but also to societal actors. It is often seen as a paradigmatic case 
of the “strong state” with unilateral state intervention and weak societal inputs (e.g. Levy 1999). 
For its part, the UK is widely regarded as the birthplace of the “Westminster model”, with 
strong executive and weak legislative powers – a feature reinforced by strong party discipline 
and majoritarian electoral rules (e.g. Finer 1975; Dunleavy 2006 cf. Flinders 2005).19 The 
concentration of executive powers in the two countries implies that these are cases where the 
state is more likely to be able to impose its preferences upon societal actors. If we see political 
accommodation of societal interests even in such institutional settings, then we should observe 
similar dynamics in other settings as well. 
Some readers may feel that these two countries are so different from each other at the 
starting point, in terms of rationing as a policy problem inherent in the respective health care 
system, that a meaningful comparison is impossible. They might think, for instance, that with 
a traditionally smaller pharmaceutical spending per capita,20 drug rationing could be a policy 
problem in England but not in France. In this view, the observed variation in political dynamics 
in the post-reform period would simply reflect the prior nature and the intensity of the policy 
problem and be unrelated to institutional structures created by the reforms. To consider this 
potential objection, in Chapters 2 and 3 I briefly look at the history of health care funding 
                                                     
19 Note that this description is about formal, constitutional structures at macro level. There has been a 
long debate over actual characteristics of the pattern of policymaking and governance structures 
especially at meso-level in both Britain and France.  
20 The 2015 retail pharmaceutical expenditure capita (including both prescription and over-the-counter 
medicines): $497(UK), $637(FR) (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 







policy of the two countries prior to the procedural reforms in the 1990s. As these chapters will 
show, both countries had a history of policy measures that explicitly excluded drugs from 
health care coverage, and in both countries such measures were widely seen as an unpopular 
policy that could threaten incumbent governments. Rather than confronting qualitatively 
different policy problems, the two countries have been faced with a similar challenge but 
responded in different ways.  
The analysis for each country begins with the late 1980s and ends with the mid-2010s 
(around 2016). The starting point of the analysis is when, in both countries, the policy debates 
that would result in major institutional reforms of their drug funding processes in the 1990s 
began in earnest, together with some background analysis of earlier post-war decades. The 
study explores the emergence of reforms to establish regulatory institutions in the 1990s and 
in the 2000s, followed by examination of the post-reform period, with the analyses ending in 
the mid-2010s. The length of the time period covered in this study is designed to enable me to 
examine mid-term political dynamics and policy and institutional development, which tended 
to be missed out in analyses focusing solely on individual regulatory choices or policymaking 
processes over a shorter period.  
 
A roadmap of the thesis  
The next chapter sets out an analytical framework to examine political struggles following 
the establishment of the regulatory state institutions. It describes how different levels of 
political insulation affect forms of political conflicts, such as political actors’ strategies for 
mobilisations and the different arenas in which political conflicts are mediated; and how the 
conflicts in turn shape policy trajectories. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the emergence of 
institutional structures with different levels of political insulation. They give a brief description 
of each country’s post-war institutional structure and actor constellation as well as their 
coalitions. In doing so, they situate the policy debates and political struggles that gave rise to 
the regulatory state institutions in their deeper institutional contexts. By describing policy 
development around the emergence of different degrees of political insulation, they establish 
varied institutional and policy strategies for tackling an unpopular policy such as rationing.  
The following four chapters then examine the consequences of the different institutional 
structures. Through comparative analysis and process tracing, they show how different levels 






funding policies over time. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the post-reform trajectory in England. 
Chapter 4 shows how the institutional structure with a high level of political insulation, while 
enabling politically costly decisions, later led to a partial policy reversal by provoking a greater 
counter-mobilisation channelled through public and electoral arenas. Chapter 5 then 
demonstrates how policymakers nevertheless did not achieve a fuller policy reversal. Chapters 
6 and 7 look at the French trajectory after institutional reforms with low political insulation. 
Chapter 6 zooms in onto ministers’ policy choices about whether to follow expert opinions 
about a drug’s clinical benefit, showing that how the anticipated political costs associated with 
exclusion of drugs informed ministers’ choices to avoid politically costly decisions. Chapter 
7 then looks at the broader political struggles over changing rules governing the expert 
opinions. Here again, the potential of politically costly choices discouraged elected officials 
from enacting reforms; instead of changing rules that might enable more politically costly 
choices, the government kept tackling the drug provision dilemma largely through existing 
instruments, such as pricing control, containing conflicts within the existing organised 
channels. Together, these two chapters show the role of low political insulation in policy 
continuity.  
Chapter 8 puts together empirical findings and discusses theoretical implications for the 
scholarship of both the regulatory politics and endogenous development. The thesis ends with 
wider implications of the study’s findings for debates about regulatory reforms, 







Chapter 1 Studying political dynamics in the post-reform period: An analytical 
framework   
 
The proliferation of regulatory agencies in Europe over the past few decades is considered 
significant as it indicates larger changes in state-society relations. As set out in the Introduction, 
however, whereas regulatory agencies occupy a central place in this “regulatory state” thesis, 
scholars to date have not paid enough attention to the processes through which policies 
accompanying the creation of agencies evolve over time. The present thesis addresses this gap 
through the study of drug funding policy in England and France – a policy that, as the 
regulatory state thesis argues, might lead to disruption of the existing governance structure and 
that, due to rationing decisions’ highly unpopular nature, highlights tensions between non-
majoritarian institutions and democratic politics. The thesis examines how institutional 
structures created by regulatory reforms can reinforce or undermine their accompanying 
policies. It thus studies endogenous drivers of post-reform policy development. 
This chapter presents an analytical framework for understanding the post-reform 
trajectories of drug funding policy. It looks at how institutional arrangements around this 
policy shape political dynamics; and how these, in turn, affect policy development. The 
argument is that policy durability after a regulatory reform depends greatly on the locus of 
decision-making over drug funding. Specifically, this study suggests that political insulation, 
namely, the extent to which elected officials are excluded from decision-making, has major 
implications for subsequent trajectories by creating its own political dynamics. The chapter 
considers how different levels of political insulation affect policy choices; and how the 
different policy choices generate subsequent mobilisation over policy change.  
The analytical framework builds on the literatures on regulatory politics and on the 
historical institutionalist analysis of endogenous change –two scholarships that have been 
largely separate from each other. Regarding the scholarship on regulatory politics, through its 
inquiry into the post-reform political dynamics this study engages with a key argument of the 
regulatory state thesis in Europe, that is, the proliferation of regulatory agencies is part of a 
larger transformation in state-society relations. It advances the notion of political insulation – 
a notion that departs from the literature’s conventional focus on a regulator’s independence -- 
and explores its implications for post-reform policy development. Regarding the endogenous 
change literature, I build on its emphasis on the role of underlying coalitions to address the 






institutionalist ideas about the role of past policy choices and of arenas in political conflict to 
explore post-reform political dynamics.  
The chapter proceeds in five steps. First, it presents the main interest of the study: 
development of drug funding policy after regulatory reforms. I provide a conceptual definition 
of an explicit drug rationing strategy, and set out how I empirically assess its occurrence. 
Second, the chapter discusses the locus of decision-making over drug funding. I provide the 
notion of political insulation, and how it is different from the delegation literature’s 
conventional focus on the regulator’s independence. Third, I present an analytical framework 
for the study of endogenous policy development after regulatory reforms. The focus is on how 
political insulation generates forces for both policy durability and change, by structuring the 
power balance between political actors’ coalitions. The fourth section discusses methods and 
sources used for the empirical research, followed by conclusions in the fifth section. 
 
1.  The outcomes of interest: The post-reform trajectories of drug rationing policies 
In this thesis drug funding policy refers to government policies for covering (parts of) the 
cost of pharmaceutical products by public health care systems, regardless of whether they are 
a general tax-funded health service, which directly delivers reimbursable treatments, or a 
contribution-based health insurance, which reimburses their costs. 21  By policies, I mean 
written rules (i.e. formal rules and informal guidelines) as well as decisions on individual drugs 
based on these rules. 
The thesis’s analytical focus is on explicit drug rationing strategy– a policy strategy that 
can be understood here as an explicit decision or non-decision by a public policy-making body 
to limit the usage of a particular drug via the public healthcare system compared to the scope 
of approved usage. This is a somewhat peculiar definition of drug rationing, based on the 
present study’s focus on the consequences of setting up regulatory agencies, and several 
clarifications are in order. First, rationing takes various forms and methods, and analyses in 
this thesis are centred on one particular form: an “explicit” form of rationing, that is, a rationing 
decision made by public authorities. It does not look in detail at an “implicit” form of rationing, 
where decisions to restrict treatments are not publicly discussed and are typically made by 
                                                     







medical professionals. Examples of such rationing may include “bedside rationing” where 
individual clinicians choose either not to use specific treatments or to substitute them with 
cheaper or less intense treatments, and rationing by delay through waiting lists for specialist 
appointments (cf. Klein 1993; Mechanic 1995). The focus on explicit rationing does not mean 
that I do not consider implicit rationing important – far from it; as set out in the Introduction, 
setting up regulatory agencies assessing a drug’s benefit meant a potential departure from the 
traditional governance structure precisely because they replaced a clinician-centred implicit 
rationing with an explicit one. Rather, the focus on explicit rationing reflects this study’s 
central concern with the consequences of the creation of regulatory agencies -- and the 
concomitant shift in institutional structure that enables explicit rationing strategies. To further 
narrow down the focus, this thesis examines rationing of on-patent medicines; generic 
medicines are not examined, as the institutional arrangements for these drugs involve a 
different set of regulatory processes and actors.    
Second, this study looks at a regulatory decision over funding a drug that comes after its 
approval. It uses the scope granted at drug approval as the “baseline” of drug usage and 
considers explicit rationing strategy as restriction compared to that scope. Before a new drug 
or a new indication of an existing drug enters a jurisdiction, a drug approval agency within the 
jurisdiction must grant an approval (“marketing authorisation”) based on the drug’s safety, 
efficacy, and quality. 22  When an explicit rationing strategy is available to policymakers, 
however, the approval of the drug does not automatically mean that the healthcare system will 
cover the cost of the drug for all the publicly insured population in the jurisdiction. Based on 
the assessment of a regulatory agency or expert committee – usually a different body to the 
drug approval regulator -- about the drug’s clinical or cost-effectiveness, policymakers might 
decide to limit its usage. Such a restriction can take place through either the breadth of 
population covered by funding – the drug will then be reimbursable for a certain patient 
subpopulation but not others -- or the proportion of costs covered by the public health system 
– i.e. refusal to cover the cost of the drug altogether or a change in the healthcare system’s 
reimbursement rate.23 Another form of explicit rationing strategy is the time lag caused by 
                                                     
22 In the UK, the term “licensing” is often used to describe marketing authorisation. The narrative of the 
thesis (especially the chapters on the English case) uses approval, “marketing authorisation, and 
licensing of a drug interchangeably.  
23 In addition to denying funding of a technology or changing its reimbursement rate, policymakers can 






non-decision of a regulator – the delay that is to do with the agency’s role as a gatekeeper of 
a product’s market entry.24 The reimbursement regulator may put the drug into the assessment 
process but not make a timely decision. In such a case, even after the drug approval agency 
has licensed a drug, patients are not able to access it through the public healthcare system until 
the reimbursement regulator concludes its judgement.  
Third, it is worth noting that although explicit rationing decisions affect the availability of 
drugs, they are hardly equal. Crucially, the absence of an explicit rationing decision for a drug 
does not mean that the drug will be available via the given public healthcare system. Even if 
policymakers decide to include a drug on the reimbursement list, the actual availability of the 
drug is determined by several other factors, including delays in implementation, local-level 
funding decisions, and implicit rationing mentioned above. The thesis focuses on the explicit 
decision by policymakers and does not examine the problem of drugs’ availability.    
The outcomes that the present study examines are the development – both continuity and 
change – of drug funding policy after regulatory reforms, in terms of the occurrence of explicit 
rationing strategies. Temporal variation in the occurrence is assessed in two main ways. First, 
it looks at the introduction and use of rules about drug funding – criteria that define what kinds 
of drug should be funded or excluded by public healthcare systems. This study looks at not 
only the adoption of rules but how policymakers apply them in practice. The latter is necessary, 
because given the unpopular nature of an explicit rationing strategy using rules for decision in 
practice can be a major site of political struggles. Second, this study examines the adoption 
and use of policy instruments that are designed to change the application of drug funding rules 
to an explicit rationing strategy. The multiple policy instruments and processes involved in 
drug funding means that policymakers can use instruments other than those directly related to 
drug funding to manipulate the occurrence of explicit rationing strategies. For example, even 
if the application of funding criteria would have otherwise led to an explicit rationing decision, 
policymakers might change the terms of drug pricing to avoid its occurrence. In this case, as 
the intervention takes place in a way that is interlinked with but outside of the process of drug 
funding decisions, the application of drug funding rules alone cannot correctly assess the 
occurrence of explicit rationing strategies. In either case, the analytical aim to examine the 
                                                     
As such a user charge is not within the remit of the regulatory agencies both in England and France, it 
is outside the scope of analysis. 
24 This issue is well-documented in approval regulation. For a theory of regulator as a gatekeeper and 






occurrence of explicit rationing strategies reflect this study’s interests in the final policy 
products that are to be imposed on society; after all, the hallmark of political struggles over 
rationing is whether policymakers can decide to impose it or not.  
 
2.  The locus of decision over drug funding: The concept of political insulation 
An inquiry into the post-reform policy trajectories involves a rethinking of the premises 
behind regulatory reforms. As the Introduction noted, the regulatory state thesis argues that 
the growth of regulatory agencies is a key part of larger transformations in the governance 
structure that link the state with society. (Majone 1997). Yet, although the proliferation of 
regulatory agencies constitutes a core indicator of the regulatory state thesis, it does not specify 
much about the processes that link the creation of agencies to the wider shifts in state-society 
relations. Instead, such a transformation is functionally assumed, following the perceived 
failure of the existing “positive” state and the creation of agencies that are supposed to replace 
functions of the state apparatus. The agencies are also assumed to have possessed the qualities 
that constitute the state-society relations in the regulatory state from the beginning, such as 
expertise and rule enforcement—an assumption that warrants a fuller empirical scrutiny. 
Moreover, as I shall argue in this section, the principal-agent framework of delegation – a 
dominant approach to the creation of an agency and hence closely intertwined with the 
regulatory state thesis – fails to fully capture the process of the post-reform dynamics either. 
To address these gaps, this thesis will clarify the process through which the institutional 
features created by regulatory reforms endogenously affect the subsequent policy development. 
As a first step towards such an inquiry, this section argues that, instead of taking a somewhat 
narrow focus on the independence-control dilemma that characterises much of the principal-
agent framework of delegation, there is merit in looking at the wider institutional structures 
that allocate powers among political actors.  
In understanding the regulatory state thesis in Europe and delegating reforms to agencies, 
the principal-agent framework of delegation offers a good starting point. Rooted in its core 
concern of the democratic control of unelected officials, both the US-based and the more recent 
European literatures typically consider the creation of regulatory agencies through the lens of 
principal-agent relations, where the principal – an elected politicians – delegates tasks to the 
agent – a regulatory agency (For the US-based literature, e.g. McCubbins et al. 1987; Epstein 






Stone Sweet 2002; Gilardi 2009). The formal independence of the agency from elected 
officials, understood as the amount of discretion granted to the agency by the elected 
politicians, constitutes a crucial component of delegation. 25  When delegating tasks to a 
regulatory agency, elected politicians are concerned about the loss of political control, as the 
agency may develop its own preferences that differ from those of the politicians – a problem 
known as “bureaucratic drift”. To tackle this loss, politicians can design the agency’s legal 
structures that define the level of discretion given to the agency; they can also devise various 
mechanisms to monitor and control the agency’s behaviour so that the agency fulfils the 
original mandate behind its creation (McCubbins et al. 1987, 1989).  
The principal-agent framework of delegation has also proposed determinants of the level 
of formal independence given to regulatory agencies, which is linked to the rationales behind 
delegation. A major account emphasises the technical complexity of the issue. Bawn (1995), 
for instance, argues that in designing an agency’s independence, politicians trade political 
control of the agency for its expertise. While the higher independence of the agency leads to a 
better application of its expertise, it is also more likely to result in bureaucratic drift. In a 
technically complex issue, politicians give more independence to the agency, because they are 
more willing to benefit from the agency’s expertise at the expense of control over the agency’s 
behaviours. 26  Another prominent reasoning behind delegation is to enhance credible 
commitment. The credibility problem arises when politicians promise a long-term policy goal 
that is beneficial to society. Because politicians tomorrow may have different preferences from 
the present ones, their intention to commit to the goal is not credible. Delegating powers to an 
independent agency separate from the government, according to this view, alleviates the 
credibility problem – a motivation that often takes the metaphor of the principal “tying their 
own hands”. 27 Credible commitment is considered important in regulatory policy not only 
because of the benefit for constituencies but also because of the necessity to attract private 
investment (Levy and Spiller 1994). Third, scholars have argued that the government delegates 
                                                     
25 This understanding of formal independence as referring to discretion follows that of Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1994; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002; Hanretty and Koop 2012. It should be noted that 
scholars commonly distinguish formal independence from actual independence (Cukierman  et al. 1992; 
Maggetti 2012). The latter can be conceived of as an agency’s ability to “carry on their regulatory action 
without constraints within the limits of their mandate” (Maggetti 2012, 39). To avoid confusion, in this 
thesis I use the term “autonomy” to refer to actual independence.     
26 For a similar argument emphasising benefits from the agency’s expertise, Epstein and O’Halloran 
1994. 
27 The credibility-based theory of delegation is first developed in the literature of central banking. See 






powers to a regulatory agency to shift the blame for negative policy outcomes (Fiorina 1982; 
Weaver 1986; Hood 2002). Weaver (1986), for instance, claims that politicians care more 
about blame resulting from negative policy outcomes than credit from positive ones. Rooted 
in the “negativity bias” of voters, he argues, the motivation of politicians to avoid blame leads 
them to delegate more responsibility. Empirical works on both US and European regulation 
have investigated the validity of these different theories.28 
The impact of the delegation theories on studies of regulatory politics cannot be 
exaggerated. They offer powerful propositions about why formal features of regulation exist 
as they do. This thesis, by examining the trajectories after creation -- rather than creation and 
design – of delegated bodies, has a different focus from the delegation literature; at a more 
fundamental level, as later discussions shall show, by emphasising power-distributional 
implications of institutions, my analytical framework rests on a different foundation from 
much of the delegation literature’s functional, equilibrium-based ones. Notwithstanding these 
major differences, the analysis to follow is still consistent with some of the insight of the 
delegation theories. It draws on the idea that elected politicians consider the (perceived) cost 
and benefit of regulation in making policy choices. Specifically, this study looks at how 
politicians’ blame-avoidance motivation can shape their strategic behaviours. 
Nevertheless, the principal-agent framework’s focus on formal independence of the agency 
– and its underlying concern about the independence-control trade-off -- is perhaps less helpful 
in understanding trajectories after regulatory reforms than to interpret the statutory features of 
regulation. Part of the problem is conceptual. In measuring regulatory agencies’ formal 
independence, scholars typically equate the level of delegation to the amount of the agency’s 
discretion -- i.e. the formal ability of the agency to act without political interference -- and use 
the latter to capture the degree of formal independence. The problem is that, as Hanretty and 
Koop (2012, 202-203) have pointed out, scholars tend to conflate the amount of discretion 
with the range of competence or powers of a regulatory agency.29 But the two are conceptually 
distinct. A highly independent agency which produces its outputs without political interference 
                                                     
28 For Europe-based empirical works, e.g. Gilardi 2002, 2005; Elgie and McMenamin 2005; Elgie 2006; 
Wonka and Rittberger 2010.   
29 This conceptual conflation of discretion with competence results in a measurement issue. For instance, 
Cukierman et al.1992 ’s influential index of central bank independence uses indicators describing both 
the central bank’s discretion (appointment rules, budgeting etc.) and its regulatory competence. Building 
on this index, indices on the regulatory agency’s independence used by Gilardi 2002, Wonka and 
Rittberger 2010 and others also includes indicators on both discretion and competence to measure an 






can have few powers, where its outputs may have little impact on the final product of public 
policy. Conversely, it is also possible that an agency has little formal discretion, but the outputs 
it produces will have legally-binding powers.  
The distinction of discretion with powers is also theoretically important. Indeed, some of 
the rationales behind delegation that scholars have proposed seem to be applicable only in a 
setting where regulatory agencies have substantial competence or powers. For instance, an 
agency cannot be a device of credible commitment if the agency’s outputs can easily be 
overridden. Likewise, shifting the blame of policy outcomes to a regulatory agency can be a 
meaningful strategy only when that decision is attributable to the agency -- a condition that is 
unlikely to be met, again, if the agency does not have the powers to decide. To be sure, theorists 
of delegation are hardly unaware of this distinction. Majone (2001) hence stressed that 
delegation as a commitment device follows a logic that is quite different from delegation based 
on expertise. For him, the principal-agent logic of delegation and control is not relevant to the 
commitment-based delegation. For, in the former the principal designs control mechanisms to 
align the agent’s preferences with his/her own. An agent who follows the principal’s 
preferences, however, does not make the principal’s commitment credible. A credibility-based 
delegation, he argued, involves an irrevocable transfer of the principal’s “political property 
rights” (cf. Moe 1990) in a given policy issue to the delegate. In contrast with aligning the 
agent’s preferences with the principals through control mechanisms, in the case of credibility-
based delegation, the delegate – or what he terms “trustee” – has different preferences from 
the principal and the powers to decide and implement her preferred policy. 30  Yet, the 
subsequent empirical application of delegation theories to regulatory policy does not clearly 
differentiate the situations involving the trustee from the ones involving the agent.31  
                                                     
30 Scholars of monetary policy have long recognised this problem of revocability of a central bank’s 
decisions. Keefer and Stasavage 2003, for instance, argued that the presence of an independent central 
bank can enhance credibility (i.e. reduce inflation) only in a political system with multiple veto points 
and polarised veto players that can limit policy reversal. See also Lohmann 1998. 
31 For instance, in an agenda-setting article on delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in Europe, 
Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002) acknowledge distinction between trustee and agent, by citing the 
Majone argument mentioned above, but fail to differentiate discretion from powers or competence. As 
a result, while they point out, following Majone, that the same actor (such as the European Commission) 
can act more as a trustee in some situations while acting more as an agent in others, they conclude, “the 
problem  of  knowing  how  to  identify  the  exact  point,  along  any  given spectrum that arrays various 
forms of delegation, the agent is more properly theorised as a trustee has not been resolved” (7). Yet, if 
we distinguish powers with discretion, the trustee situations seem to be more related to the delegate’s 
powers than to its discretion. Indeed, many of the examples they cite as a trustee situation (e.g. some 
constitutional courts and independent central banks) seems to be related to the competence of the 






Considering powers allocated to the agency as a matter distinct from that of discretion (or 
formal independence) has major implications for the present inquiry into the trajectories after 
regulatory reforms. After all, it is the former that defines the final product of policy decision 
that imposes a loss on society. As a later part of this chapter shall discuss, the loss imposition 
by policy decisions inspires subsequent mobilisation for and against the decisions. The 
political actions triggered by regulatory decisions hence affect the political dynamics to follow, 
shaping policy trajectories over time. Examining endogenous roles of institutional 
arrangements in later policy development thus calls our attention to the structural features that 
differ from the independence of a regulator. At the same time, paying attention to the powers 
given to the agency in a given policy task also means that we no longer have to follow the 
principal-agent framework’s underlying assumption of hierarchy between the principal and 
the agent, where the former allows discretion of, and exercises control over, the latter. What 
matters instead are how the powers are allocated among political actors, be they agencies or 
politicians, and where the decision takes place in a given policy issue. In short, an inquiry into 
the post-reform trajectories involves reframing the underlying questions that have shaped 
studies of delegation to regulatory agencies.  
Building on this discussion, this study explores how the allocation of powers among actors 
over decision-making affects policy development after the creation of regulatory agencies. 
Specifically, based on the study of drug funding policy in England and France, the thesis 
proposes that the post-reform policy continuity hinges on the extent to which elected 
politicians are excluded from decision-making over a given issue – a variation that is here 
called political insulation. The question of where decision-making takes place is of 
fundamental importance in defining political conflicts after regulatory reforms. The degree of 
political insulation deserves special attention because of the core feature of explicit drug 
rationing strategies that imposes losses on different societal actors. As the discussions to 
follow shall detail, political insulation not only defines the ability of policymakers to enact an 
unpopular policy but also has significant implications for subsequent political dynamics and 
policy development.  
The level of political insulation varies across institutional settings. As a parameter of the 
decision-making locus, it defines the roles of different political actors who share the public 
decision-making process for a given issue. Of particular importance in distinguishing different 
levels of political insulation is the role of the elected official in the decision-making process. 
On the one hand, in a setting with high political insulation, elected officials have no say on 






benefit, it is the agency that decides on drug funding. The agency’s outputs, once concluded, 
become decisions and are non-revocable by elected officials. On the other hand, where 
political insulation is low, elected officials hold the decision-making powers over drug funding. 
In such a setting, even after the creation of a regulatory agency, the agency’s outputs do not 
mean policy decisions; instead, elected officials have decision-making powers in their hands. 
Low political insulation may in practice involve different procedural arrangements, such as 
where an agency’s outputs have an “advisory” or “informal” status, or the formal legally-
binding powers rest with the minister. In either case, however, the agency’s outputs can be 
overridden by elected politicians. The varied levels of political insulation thus make major 
differences to the powers left in the hands of elected politicians in a given decision-making 
after the creation of a regulatory agency. 
By exploring the role of the political insulation of a decision-making locus in shaping the 
post-reform trajectories, this study thus departs from the principal-agent framework’s focus 
on the political independence of the regulator. In doing so, it makes a concomitant shift in the 
analytical interest from political control of the independent agency to the locus of the authority 
in a broader institutional landscape that defines a given policy issue. The central question is 
not whether a regulator can act independently from politicians, or whether politicians can 
control the regulator’s actions. Rather, paying attention to the locus of decision brings us to 
different questions -- where the decision takes place, who has the powers to decide, to what 
extent elected politicians are excluded from the decision-making. This study looks at 
institutional arrangements that structure the process of regulatory policy-making – the 
constellation of actors involved in the chain of the regulatory policy-making process, and the 
institutionalised allocation of powers among them.  
To some extent, this emphasis on the locus of authorities is consistent with some of the 
earlier works of European regulatory politics and political economy before the delegation 
theory became dominant. In particular, the metaphor of “space” draws attention to the 
allocation of authority among actors who are its partial occupants, and interdependence and 
bargaining among them. Crouch (1986) uses the term “political space” to describe how 
political struggles over authority – such as the destruction of guilds and the monopoly of 
legitimate authority by the parliamentary state -- affected the subsequent allocation of public 
authorities between the state and organised interests. Crouch’s metaphor of space was 
converted by some regulatory politics scholars, such as Hancher and Moran (1989), to portray 
the interdependence of political actors who fill up the “regulatory space” – “the range of 






my approach from the principal-agent framework. Unlike that framework, where actors’ 
relations are pre-determined and hierarchical, paying attention to the allocation of powers 
points to dynamic elements that emerge from power struggles at a particular point in history. 
Just like the modern state replaced guilds’ authority, the hallmark of the regulatory state thesis 
is its possibility for non-majoritarian institutions to replace the authority previously held by 
organised interests -- such as doctors in healthcare rationing.  
The preceding discussions on the discretion and powers of a regulatory agency also point 
to a broader issue that is relevant to this study of the post-reform political dynamics -- that is, 
the possibility of changing political coalitions in the post-reform phase. The delegation 
theories, again, offer a useful starting point. As described above, scholars of credible 
commitment begin with the idea that the principals tomorrow will have different preferences 
from the ones today. This temporal variation is partly due to the uncertainty inherent in politics, 
where the “enacting coalition” who set up the agency will be replaced by their successors (cf. 
Moe 1990). Even without the turnover, however, tomorrow’s politicians may be inclined to 
short-term interests despite their own commitment to the long-term policy goal today – a 
problem known as time-inconsistent preferences. In either case, scholars argued, there can be 
a shift away from the preferences of the enacting coalition behind institutional creation -- or 
what is called “coalitional drift” (Shepsle 1992; Horn and Shepsle 1989). These scholars 
pointed out that mechanisms of political control in the standard principal-agent model actually 
exacerbate coalitional drift. In this sense, as Shepsle (1992) suggested, there is a trade-off 
between bureaucratic drift and coalitional drift.  
These claims about coalitional drift highlight a potential source of the post-enactment 
political dynamics and policy development. To be sure, reflecting its functional understanding 
of institutions – an institution exists because it is beneficial for those involved -- in the 
delegation theory of regulation, the problem of coalitional drift is largely tackled through 
formal institutional design (cf. Horn 1995). Majone (2001)’s claim about the functional 
imperative of delegation to a trustee described above can hence be read as one such solution 
to tackle this problem of coalitional drift. If the problem can be resolved by institutional 
engineering, it would be no surprise, then, that the implications of shifting coalitions for later 
policy development are largely unexplored.  
Notwithstanding these formal safeguards, however, there are still reasons to believe that 
the implications of coalitional drift for post-reform development deserve serious consideration. 






from the very functioning of regulatory institutions. First, through its implementation 
regulatory policy inevitably creates winners and losers;32 and in politics, as scholarship of 
endogenous institutional change argued, “the losers do not necessarily disappear” (Thelen 
1999, 385). Rather than adapting to existing institutions, those who are negatively affected by 
the policy may mobilise themselves and seek to change the rules. As a policy with significant 
visible loss-imposition on both organised interests and the public, an explicit drug rationing 
strategy may especially be subject to intense counter-mobilisation. Moreover, as we shall see 
later in this chapter, the loss-imposition on different societal actors also implies that once the 
institutions begin to operate, there is a greater possibility of coalitional drift. This could, for 
example, occur via the politicians adjusting their position in response to mobilisation of 
organised and/or popular interests – a point that I will come back to in the next section to 
discuss mechanisms more carefully, but for now there are reasons for elected politicians to 
drift away from their initial position. The drift can be particularly serious for the persistence 
of regulatory policy, which -- unlike some central banks and constitutional courts – does not 
typically require constitutional amendments to modify its rules and hence only has relatively 
lower hurdles to policy modification.33 In short, the operational phase of a regulatory reform 
possesses the significant possibility of coalitional drift that is shaped by the ongoing 
functioning of the regulatory policies accompanying the reform. The coalitional drift, in turn, 
has potential impacts on policy continuity and change. To understand the development in the 
post-reform phase of regulation, we need to consider how the existing policies generate 
political contestation and shift actors’ positions over time through their operation.  
Empirically, coalitional drift is widely observed across different areas of regulation. As 
Schillemans and Busioc (2014) summarise, contrary to the principal-agent model’s 
expectation about bureaucratic drift, “[n]ational and European agencies are found to be 
guardians of specific policies and contents and they are, in line with their formal mandates, 
                                                     
32 As Moe 2005, 220 argued in his critique of an efficiency-based understanding of political institutions, 
even if a regulatory agency is created because it is mutually beneficial for all the actors involved in the 
institutional design, such as bureaucrats, elected politicians in the enacting coalition and societal 
interests they represent, once it starts operation it exercises power over society as a whole – including 
the rest of the population that is not included in the institutional design. There can therefore be 
significant gaps between those who agreed on rules and those on whom the rules are imposed. Inspired 
by the very operation of the rules, the gaps may give rise to political conflicts over policy continuity 
and change. For a similar point based on the same argument by Moe, see Héritier 2007, 9.   
33 For a similar point, see Jacobs 2010, 102 on constraining effects of public policy programmes. The 
ability to set institutional barriers against policy reversal in such a situation is also why, as noted above, 
studies of central bank independence (e.g. Keefer and Stasavage 2003) argue for polarised veto players 






strongly protective of the independence of their expertise against political intervention” (201). 
Instead of the bureaucrats running away from the mandate to do what they want, they report, 
what studies have repeatedly suggested is coalitional drift, or what they call “forum drift” -- 
“the accountability forum drifting away from agreed upon goals and measures” (Ibid.) These 
observations further underline the necessity of developing a framework for understanding the 
policy development that takes into account coalitional change.  
In sum, to understand the roles of the locus of decision in post-reform trajectories requires 
an analytical framework that is different from the dominant theories of regulation. Discussions 
in this section have already given some clues about components that such an analysis should 
contain. First, such an analysis should look not just at a regulator’s relations to politicians but 
also broader institutional arrangements for drug funding. Its second component should be 
endogenous changes in political coalitions during the operational phase and their implications 
for policy development. The possibility of endogenous coalitional change also underscores the 
need for a temporal analysis that traces the processes unfolding over time. Having laid down 
its necessity, the next section presents an analytical framework for endogenous policy 
development in the post-reform period.  
 
3.  How political insulation shapes the post-reform trajectories: An analytical framework 
for endogenous development 
A coalition-based perspective on endogenous development 
In analysing policy development in the post-reform period, the study builds on the basic 
assumptions of the recent literature on endogenous change that emphasise the distributional 
effects of institutions (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005).34 As discussed 
in the previous section, the regulatory state thesis does not tell us much about the processes 
through which the creation of regulatory agencies affects state-society relations. The 
endogenous change literature offers a promising avenue to complement this lacuna because of 
its emphasis on power struggles inherent in institutions and its focus on temporal dynamics. 
                                                     
34 Following the literature, policies are here conceived as part of institutions. As the later discussions 
show, scholars of endogenous change often talk of institutional change that alters functioning of 
institutions without changing formal rules. Like institutions, policies also constrain subsequent political 
dynamics – an effect that constitutes a major component of this study. It is therefore appropriate to 






This literature rests on the premise “that conceives institutions above all else as distributional 
instruments laden with power implications” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 8, italics original). A 
fundamental insight here is that institutional stability is inherently a political process 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 7f; Hall and Thelen 2009). If institutions have distributional 
consequences, they hold frictions and tensions within them. The maintenance of institutions 
or policies, then, requires ongoing mobilisation of support from their underlying political 
coalition. From this perspective, one of the sources of endogenous change is shifts in the power 
balance between the coalition supporting the existing institutions and the coalition opposing 
them. The understanding that institutional evolution comes out of power struggles is based on 
an assertion associated with historical institutionalism in comparative politics (Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992; cf. Hall and Taylor 1996) but is also consistent with the power-based rational 
choice theories mentioned above (Knight 1992; Moe 2005). The focus of an inquiry into 
endogenous change should be, then, to identify when and how relative strengths of underlying 
coalitions change over time, and how existing institutions affect subsequent policy 
development by structuring the coalitional balance. 
This latter point – the role of institutions in shaping coalition politics and policy 
development -- poses a significant analytical challenge, as the literature of endogenous change 
has invited criticism for conceiving institutions as overly “plastic” (Capoccia 2016, 1100; Hall 
2016, 39; Pierson 2006, 116; Blyth 2016; cf. Pontusson 1995). If institutions can easily be 
deployed and modified by political actors, critiques note, the notion of institutions that 
constrain actors’ preferences and strategies loses much of its analytical leverage, making 
institutions epiphenomenal. This is legitimate criticism; a framework for endogenous change 
must show that institutions or policies are not a mere vehicle used by political coalitions to 
achieve their goals; they also structure the coalitions.  
This study tackles this question about the role of institutions in structuring politics based 
on two interrelated building blocks, both of which are related to the intellectual traditions of 
historical institutionalism. The first concerns the role of different arenas in politics. 
Specifically, this study looks at how political dynamics channelled through different arenas 
can affect endogenous policy development by expanding or containing conflicts between 
actors’ political coalitions.  
By examining the mediating roles of different arenas, this study seeks to elucidate 
mechanisms of policy development that are not fully explored in the current scholarship of 






incremental change that is driven by a “hidden” subterranean form of politics (Hacker et al. 
2015; Streeck and Thelen 2005). While suggesting its different variants, a common image of 
the change that scholars have invoked is the one where elite political actors who work around 
well-entrenched formal rules take small actions that, over time, lead to transformative change. 
Such a hidden change includes what scholars call “drift”, that is, the failure to update rules 
despite changes in the external environment; “conversion”, namely, redeploying established 
rules for a new purpose without changing them; and “layering”, that is, adding new rules on 
top of established ones to change their functioning (Hacker et al. 2015; Streeck and Thelen 
2005). The common analytical thread here is to identify elite actors’ reinterpretation of, and 
defection from, established rules – or lack thereof – that bring about de facto changes without 
passing a large-scale reform through the legislature. The literature hence calls our attention to 
courts, bureaucracies and other agents charging implementation of rules and influences of 
powerful societal actors through these organised political arenas.  
Yet, as Capoccia (2016, 1101) recently points out, organised interaction within elite-level 
politics may not be the sole avenue where political struggles over endogenous change take 
place (see also Weir 2006, 174 for a similar point). If the battles that are consequential to 
endogenous change can occur in the absence of successful reforms channelled by public and 
electoral arenas, the opposite is also possible. Actors who contest established institutions 
should avoid difficult paths where institutions are well-entrenched and instead find “weak 
spots” to initiate change. Efforts by political actors to circumscribe the blockages created by 
the existing rules should, then, in large part depend on the existing institutional landscape in a 
given policy domain – a landscape that is shaped by not only the structures of macro-level 
political institutions but also domain-specific institutional arrangements and policy 
programmes.  
Indeed, for sectoral regulation in Europe, it may not be the organised interaction of elite 
actors where the entrenchment of post-war institutions was weakest and most susceptible to 
change. As the regulatory state thesis reminds us, in Western Europe the dominant status quo 
founded after the post-war years was sectoral corporatist bargaining between bureaucratic 
departments and organised interests.35 What made the creation of regulatory agencies in the 
past few decades potentially important for the governance structure was, in fact, that it could 
lead to opening up the political space to other political actors who had previously been 
                                                     
35 See works related to sectoral (or “meso-”) corporatism in the 1980s. E.g. Cawson 1985; Schmitter 






excluded from the organised bargaining, including single-issue interest groups and the courts 
in charge of judicial reviews (Majone 1997). The entry of these newly empowered actors to 
political conflict over regulation, then, may have important implications for coalition 
formation and management, tipping the power balance in favour of or against supporters of 
the maintenance of existing institutions – a coalitional politics that is not solely mediated by 
traditional bargaining channels. 
Through the analysis of how different arenas channel political mobilisation, this study thus 
pays attention to the ability of different arenas to affect coalitional balance by expanding or 
containing conflicts. To be sure, this emphasis on coalitional balancing through different 
arenas is hardly new: as Schattschneider (1960) argued, politics can be conceived as control 
over the scope of conflict; what constitutes politics is countervailing forces between what he 
calls “privatisation” and “socialisation” of conflicts, that is, those who try to reduce the number 
of individuals involved in a conflict and those who try to expand it (p.7ff). Conflict expansion 
occurs when the losing side brings others who were previously not involved into the conflict. 
Arenas have a mediating role in this process of conflict expansion as they define whether a 
conflict gets expression. By shaping the scope of conflict, arenas can thus have impacts on 
coalitional balance. While Schattschneider’s idea about conflict inspired many intellectual 
traditions of institutionalism, the insights have yet left room for a fuller incorporation to the 
study of endogenous change. This study seeks to contribute to the literature through a 
framework that considers the roles of arenas in regulator politics.36 
The second building block of the analysis to follow is how past policies structure the 
present politics. The growing literature on “policy feedback” offers a useful analytical tool to 
link policy choices to subsequent political struggles (Pierson 1993; for reviews, Béland 2010; 
Moynihan and Soss 2014). The idea is that once enacted, past policies create their own political 
dynamics, generating sources of both durability and change over time. The effects of policies 
on subsequent political dynamics take place through their impacts on the capacity, coalitions, 
and information processing of different political actors. These political dynamics, in turn, 
affect subsequent policy development. The feedback effects can be labelled as self-reinforcing 
or self-undermining. On the one hand, policies can create positive, self-reinforcing, feedback 
                                                     
36 Some of the recent theoretical works on endogenous change has suggested a similar direction to the 
present study. Capoccia (2016) proposes that an institutional defender’s ability to delay the timing of 
reforms affects institutional persistence. While he does not link his discussions to the concept of arenas, 







by creating supporting coalitions among societal and government actors; such a coalition may 
resist policy changes in the later period. On the other hand, policies can also generate negative, 
self-undermining, feedback by triggering a backlash and counter-mobilisation among the 
political actors who seek to change them.  
For the present inquiry into explicit drug rationing, it is important to examine both positive 
and negative feedbacks. Due to its loss-imposing nature, an explicit rationing strategy could 
make itself especially susceptible to political backlash. For the durability of explicit rationing 
policy, it is important to minimise self-undermining feedback that expands coalitions for 
policy change while, through self-reinforcing feedback, crafting and maintaining coalitions 
for policy continuity.  
When combined with the above-mentioned logic about the role of different arenas, the 
notion of policy feedback is especially useful for the study of post-reform policy development. 
For instance, self-undermining feedback may generate a greater magnitude of counter-
mobilisation when the counter-mobilisers expand the political conflicts to outside the existing 
arena. The broadened coalitions for policy change should then put policymakers under greater 
pressure. Conversely, the containment of self-undermining feedback within an existing arena 
can limit counter-mobilisers’ attempts to broaden their coalitions. The blockage of expanding 
self-undermining forces hence should contribute to policy continuity. Discussions below will 
further consider how a particular feature of an institutional arrangement -- such as political 
insulation – expands or limits self-undermining feedback. 
In sum, coalition-based perspectives on endogenous change can provide a promising 
avenue for research into post-reform policy development when fruitfully combined with the 
insights about the roles of arenas and policy feedback. Such an analysis pays attention to how 
existing policy choices can craft political coalitions over policy change; and how the 
coalitional dynamics are mediated by different arenas.  
Based on these analytical building blocks, Figure 1.1 sketches this study’s analytical 
framework for understanding how political insulation affects policy development after 
regulatory reforms. Having first set out this study’s perspective on drug funding policy as 
coalitional politics, the analytical framework will describe a causally-connected chain of 
events that links political insulation to post-reform policy development: (i) how the different 
levels of political insulation of the locus of decision affect policy choices on drug funding, in 
particular whether elected politicians can prevent a politically costly policy choice for explicit 






downstream political dynamics, including both counter-mobilisation and mobilisation of 
different actors through different arenas; and (iii) how the downstream political dynamics, in 




Drug funding policy as coalitional battles 
This study conceptualises drug funding policy as political struggles between coalitions 
among public and private actors formed around what can be called producers and payers. On 
the one hand, producers are political actors who benefit from policies to cover the cost of a 
drug via the public healthcare system. The actor that lies at the heart of such a “pro-access” 
coalition is the pharmaceutical manufacturer of a given drug, whose income heavily depends 
on whether the government chooses to pay the cost of the drug through the public healthcare 
system. Given the fact that in European countries on average about three-quarters of healthcare 
provision is financed by the public healthcare system, be it a general-tax-funded health service 
or contribution-based obligatory social insurance, a decision not to fund the drug through the 
public healthcare system can result in significant loss in the company’s income. Patient groups 
specialising in particular disease areas are also often involved in the pro-access coalition. 
Representing the “constituency” of a given medical technology or disease area, such groups 
mediate collective action to advocate for better access to drugs in the disease area. On the other 
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hand, the payers’ coalition is formed around the entities who pay the cost of a technology 
available via the public healthcare system, either the national health service or the national 
insurance bod(ies), and the parent government department supervising the entities. They do 
not deny access to technologies, but payers tend to try to avoid wasteful spending on clinically 
ineffective or less cost-effective drugs; they also tend to be interested in incorporating 
assessments measuring drugs’ clinical or cost effectiveness to aid their choice. 
In analysing public and private actors’ coalitions, it is useful not to conceive the state as a 
unitary entity and instead to disaggregate it into multiple organisational units and branches (cf. 
Morgan and Orloff 2016). This is especially the case for pharmaceutical policy, where several 
conflicting policy goals and instruments are involved. In such an issue area, several actors 
within the state act as carriers of different policy goals and instruments, generating rivalries 
and turf wars between each other. In some cases, the alignment of coalitional battles among 
supporters for different policy goals within the state may be along organisational boundaries. 
For instance, a ministry in charge of industry might be more inclined to industrial policy goals 
and therefore more sympathetic to the producer’s coalition, whereas a ministry in charge of 
health and the treasury might be more aligned with the payers’ coalition, and we might observe 
turf wars among these different government departments. In others, however, the same 
organisation may be tasked with different policy goals. For example, the formal mandate of 
drug pricing often explicitly speaks of both an industrial policy goal, such as incentivising 
innovation, and a health policy goal, including controlling healthcare costs. In that case, the 
public organisation in charge of pricing may have to deal with these conflicting demands. 
Discussions on political dynamics below and in the empirical chapters will further suggest 
how government actors located within different parts of the state link up with different 
coalitions, and how existing policy can shape such coalitions. 
 
Low vs high political insulation affects policy choices  
At the heart of the policy choice on drug funding lie elected officials, typically ministers in 
charge of health and pharmaceutical policy. Another corollary of the multiple goals that 
pharmaceutical policy serves means that the policy preference of ministers regarding drug 
funding is ambiguous and not readily apparent. How ministers weigh costs and benefits of 
funding or excluding drugs shall depend on multiple factors. Yet ministers are blame-avoiding 
in that they worry about the real or potential loss that a decision to explicitly ration drugs can 






see, however, the policy strategies that ministers can take to avoid the blame for an explicit 
rationing strategy depend greatly on the allocation of powers in a given policy issue, which 
constrains ministers’ room for manoeuvre. 
With the creation of non-majoritarian institutions, experts are said to play a more prominent 
role in the decision-making process. In practice, however, it is rare that experts are granted 
complete powers and responsibility. To recap the discussion in the previous section, it is more 
useful to consider post-reform decision-making over drug funding as a “regulatory space” 
shared by experts in the regulator and elected officials. And this shared space is not created 
equally; the processes as well as the location of decision-making differ from one another across 
institutional settings. For the present discussion a crucial variation lies in the allocation of 
decision-making powers between experts and elected politicians, and, in particular, whether 
and to what extent elected politicians are excluded from the locus of decision-making -- a 
variation that is labelled low versus high political insulation. In a decision-making process that 
is less insulated from elected officials, ministers have the final say on whether to fund a drug 
following expert bodies’ assessment. By contrast, in a decision-making process with high 
political insulation an assessment by the expert body becomes the final ruling, and ministers 
do not have powers to overturn it. 
The differences in the allocation of powers have profound implications for policy choices, 
especially when experts in the regulator make a negative judgement—that is, they recommend 
an explicit rationing strategy, concluding that the public healthcare system should not cover 
the cost of a drug. The literature on blame-avoidance has argued that in an unpopular policy 
choice, such as explicit rationing, politicians will try to shift the blame of negative policy 
outcomes to the regulator (Weaver 1986; Hood 2002). As I noted in the previous section, 
however, such a blame-shifting strategy commonly discussed in the literature is meaningful 
only where the regulatory agency has substantial powers in the given policy decision. High 
political insulation is such a situation -- ministers have no final say on the regulator’s policy 
outputs; only once the regulator has imposed a loss on society, can the minister then attempt 
to shift the blame for the loss onto the regulator. 
The situation is quite different if the locus of decision is less politically insulated, whereby 
the minister is involved in the decision over drug funding. In such a setting, ministers do not 
have to wait until the negative policy outcomes arise. If the regulator makes a negative 
judgement, ministers can still make a final decision, considering the perceived “political costs” 






benefit of choosing to follow experts’ outputs and excluding the drug. If the elected official 
believes that excluding a drug from reimbursement is too politically costly, they can then 
refuse to follow experts’ outputs and choose to make the drug available. The question is then: 
when do ministers find the political cost of excluding a drug that experts have concluded a 
negative judgement about “too much”, compared to the benefit of keeping it on the 
reimbursement list? To answer that question, we need to know which societal actors are 
expected to have a loss imposed on them by the decision, and how ministers weigh the 
anticipated loss on them. An explicit rationing strategy imposes loss on different societal actors, 
including the manufacturer and the consumer of the drug. Knowing that experts have made a 
negative judgement (or that a negative judgement is likely), those actors who foresee a loss to 
themselves may try to persuade the minister, through lobbying, public campaigning or other 
means, to choose not to follow the experts’ outputs. We can then further ask: when are 
ministers convinced by such mobilisations? What are the tactics that ministers can use to deal 
with negative expert outputs? Chapter 6 will explore these questions. Using the variation of 
drugs with different types of manufacturers and consumers involved, it inductively develops 
arguments about when, in an institutional setting with low political insulation, ministers follow 
experts’ policy outputs and when they refuse to do so. Regardless of the precise content of 
political cost, however, the overall picture is that ministers can take an anticipated action, using 
their decision-making powers, to prevent an unpopular decision from taking place.    
The differences in institutional structure and locus of authority may thus yield ministers’ 
different blame-avoidance strategies, leading to different policy choices. Depending on the 
level of political insulation, ministers may use either “anticipatory” or “reactive” blame-
avoidance strategies – a distinction that scholars are only beginning to recognise (cf. 
Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Hood 2005; Hinterleitner and Sager 2017). On the one hand, in a setting 
with low political insulation, ministers can use an anticipatory form of blame-avoidance 
strategy to prevent an unpopular policy choice, by refusing to follow an expert’s outputs. As 
a result of ministers’ pre-empting action, there should be less explicit rationing of the drugs 
that ministers otherwise find too politically costly to impose. On the other hand, in an 
institutional setting with high political insulation such an option is not available to elected 
politicians. They will engage in a reactive form of blame-avoidance strategy, by shifting the 
blame for an already existing unpopular policy outcome to the regulator. As a result, the 
highly-insulated decision-making process should enable more policy decisions that are 







Policy choices structure downstream political dynamics 
The different policy choices, linked with varying levels of political insulation, have distinct 
downstream effects on subsequent political dynamics. By structuring the forms of political 
conflicts, including which arenas political conflicts are mediated in and which political actors 
are involved, the downstream effects, in turn, shape different policy trajectories over time. The 
endogenous political dynamics involve both counter-mobilisation and mobilisation. We will, 
first, examine how policy choices generate counter-mobilisation by political actors, creating a 
self-undermining dynamic. While high political insulation enables policy decisions that is 
otherwise too politically costly, the decisions should trigger a greater magnitude of counter-
mobilisation channelled by public and electoral arenas. By expanding their societal coalitional 
base, counter-mobilisers seek to reverse existing policies from outside the existing locus of 
decision-making. By contrast, since ministers in low political insulation settings prevent policy 
decisions they deem too politically costly, there should be less opportunities for such counter-
mobilisation mediated in the public arena. Second, we will discuss the self-reinforcing 
dynamic by looking at how policy choices give rise to political forces that contribute to policy 
continuity. Such feedback effects from existing policy should be observed in relation to 
different organised actors, including regulatory agencies, drug companies, and clinicians. 
 
(a) Counter-mobilisation against loss-imposition 
Let us first consider how policy choices affect subsequent political dynamics by generating 
political contestation against them. Recall Schattschneider’s (1960) idea of politics as control 
over the scope of conflict. From this perspective, the preceding discussions on policy choices 
over drug rationing can be seen as a part of the government’s attempt to contain conflicts over 
drug funding to the existing locus of decision-making. In a less-insulated setting, elected 
politicians can try to contain potential or real conflicts that an explicit rationing decision might 
trigger by considering the political costs involved. By making a decision not to exclude the 
drug, ministers can attempt to accommodate societal interests that would otherwise have had 
losses imposed on them and, as a consequence, try to contain political conflicts within the 
existing locus of decision-making. By contrast, in a highly insulated locus of decision-making, 
such strategies for conflict containment are not possible. Unlike a less politically insulated 
setting, where societal actors avoid loss-imposition during the decision-making process, in a 







A key mechanism that links a policy choice to subsequent contestation over policy is policy 
feedback. This may have an influence on subsequent policy development through a number of 
pathways, but the most relevant to the present discussion is “interpretive” feedback (Pierson 
1993, 611–624; 1994; Campbell 2012). Pierson (1993) has argued that the design of specific 
policy and government programmes affects subsequent politics by shaping ways in which 
societal actors, especially the mass of the public, process information. Specifically, he points 
out two aspects of policy design that may condition this effect. The first is visibility, which 
refers to whether the public may be aware of policy outcomes. The second is traceability, or 
whether the public can attribute the blame for a negative policy outcome to specific political 
actors. The varying degrees of a policy’s visibility and traceability, therefore, and the efforts 
of political actors to manipulate these factors, affects whether mobilisation over existing 
policies is likely to follow. 
This feedback effect plays an important role in political contestation over regulatory 
policies because of the nature of their policy decisions. First, negative outcomes of regulatory 
decisions can be highly visible as they impose a loss on clearly identifiable specific individuals 
and organised interests who bear the burden of the decisions, with diffuse benefits and 
beneficiaries (Wilson 1980, 357–394). Moreover, decisions by a regulatory agency – 
especially in a high- politically insulated setting -- can also be highly traceable compared to 
other forms of governance where decision-making authorities are shared by multiple actors. 
In fact, an independent regulatory agency can be a useful device for politicians to shift the 
blame for policy outcomes precisely because of this high level of traceability.  
These attributes of policy decision, in turn, translate themselves into a political strategy for 
counter-mobilisation. Actors seeking to challenge the existing orientation of a policy exploit 
the high level of visibility. They may illuminate the negative consequences of policy choices 
while obscuring their benefits, framing them as a “policy failure” caused by the regulator’s 
decisions.37 Political campaigns to “raise awareness” enable actors to build a broader base of 
mobilisation that is not limited to narrow “stakeholders”. Judicial reviews to challenge policy 
decisions are not only sought for their own purpose but also served to help actors broaden their 
coalition through raising public attention to the issue. The heightened level of salience may 
                                                     
37 Both the literature on blame-avoidance (Hood 2002, 2011) and problem definition (Baumgartner and 
Jones 2010; Stone 1989) highlight the importance of how political actors frame the attribution of blame 






draw the attention of vote-seeking politicians who are otherwise not interested in the issue.38 
These politicians may then join the coalition of actors advocating for policy reversal. As the 
pressure rises, incumbent elected officials may also adjust their policy positions, for fear of 
being punished by the voters. In sum, the institutional arrangement of regulatory decisions is 
prone to generate negative self-undermining feedback that fuels the pressure on policy-makers 
to change policies. The pressure may therefore limit the government’s ability to keep on 
imposing the existing orientation of the policy choice.  
Under what conditions is this feedback effect more likely to be amplified? A number of 
factors condition this interaction of elite actors with mass politics, but the capacity of elite 
counter-mobilisers to attract broader coalition hinges, in important ways, on political costs that 
a policy decision triggers, and in particular, how the cost of a policy is distributed within 
society (Jacobs and Weaver 2014; cf. Pierson 1994, 45–46). If a policy choice imposes a loss 
on tightly-linked groups, the policy may generate a greater counter-mobilisation; and if the 
negative impact of a policy is felt through a dramatic event that captures intense public 
attention over a short period of time, known as a “focusing event” (cf. Kingdon 1994), it 
triggers a greater magnitude of feedback effects. 
This pathway to counter-mobilisation does not deny other strategies that a pro-access 
coalition can use. On the contrary, we expect that actors seeking to get better access to a drug 
and challenge existing policy orientation should combine different strategies to achieve their 
goal. One such strategy is to seek to forge an alliance with government actors. This may 
include informal lobbying of, and formal consultation by, regulatory agencies and the parent 
ministries in charge of health; representation channelled by ministries in charge of the industry, 
which are likely to be their natural ally; and informal linkages and lobbying to parliamentarians 
and party politicians who are sympathetic to business interests.  
Actors from producers’ coalition should also attempt at expanding their coalitions by 
allying with other societal organised interests, such as clinicians. For example, some of the 
specialist doctors who are particularly keen on novel treatments in their specialised area might 
be particularly receptive to a coalitional appeal by drug companies. These clinicians may not 
only help the pro-access coalition’s mobilisation through elite-level debates but also help 
broaden the producers’ coalitional base by joining their public campaign, and, through their 
                                                     
38 For the role of public attention in drawing politicians’ responses, Baumgartner and Jones 2010; 






public legitimacy as the professional authority, advocating for better access in the public 
sphere. 
Yet, a key difference between actors’ strategies in a highly insulated setting and those in a 
less insulated one is that, in addition to those strategies operating at the elite-level of interaction, 
the former can expand the conflict to mass politics by exploiting the visibility and traceability 
of the loss-imposition. Such a strategy to win the “noisy politics” in order to influence the 
policy process may, in fact, be more costly than “quiet politics” taking place within a closed 
circle of elite actors (cf. Culpepper 2010). In this sense, as Schattschneider (1960: 16) has 
pointed out, expanding conflicts to mass politics is a strategy deployed by the losing side of a 
conflict.39  
In short, by endogenously structuring political strategies for counter-mobilisation 
challenging the status quo through expanding the coalitional base, a policy choice for rationing 
in a highly insulated environment tends to produce a greater magnitude of self-undermining 
feedback. Moreover, with the expansion of conflicts, counter-mobilisation and the resulting 
political battles are channelled through the legislative arena. By contrast, in a less insulated 
environment the magnitude of this dynamic should be relatively limited. The regulator’s 
negative recommendations may still arouse a counter-mobilisation due to the potential loss it 
is likely to trigger. But since the minister, who has final decision-making powers, is receptive 
to such a counter-mobilisation when they find the cost of proceeding to exclude the drug too 
high, the regulatory outputs should result in less accumulation of actual losses that counter-
mobilisers can exploit to broaden their coalitional base in mass politics. As a result, political 
conflicts are channelled less through the public and legislative arenas, and operate more in the 
existing decision-making arenas for drug funding.  
(b) Endogenous development of institutional defence against counter-mobilisation   
For its part, the capacity and strategies of the pro-payer coalition to defend the status quo 
against counter-mobilisation hinges greatly on its ability to harness self-reinforcing feedback 
flowing from existing institutions. We shall here discuss feedback effects emerging from two 
distinct sources. First, the institutional defence against counter-mobilisation is shaped by the 
regulatory agency’s own actions. A regulatory agency does not stand still after its creation; 
once operating, its activities to achieve its policy mandate generates feedback effects on 
                                                     
39 Developed also from Schattschneider’s conflict expansion model, a vast literature on venue-shifting 
and agenda-setting (Baumgartner and Jones 2010) and on “outside” lobbying (Kollman 1998) has 






different actors, including itself, the regulatee (drug companies), and actors in the chain of 
service delivery (clinicians). Second, feedback effects can also emerge from outside the 
political struggles over drug rationing. In particular, the multiple interlocking institutions in 
the pharmaceutical policy mean that political actors’ strategies against counter-mobilisation 
depend not only on drug funding but also on neighbouring institutions interlinked with the 
issue. Let us explore each of them in turn.  
The first element of self-reinforcing feedback concerns regulatory agencies’ use of experts 
and expertise. A regulator’s experts and expertise deserve special attention, given their key 
roles as assumed in the regulatory state thesis. All else being equal, impacts of the use of 
expertise on policy should be self-reinforcing in nature because of what scholarship of policy 
feedback has called its “resource” effects (as opposed to interpretive effects discussed above), 
that is, effects on capacities or incentives for mobilisation, on both interest groups and the state 
(Pierson 1993). The operation of regulatory agencies and the mobilisation of a particular set 
of experts and expertise should generate “sunk costs” by encouraging different actors to invest 
their resources and energy in the specific set of regulatory requirements. The “asset specificity” 
of these investments means that actors who have invested in these particular skills and 
requirements will be reluctant to switch to other sets of requirements (Pierson 2000). 
 A regulator’s mobilisation of expertise creates a self-reinforcing dynamic for the agency 
itself in two major ways. First, establishment of a regulatory agency is followed by the creation 
of its own stakeholder network comprised of experts who support its work. Unlike agencies in 
the United States, which tend to develop in-house expertise, a distinct characteristic of 
regulatory agencies in European countries and the EU is that they tend to draw on existing 
resources and the expertise of outside experts for their regulatory process. This is true for 
pharmaceutical policy, where agencies both in England and France, with their historical lack 
of in-house experts and resources, have built on networks of existing domestic academic 
experts. The operation of agencies and the particular set of experts and expertise that they rely 
on, in turn, should create their own vested interests of academic industries by forging 
“epistemic communities”. Depending on the specific set of regulatory requirements, such 
communities include different combinations and power balances among various types of 
experts related to pharmaceutical policy, including clinicians, economists, epistemologists, 
and pharmacologists, among others.  
Second, the regulator’s active mobilisation of expertise both to produce policy outputs and 






regard, downstream consequences for its policy continuity through its outputs for at least two 
reasons. First, continuity in the agency’s outputs is closely linked with its desire to fulfil its 
core missions and do so with autonomy (Wilson 1989, 182; Carpenter 2001). Since Max 
Weber highlighted predictability as a major principal of bureaucracy, scholars have grappled 
with bureaucratic organisations’ risk-averse tendency (cf. Olsen 2008). Contemporary public 
administration scholars have argued that public bureaucracy tends to be risk-averse in its 
policy decisions, due to its fear of “reputational damage” (Carpenter 2010, 67) or of getting 
criticised or blamed (Hood 2011, 5; Wilson 1989, 191-192). In either perspective, bureaucracy 
prefers a familiar and predictable course of actions because the lack thereof runs the risk of 
policy errors and these will lead to the reduction of autonomy. Once the mobilisation of a 
particular expertise shapes an agency’s mission-fulfilling activities, it should therefore become 
self-reinforcing in nature.  
Moreover, the agency’s active mobilisation of expertise to justify its decisions also 
facilitates policy continuity. In mobilising expertise for their mission fulfilment, regulators 
tend to develop several mechanisms to ensure that their use of expertise contributes to policy 
continuity. For instance, regulators may develop explicit codified regulatory criteria and 
reasoning behind their outputs. Such rules help create consistency in the regulator’s 
application of expertise to cases.40 Regulators may also craft various internal procedural rules 
and external accountability mechanisms to fend off criticisms. Through the presentation of 
explicit rules that appeal to procedural fairness and accountability, regulators may try to tackle 
criticisms and reframe the “parameter of blame and accountability” (Black 2010 quoted in 
Lodge and Busioc 2016, 250; cf. Koop 2014). These effects of shaping the agency’s 
justification as a “presentation strategy” (Hood 2011, 52-53) to manage blame should be 
stronger where the regulator faces criticisms and policy debates concerning its policy outputs. 
In such a situation, the regulator should try to justify its outputs and defend itself by using its 
expertise and elaborating on the reasoning behind its decisions. Through these mechanisms of 
organisational defence about its application of expertise, regulators may further strengthen its 
continuity and predictability in its policy even in the face of criticisms.  
                                                     
40 Legal scholars have argued how courts (especially in common law countries) use precedents and 
judicial doctrines to develop “argumentation frameworks” that connect past decisions with future ones, 
creating self-reinforcing judicial decision-making (Stone Sweet 2002, 124ff; Hathaway 2000).While 






The self-reinforcing nature of regulatory expertise is not only on the regulator’s side. Drug 
companies, who wish to get market access, also have to invest their resources in a specific set 
of expertise, the evidence to support applications and other regulatory requirements to win the 
regulator’s positive guidance. Given the dominance of public healthcare as payers in both 
England and France, even though drug companies may be lobbying for changes to regulations 
to lower the hurdles in the long-term, in the short-term they still have strong reasons to make 
these investments. And the considerable differences in regulatory criteria and procedural rules 
for drug pricing and reimbursement across one country to another means that these 
investments are highly specific to a jurisdiction. As a result, in a later lobbying effort to change 
rules drug companies are constrained by their own past investment; they must weigh the 
benefit of change against the cost resulting from investments they have already made.   
Another self-reinforcing feedback of regulatory activities is in relation to intermediary 
actors between regulatory decisions and its delivery to citizens – in this case, clinicians. The 
above-mentioned resource effects of policy feedback may also operate in relation to clinicians, 
as they may have to update their skills and treatments, while having to make their familiarised 
treatments obsolete, to comply with the regulator’s guidance. In addition to investment in skills, 
however, the loss-imposition nature of an explicit rationing strategy may generate a powerful 
interpretive effect for clinicians, which alters the terms of responsibility and blame-attribution 
for rationing. Scholars of healthcare politics have long claimed that physicians have always 
tried to protect their clinical autonomy; and any attempts to encroach on it by the state have 
met fierce resistance from the medical professions (cf. Starr 1982). However, when it comes 
to rationing, doctors’ preferences are ambiguous at best. The idea that doctors defend clinical 
autonomy rests on assumptions from the era when clinical judgment, and any resultant 
rationing, was individual and hidden. Once rationing begins to take a collective form, either 
through local-level decision-making or via ministers and regulators at the national level, its 
practice becomes more visible to the public. For clinicians the shift to more collective and 
explicit forms of rationing is, on the one hand, a loss of the full autonomy that they used to 
enjoy. Instead, they now find themselves in the chain of service delivery, with authority being 
shared with the government and payers. On the other hand, the increase in visibility of 
unpopular practices such as rationing means that their perceived benefit of exercising 
autonomy and taking responsibility for clinical judgement and rationing may become 
significantly discounted. They might even benefit from the regulator’s decisions to aid them 
to implement otherwise unpopular choices without receiving blame from the public. These 






the regulator, because this implies that they would become the subject of blame for policy 
outcomes. Clinicians may still want to “make their voice heard” and change the substance of 
regulation, but they may resist the wholesale breakdown of regulatory institutions.  
Hence, by interacting with blame-avoidance, the transition to the regulatory state may 
impact on clinicians’ preferences for maintaining existing regulatory institutions. Again, the 
level of visibility and traceability of policy design may play a role in how likely it is that this 
effect will take place. When the regulator’s dominant position in the process of implementation 
is easily traceable -- which should be more likely the case in a high politically-insulated setting 
-- and societal actors are well-integrated in the process, such a policy design may allow societal 
actors at the implementation stage to attribute blame for losses resulting from the policy to the 
regulator instead of taking it up themselves. The actors may therefore oppose a policy agenda 
aimed at shifting the burden of decision-making back onto them.   
In addition to these feedback effects coming directly from institutional reforms of 
regulatory institutions for drug funding, the multiple decision-making processes involved in 
pharmaceutical policy means that the inter-connected institutions provide an endogenous 
source of reproduction of pro-payer coalitions.41 In particular, the drug pricing regime – a 
process profoundly linked with drug reimbursement decision -- has important implications. 
Again, the idea of the scope of conflict is useful to help understand the political dynamics. 
Unlike drug reimbursement, where explicit rationing decisions can trigger the involvement of 
multiple outside actors, the sole actors involved in the decision-making venue for drug pricing 
are the government department in charge and the pharmaceutical industry. The secrecy of the 
pricing process and terms of bargaining may also enhance this hidden insulated nature of 
policy process. Regardless of whether drug pricing takes the form of free pricing for individual 
drugs with profit control, as in Britain, or the statutory pricing led by bureaucrats, like in 
France, compared to the reimbursement process we would expect the pricing one to tend to 
preserve the existing power balance between the industry and the government better. Hence, 
if the existing distribution of power is favourable to the government and the payer vis-à-vis 
the industry, the government should reinforce pricing power as a weapon at its own disposal 
to contain conflicts. Conversely, if the existing pricing regime is favourable to the industry, 
the government and the payer should have a hard time reversing the power balance.  
                                                     







Policy and institutional change 
Taken together, existing institutional arrangements with varying degrees of political 
insulation have significant implications for subsequent policy development. In an institutional 
setting where the locus of decision-making is highly insulated from elected politicians, the 
accumulation of politically costly decisions should lead to wider mobilisation involving high-
profile public debates, with the regulatory agency being in the forefront of criticism. Drives 
for policy and institutional changes should come from outside the existing locus of decision-
making, eventually destabilising existing policy and institutions. The capacity of the pro-payer 
coalition to counteract these counter-mobilisation and to defend the existing orientation of 
policy and institutions depends on its academic expertise, support from clinicians, and 
stabilising effects of the pricing regime. By contrast, in a less politically insulated decision-
making process, we should observe fewer decisions that are otherwise politically too costly 
for the incumbent government. This containment of conflicts to existing policy-making arenas 
blocks negative feedback effects from being set in motion. The conflict containment hence 
contributes to policy persistence.  
 
4.  A note on methods and sources 
From the next chapter onwards, the thesis turns to empirical exploration of the trajectories 
of drug funding policy in England and France. Through comparative case studies and process 
tracing, I develop arguments about endogenous development of drug funding policy after 
regulatory reforms. This section discusses the methodological considerations that guide this 
inquiry. 
This study is largely a theory-building exercise. Since the claims developed in this chapter 
are partially generated from the empirical study to follow, the thesis cannot claim to provide 
an independent testing of the theoretical framework. Instead, the aim is to generate a theory of 
endogenous policy development. Through the study of drug funding policy in England and 
France, the thesis seeks to develop claims about how certain institutional features such as 
political insulation affect policy development.  
This study combines comparative case studies with process tracing to study post-reform 






nationally. It applies several longitudinal comparisons by using variation before and after 
changes in organisational structures and other variables of interest. Employing it with process 
tracing, such “before-after” comparison provides a powerful tool for clarifying the sequence 
of events while evaluating alternative explanations. The study also uses a series of “within-
sector” comparisons by looking at variations across different disease areas and different types 
of drugs. As discussions in this chapter have suggested, political dynamics in the post-reform 
period may vary greatly depending on political attributes – costs and benefits – that a given 
drug or disease area carry to different political actors. The within-sector comparison enables 
me to develop hypotheses relevant to this claim; it also allows me to generate claims on when 
the mechanisms identified are more likely to be observed.  
The study mainly uses inductive process tracing to identify mechanisms linking 
institutional structures with policy trajectories.42 It clarifies a chain of events that constitutes 
the processes through which political insulation affects subsequent policy development. This 
methodological choice is appropriate because the study traces particular, complex processes 
that lead to policy development –processes that are either unknown or underspecified by the 
literature. In some of the narratives to follow, process tracing is also used in assessing 
alternative explanations for the observed events. The deductive process tracing is used here 
for a supplementary purpose; it is designed to help me propose the mechanisms and processes 
generated by inductive process tracing with more confidence.  
The study uses a variety of materials to trace policy development. It draws on different 
types of primary source materials, including government documents and policy reports, 
parliamentary minutes and reports, statements made by various societal actors; 43  and 
newspapers, trade journals, and other secondary materials written by clinicians, economists, 
legal scholars, journalists, and other observers.44 Different types of sources enable me to use 
process tracing with greater precision by providing a detailed narrative about the position of 
actors, policy-making, and the sequence of events. In citing materials, I corroborate the 
evidence with other independent sources wherever possible.  
                                                     
42 For an inductive use of process tracing, George and Benett 2005, Chapter 10; Falleti 2016. 
43 All the translations of quotes from French sources in this thesis, unless specified otherwise, are mine.   
44 Newspapers were used both as sources of events and, in some of the chapters, for an indicator to 






In addition, the study supplements these written materials with open-ended or semi-
structured interviews with different actors involved in the policy process. They were mainly 
former and current officials from the ministries and agencies in charge of pharmaceutical 
policy, as well as academics close either to the government or the pharmaceutical industry.45 
I identified and selected interview partners based on their roles in episodes of policy debate 
and policy-making, where I relied on both published information and so-called “snow-ball” 
sampling. The interviews were conducted either in person or over the phone, typically lasting 
for an hour. The interviews are not designed to provide the main source of evidence but to 
complement the analysis based on written materials.  
As to regulatory practices for individual drugs, analyses in the thesis are mainly based on 
documents written by regulatory bodies, supplemented by other primary and secondary 
sources where necessary. The data on the prices and reimbursement status of drugs mainly 
draws on the official database of national formulary, again supplemented by other publicly 
available sources.46 
        
5.  Concluding remarks 
This chapter proposed an analytical framework for the study of post-reform policy 
development. Drawing on the delegation theory and the endogenous change literatures, it 
discussed the role of political insulation in shaping policy development. The chapter suggested 
how political insulation affected policy choices, and how policy choices generated 
mobilisation over policy change. A high politically-insulated setting enables policymakers to 
produce explicit rationing strategies that would have been otherwise too political costly; but 
the policy choice generates a greater counter-mobilisation channelled by the public arena, 
thereby undermining policies over time. In a less politically-insulated setting, by contrast, 
elected politicians prevent such a choice; the absence of opportunities for expanding conflicts 
over policy choice, in turn, contributes to policy continuity. 
                                                     
45 For the anonymised list of interviewees, see Appendix.  
46 I mainly consulted the British National Formulary (https://www.bnf.org/products/bnf-online/) for the 
English case, and the national health insurance body for salaried workers’ (CNAMTS: Caisse nationale 
de l'assurance maladie des travailleurs salariés) Base des médicaments et informations tarifaires 
(http://www.codage.ext.cnamts.fr/codif/bdm_it/index_presentation.php?p_site=AMELI) for the 
French one. In some cases, the official data was supplemented by publicly-accessible databases 






The analytical framework developed here has its own limitations. Perhaps the most 
apparent is that the origins of the designs of the decision-making process are outside the scope 
of the framework. If differences in political insulation are so important, where do they come 
from? It should be noted that whether politicians prefer high or low insulation when creating 
delegated bodies cannot readily be deduced. The literature on blame-avoidance tends to 
assume that ministers have incentives for shifting blame to delegated bodies; it follows that in 
an unpopular policy area they should prefer to delegate more responsibilities to regulators 
(Weaver 1986; Hood 2002). But this premise is not as self-evident as it looks. It is equally 
possible – as indeed the discussions above have suggested and the chapters to follow shall 
demonstrate -- that ministers may want to keep powers to themselves so that they can avoid 
unpopular policy outputs from happening in the first place. Moreover, the origins of political 
insulation can be affected by a number of other factors, which requires a separate analytical 
framework. Preferences of elected officials regarding political insulation are thus outside the 
scope of this study; the empirical part will instead inductively identify politicians’ strategies 
over rationing.  
This study’s analytical framework departs from the dominant theory of delegation based 
on the principal-agent framework in two respects. First, the principal-agent framework 
typically assumes preferences of elected officials are exogenously given and stable, and 
problematises bureaucratic drift that departs from the elected officials’ preferences. By 
contrast, the present study does not assume fixed preferences of actors, especially those of 
elected officials. This enables me to capture the dynamic process of changes in the position of 
elected officials over time, responding to varying level of pressures and to perceived political 
costs of rationing drugs. Second, examining the locus of decision-making calls our attention 
to institutional variations and political struggles that differ from the scholarship on delegation. 
The approach adopted here enables me to examine a set of political struggles involving 
multiple actors and organisational processes that is wider than the principal-agent relations. 
This study draws on the endogenous change literature’s emphasis on underlying coalitions 
of institutions, but delineates the processes that are somewhat different from the image of 
gradual hidden change that the literature has advanced. In a regulatory policy that imposes 
losses on the organised interests and the public, the former’s elite-level of interactions is not 
the only arena that drives change. In addition to such interactions through the organised 
channel of politics, broadening the coalitional base via the public arena can also shift the power 
balance of underlying coalitions that becomes a source for change. The analytical framework 






including the possibility of coalition expansion mediated by the public arena. It hence called 
attention to the roles of multiple arenas in the politics of endogenous change and feedback 
effects on actors’ mobilisation and counter-mobilisation. 
The thesis now turns to an empirical inquiry into the trajectories of drug funding policy in 
England and France. As later chapters shall uncover, the different institutional arrangements 
created by regulatory reform structured the subsequent political battles over drug rationing, 
shaping the post-reform trajectories of the two countries. Before examining the post-reform 
trajectories, however, the next two chapters first depict the policy debates over explicit drug 








Chapter 2 Experts rule: The emergence of high political insulation in England, 
1989-1999 
 
Between the 1990s and mid-2000s both England and France addressed the issue of drug 
rationing. They experienced procedural reforms that created regulatory agencies assessing a 
drug’s clinical or cost-effectiveness for funding decisions. In both countries, these institutional 
reforms were considered significant for the existing structure that had governed drug provision 
within the health care system for decades. Yet, the shape of the regulatory state over drug 
rationing varied across the two nations, with a marked difference in the locus of decision-
making.  
The following two chapters describe institutional arrangements for drug funding to explore 
this variation. By tracing policy debates during the years leading up to the reforms that created 
regulatory agencies assessing a drug’s benefit, each of the chapters identifies the constellation 
of actors involved, their interests and the patterns of their coalitions. They also discuss key 
attributes of the institutional arrangements, such as their political insulation. As later chapters 
shall show, political insulation structured conflicts and policy development in its subsequent 
years. The present chapter considers the England case, while the next chapter examines the 
French one. 
It is also worth noting what the two chapters are not about. Each of the chapters describes 
the institutional structures around drug funding and the policy debates around their creation. 
As noted in the previous chapter, however, the origins of the institutions are outside the scope 
of this thesis’s analysis. The chapters hence do not examine where actors’ preferences for 
certain institutions come from.  
The present chapter examines policy debates over drug funding leading up to the creation 
of a regulatory agency, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE).47 It highlights 
that with its establishment, NICE was not only expected to make advice but also to play the 
decision-making role in drug rationing within the NHS. By the early 2000s, it was established 
that NICE’s guidance signalled the final decision for the NHS; the health minister was not 
involved in decisions once NICE had issued guidance. The English case hence represents an 
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institutional structure with high political insulation, where experts’ decisions cannot be 
overturned by the minister. This chapter shows that incumbent governments’ political 
strategies towards unpopular decisions such as rationing played a role in shaping both the 
terms of policy debates and the institutional structure. While the introduction of the internal 
market by the Conservative government ushered in collective explicit rationing by local level 
health authorities, despite the advocacy by societal actors the government was reluctant to 
address its own national responsibility for rationing. It instead aided the development of local 
expertise that helped local health authorities’ funding decisions. The reluctance to take on the 
rationing responsibility remained unchanged after the election of the Labour government. 
While centralising the expert network through the creation of NICE, the government attempted 
to keep shielding itself from taking on the responsibility for explicit rationing decisions. In 
short, events that led to the institutional arrangements with high political insulation were 
shaped by strategies of the incumbent government, both Conservative and Labour, to avoid 
addressing its responsibility for an unpopular policy. 
This chapter begins by briefly describing institutional structures and the actor constellation 
since the post-war period. It then examines policy debates and actors’ strategies over drug 
rationing following the Conservative government’s introduction of an internal market from 
the beginning of the 1990s, tracing the events leading up to the creation of NICE. The chapter 
next turns to the institutional arrangements for drug funding created in the late 1990s. It 
highlights the high level of political insulation, whereby NICE’s guidance about a drug was 
the final decision for the NHS without ministerial involvement.  
  
1. Institutional and policy legacies 
In the post-war decades, the English institutional arrangements for drug pricing were 
characterised by informal governance. 48  Rather than being governed by direct state 
intervention, pricing took the form of industrial association-led self-control - a typical mode 
of governance in the era of British “club government” (Moran 2003). Every five years from 
1957, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) and the government made 
voluntary agreements for controlling the profit the industry earned from the NHS. Having 
rebranded itself as the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) in 1977, the 
                                                     






agreement’s core features, such as its voluntary and informal mode of governance through 
profit control, remained largely unchanged. The PPRS benefited the industry, especially large, 
research-orientated firms located in the UK, in several respects. First, under the scheme 
companies freely set the price that the NHS paid for individual drugs. Second, setting the limits 
of firms’ overall profits for the next five years allowed for both certainty and flexibility in 
company strategies. Third, PPRS’s indirect control had the merit of a faster product launch. 
Unlike countries with pricing control, profit control through PPRS meant few additional layers 
of regulatory process existed once a drug got approval. Given these features, scholars have 
argued that, together with the existence of elite research universities for medicines and their 
close collaboration with the industry, the NHS, and the government’s research funding bodies, 
PPRS helped develop the research-intensive pharmaceutical industry (e.g. Hancher 1990, Ch. 
2; Thomas 1995; Howells and Nearly 1995). This status quo had profound impacts on the 
options and instruments that policymakers could deploy. Unlike countries with statutory 
pricing control, containing drug expenditure through setting the price of individual drugs was 
not possible. The government hence had to rely on instruments to control the volume of drugs, 
especially those related to drug reimbursement from the NHS. 
The institutional arrangements around drug rationing since the post-war years were 
embedded in the health care system, which was also characterised by informal governance. 
Although the NHS had a hierarchical structure in fiscal terms, “implicit bargains” between 
physicians and government granted doctors extensive clinical autonomy (Tuohy 1999, 41, 
240). This institutional balance at the founding moment locked the institutions into the path it 
followed in subsequent decades. At least until the mid-1980s there was little government 
control over clinicians’ prescription behaviour. While the government set out a global budget 
to control health care expenditure, it was individual clinicians who decided on clinical 
priorities and treatment strategies. Rationing was thus “hidden”: “bedside rationing”, together 
with techniques such as waiting lists and General Practitioners (GPs) not referring their 
patients to specialists, was thus the dominant mode of decision-making.  
The implicit and hidden form of rationing was further complicated by the budgetary rules 
specific to pharmaceuticals. In primary care, drug prescription was cash unlimited49 – hence 
theoretically there was no drug rationing in primary care; GPs’ demands for prescribed drugs 
should always be met, as any excess spending for prescription was taken from other services. 
                                                     






This cash-unlimited budget was consistent with the doctrine that obliged GPs to prescribe 
according to medical needs.50 By contrast, hospital drug expenditure was funded from the 
general budget, and therefore was cash limited. In either case, however, drug rationing 
remained hidden, under the sole discretion of doctors. Any attempts at encroaching on the 
authority of doctors to prescribe met fierce opposition from doctors themselves and the 
pharmaceutical industry. The Thatcher government’s attempt to introduce the “Limited List” 
is a case in point. In November 1984, Health Secretary Kenneth Clarke announced its 
introduction, which would restrict the availability of a range of drugs that GPs could prescribe 
in seven therapeutic categories, such as cough medicines and tranquillisers.51 The proposal 
unleashed counter-mobilisation by both the ABPI and the British Medical Association (BMA). 
The ABPI, as well as individual firms, challenged the measure through all possible means, 
from advertising campaigns, lobbying the government and Members of Parliament (MPs), to 
legal actions. The following spring the government introduced the List in a watered-down 
form, covering seven therapeutic groups (Medawar et al. 1992, 176-180; Hancher 1990, 199-
204). 
This governance structure underwent profound changes when the Thatcher government 
adopted a reform to introduce an “internal market” within the NHS. The reform separated the 
purchaser and provider of health care by transforming local health authorities (bodies that had 
previously delivered care to local districts) into purchasers. It also created GP fundholders, 
which were allocated budgets and purchased services. Apart from its official rhetoric of 
efficiency through market forces, the purchaser-provider split had its own political 
consequences: it strengthened the management body’s decision-making power over clinicians 
(Giaimo and Manow 1999, 973f). In the new organisational arrangement, district health 
authorities were designed to set clinical priorities and purchase medical services. As the next 
section shows, the collective and explicit decision-making at the local level not only revealed 
rationing practices but also exposed the regional unevenness in the practices that had been 
hitherto concealed. By the mid-1990s, the variation in funding across regions began attracting 
considerable political attention (Klein 2013a, 176–179). The rise of the rationing debate over 
the course of the 1990s conditioned institutional reforms over drug funding. 
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2. The NHS internal market and the rise of “rationing” debates 
The introduction of the internal market prompted debates over explicit healthcare rationing 
among elite political actors. The BMA began advocating public debates on rationing once the 
introduction of the internal market took place. In 1992 its annual conference backed a motion 
claiming that rationing was “an unfortunate fact of life”; it called for the government to initiate 
a public debate to define how it should be conducted.52 The BMA’s advocacy also reflected, 
in part, the shift in its political strategies as the internal market, which doctors had been vocal 
in opposing, now became inevitable. It hence came to accommodate itself with the internal 
market as a new status quo and shifted its attention to operational problems. At the same time, 
the BMA continued highlighting the NHS’s chronic underfunding, which it hoped that a 
rationing debate would draw renewed attention to.  
The BMA was hardly alone in addressing rationing debates. Professional organisations in 
medicine, such as the Royal College of Physicians, also called for the involvement of the 
national government. A report by the Royal College in 1995 proposed to establish a National 
Council for Health Care Priorities, an independent body which would consist largely of 
experts; its role would be to review methods of rationing and monitor decisions taken at local 
level.53 A subsequent meeting jointly led by the BMA and the Royal College of Physicians, 
together with the NHS Executive, reported that senior NHS officials had come to accept that 
there might be a case for national, as well as local, guidelines on rationing.54 Likewise, expert 
communities, such as health policy think tank The King’s Fund, among others, promoted 
public debates on rationing by bringing together academics and NHS practitioners.   
Rationing debates were seen as significant among elites, not only in their own right but also 
for their implications for the core principles of the NHS, such as being a tax-funded, 
comprehensive service free at the point of delivery. By the mid-1990s, concomitant with 
discussions of rationing, a growing debate emerged over the sustainability of the NHS. For 
instance, in 1995, a pharmaceutical industry-funded report commissioned by Sir Duncan 
Nichol, a former chief executive of the NHS, claimed that with growing consumer demand 
and an ageing population the tax-funded NHS could no longer offer comprehensive treatments 
free for all. This would not only require rationing of treatments, the report argued, but also 
                                                     
52 Financial Times 7 July 1992; The Guardian 7 July 1992, 29 April 1992. 
53 Cf. Financial Times, 19 September 1995. 






expansion of private-sector financial contributions.55 At around the same time, a report by 
Rodney Walker, a retiring chairman of the NHS Trust Foundation, advanced a similar proposal, 
calling on people to buy private health insurance to help leave the service to the old and the 
vulnerable, by introducing tax relief on insurance premiums.56 Actors closer to the Labour 
Party, as well as NHS managers, were wary of these advocacies for private options, seeing 
them as attempts to undermine the founding principle of the NHS, ultimately leading to its 
residualisation.  For instance, a report by the left-leaning Institute of Public Policy Research 
think tank warned that the growing use of the private care would prove “a development which 
threaten[ed] to create a two-tier system with poor service for the poor” 57 . The National 
Association of Health Authorities and Trusts’ (an umbrella body of hospitals and regional 
health authorities) chief executive likewise publicly dismissed the claims put forward by the 
“ration and privatise brigade”.58    
The rise of elite-led policy debates mirrored public controversies over rationing individual 
treatments as instances of restriction of access to treatments by local health authorities began 
appearing in press headlines. To be sure, in practice most of the district health authorities tried 
to avoid blanket exclusion of treatments.59  Yet, controversial decisions, even if small in 
number, were widely reported, especially when followed by lawsuits. In particular, the case of 
“Child B”, where a local heath authority took a decision to deny a second course of treatment 
to a paediatric leukaemia patient on the ground that the chances of success were very slight, 
provoked both public attention and academic debates.60  
The Parliament Committee provided a political arena to bring rationing debates to the 
national level. The House of Commons Health Committee (HoCHC) opened a series of 
inquiries related to health care priority setting in 1994, which covered a range of different 
pillars of the NHS. An inquiry was held specifically into NHS drugs expenditure. The 
Committee’s resulting report proposed establishing a National Prescribing List, a “positive list” 
of drugs covering all therapeutic categories that could be prescribed within the NHS.61 A 
separate inquiry in 1994 was devoted to purchasing decisions by local health authorities, and 
                                                     
55 The Guardian 19 September 1995; Financial Times 20 September 1995. 
56 The Guardian 16 September 1995.  
57 Lenaghan 1996, ii. 
58 Financial Times 3 November 1995. 
59 Ham 1993, 435 
60 On the case of Child B, see New 1996, 1596; Ham 1999. 






hence more directly took up rationing debates. The committee’s Conservative chairperson 
called for “an honest and realistic set of explicit, well-understood ethical principles at national 
level”62: among other proposals demanding a stronger lead by the Department of Health, the 
committee advocated for a purchasing framework to define local packages of services and the 
criteria on which local purchasing decision should be based. In drawing up its 
recommendations the Committee considered experiences of explicit rationing decisions in 
other countries including Oregon State in the USA, New Zealand, and the Netherlands, among 
others, and together with societal actors’ promotion of rationing debates, by mid 1990s 
policymakers as well as elite societal actors were aware of examples of other countries where 
explicit rationing took place through institutionalised settings. 
In contrast to the rise of rationing debates among societal actors and MPs, however, the 
Conservative Major government refused to publicly acknowledge rationing, which it preferred 
instead to call ‘priority-setting’. Ministers repeatedly rejected the idea of setting treatment 
priorities at the national level. Responding to the BMA’s call for public debates on rationing 
in 1992, Health Secretary Virginia Bottomley noted that while priority setting must take place 
at every level the role of the government was to give service strategic decisions; it would not 
be appropriate for the national government to take decisions on clinical priority. Instead, she 
argued, such decisions should be taken locally. 63 Likewise, in its 1995 response to the House 
of Commons Health Committee’s inquiry on priority setting in the NHS, the government 
explicitly rejected the idea of a national list of treatments. Referring to “some of the radical 
approaches to rationing health care used in other countries” such as the Oregon Health Plan, 
it claimed: “Such approaches are neither necessary nor appropriate for the NHS. No one list 
could ever hope to accommodate the range and complexity of the different cases which 
individual clinicians face all the time”.64 In the previous year the government had, on the 
grounds of its operational cost, also dismissed the idea of the National Prescribing List 
endorsed by the HoCHC.65 
The avoidance of rationing debates was further reflected in ministers’ political rhetoric. For 
instance, by not taking up their responsibility for rationing ministers tended to shift the blame 
on to managers on the ground. Hence in 1995, in refuting Labour’s claim that one-third of 
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district health authorities restricted a range of surgical operations, Health Secretary Stephen 
Dorrell stated that if local authorities did not follow the obligation to use resources to meet 
priorities for care they “would be hauled before parliament for 'an abuse of public funds'”.66 
Moreover, instead of seeing it as a policy problem to be tackled, the government took existing 
variations in health authorities’ decisions and approaches to rationing as evidence justifying 
its hands-off approach to local decision-making. As Bottomley put it, “[t]he fact that different 
approaches are used suggests that there is no place for national setting of local priorities when 
the determination of local needs is elusive, even to people living in the district”.67    
Rather than addressing rationing debates, the government influenced local decisions in a 
subtler way. Two such alternative strategies are highlighted here. The first concerns the 
national framework of priorities. As noted, ministers set the strategic framework for the NHS, 
expecting ‘local strategies to be developed within the national framework, but aimed at 
addressing particular challenges specific to the needs of the local population’68. Such national 
priorities were communicated through the Department of Health (DH)’s annual Priorities and 
Planning document, which contained the government’s key policies with targets specific to 
each of them; in addition, the DH issued a large number of guidance notes to local authorities, 
some in response to specific inquiries while others addressed different matters in an ad-hoc 
manner. The resulted was what the HoCHC report called “priority overload”: local health 
authorities received an overwhelming number of “national priorities” that were sometimes 
contradictory, without clear directions of which items were most crucial. The lack of 
meaningful prioritisation, driven by the national government’s inaction, in turn, implied that 
it was the local authorities that adjudicated these different demands by the national government 
and made decisions.  
The second strategy for rationing concerns strengthening the knowledge base for decisions. 
The reluctance of the government to engage with rationing debates, let alone making a policy 
choice, does not mean that the government shied away from allowing knowledge and expertise 
to guide local decisions. On the contrary, the government championed various research and 
development initiatives for approaches to measure and compare effectiveness of different 
treatments, such as Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) and Health Technology Assessment 
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(HTA). Such efforts were pursued through enhancing the scientific capacities of the NHS in 
collaboration with academic communities of health economists  
The government’s enthusiasm for HTA had only begun to emerge in the past few years. In 
response to the House of Lords Select Committee’s 1988 inquiry on priorities in medical 
research, the Department of Health appointed a cancer specialist, Michael Peckham, as the 
first NHS Director of Research and Development. In 1991, under his leadership, it launched 
the NHS R&D Programme, with a national target to spend 1.5% of the total NHS budget on 
R&D, to be achieved in five years. Health technology assessment sat at the centre of the R&D 
Programme. In 1993 the Department of Health set up the HTA Programme - a strategy planned 
to spend the majority of the NHS R&D budget, £317 million at the time, on research on health 
technology assessment. With the ambition of creating an “evaluation culture” in the NHS, the 
HTA Programme was “to ensure that high-quality research information on the costs, 
effectiveness and broader impact of health technologies is produced in the most efficient way 
for those who use, manage and provide care in the NHS”.69 As a part of the NHS R&D 
Programme, the DH established research centres dedicated to the development of evidence-
based medicines and health technology assessment, such as the UK Cochrane Centre, opened 
in Oxford in 1992, and the NHS Centre for Review and Dissemination, based at York 
University and established in 1994. The former, in collaborating with the worldwide Cochrane 
Collaboration on evidence-based medicines, was dedicated to systematic reviews on 
randomised controlled trials; the latter centre, by focusing on research in the areas of 
comparative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of health care interventions, was aimed to 
“disseminate the results of research to the NHS in order to enhance effective decision 
making”.70 A related government-funded initiative was the Effective Health Care bulletins 
started in 1992; jointly produced by the Universities of York and Leeds, and the Royal College 
of Physicians, the bulletins provided meta-analyses of clinical and cost effectiveness of a range 
of health interventions, which were made available to district purchasers. According to the 
HoCHC report, the bulletins received “widespread and enthusiastic support” from district 
purchasers.71 In a later year, the Department of Health set up a national register of cost-
effectiveness analysis to collate results of comparative effectiveness research.  
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The Labour shadow health minister saw these government initiatives on HTA as “nothing 
but a smoke screen for rationing”.72 For his part, Health Secretary Stephen Dorrell emphasised 
that evidence-based medicines would not be “rationing by the backdoor”73; he argued that 
“[the] guidelines were to promote good value as opposed to least cost”. The government’s 
rhetoric to legitimise guidelines’ development revolved around reducing wasteful, clinically 
ineffective treatments while making information on cost-effective care readily available to 
local managers and clinicians. In the 1996 white paper “The National Health Service: a service 
with ambition”, it contended: “Managing the introduction of new technologies is a continuing 
challenge, but the NHS is becoming more effective in this, identifying and adopting those 
which will bring real benefit while discouraging those which are less cost-effective.” It also 
explicitly ruled out rationing of clinically effective treatments.74 These were not just rhetorical 
commitments; the emphasis on clinical and cost effectiveness also increasingly appeared in 
Priorities and Planning documents and other guidance to local authorities.75 
In parallel with the development of national-level programmes, the early 1990s also saw 
the growth of region-level initiative for HTA. Controversies over rationing debates put local 
health authorities under pressure. With the absence of an established basis for making 
judgements, health authorities used different tools and methods to guide their decisions, some 
involving public opinion surveys to elicit views on priorities of different treatments, while 
others sought inputs from GPs in conducting “needs assessment”. As health policy scholar 
Chris Ham reported in the early years of operation, the lack of information – and cost 
effectiveness of services in particular - to guide priority setting was perceived as a major 
problem among health authorities.76 A related observation was made by the Royal College of 
Physicians, who highlighted the failure of local authorities to collect epidemiological 
information in making judgements.77 In making choices in a technically complex and often 
controversial environment, some region-level authorities turned to an emerging academic 
community of health economists to provide evaluation of technologies based on their cost 
effectiveness. Perhaps the most notable case of such region-level initiatives was the 
Development and Evaluation Committee (DEC) of Wessex Regional Health Authorities (later 
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extended to cover all the South and West Regions). Established in 1991, the Committee was 
mainly comprised of senior clinicians, with the help of Southampton University’s public health 
research centre (Wessex Institute of Public Health Medicine). It assessed the cost-effectiveness 
of new and existing technologies using Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALY), a measure of 
the effects of health intervention. 78  Based on this assessment, the Committee made 
recommendations on whether the authority should purchase a technology or not, and the results 
were disseminated throughout the region. Claiming itself as “the first and most systematic 
initiative” of its kind, the Committee hence provided an early example of use of cost-
effectiveness analysis to inform local rationing decisions. 79  Similar initiatives were 
subsequently developed in some other regions, including the West Midlands Development and 
Evaluation Committee, the Trent Working Group on Acute Purchasing, and the Scottish 
Health Purchasing Information Centre.80  
In fact, at district level the majority of health authorities did not appear to use cost-
effectiveness analysis to inform their decisions, at least during the initial years of the internal 
market. Based on a study of the 116 district health authorities’ 1992-1993 purchasing plan, 
health policy scholar Rudolf Klein stated that he did not find a single example of authorities 
who reported they used cost-utility analysis for their decisions.81 Another study, conducted by 
The King’s Fund, reported a rather different picture. Based on a survey of the 187 English 
district health authorities, in 1992 it found that 21 percent of authorities used QALYs to assist 
their decisions, and a further 17 percent planned to do so. It concluded that “for a significant 
minority, therefore, QALYs have now become part of the rationing process”.82 Regardless of 
which one was closer to the reality, however, the local-level practices in the use of clinical and 
cost-effectiveness information left some legacies. First, by the mid-1990s, both through these 
local practices and debates over them, elite actors in the policy sector were well aware that 
district health authorities not only varied significantly with each other in terms of their policy 
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decisions, but also in their decision criteria. Second, as we shall see later in this chapter, policy 
practices at local level, notably the use of cost-effectiveness analysis, would later provide an 
example and existing resources to draw on in establishing NICE. 
The growth of regional-level initiatives for health technology assessment, such as DECs, 
cannot be fully understood without a broader context of national development. To be sure, key 
figures of the Committee tended to see national-level initiatives on cost-effectiveness often as 
slow, long-term and only covering limited topics; they argued that to meet demands from local 
commissioners it was necessary to complement national initiatives with rapid evaluations on 
more topics produced at local level.83 Yet initiatives at regional level were boosted by their 
incorporation to the funding from the NHS Regional R&D Programme. Moreover, the health 
technology assessment programme for Wessex DEC took a pivotal role in HTA initiatives, as 
the National Coordinating Centre for Health Technology Assessment (NCCHTA), which 
oversaw the NHS HTA programme, was located in Southampton University’s Wessex 
Institute for Health Research and Development. Bottom-up policy practices were thus at least 
partly facilitated by the government strategy on HTA. 
The contrast between the government’s reluctance to address the rationing debates and its 
emphatic support for guideline development underlines the importance of political incentives 
for the ministers to avoid blame for health care rationing. To be sure, the increased visibility 
and explicitness in rationing decisions was something that government policymakers should 
have been aware of when introducing the internal market. In a 1991 interview shortly before 
the operation of the internal market, when asked whether “politicians should be more upfront 
that not everything can be afforded”, Health Secretary William Waldegrave affirmed that it 
would be “utterly necessary under the new system”. As he put it: “[O]ne of the things that will 
be thrown up will be a much more explicit demonstration of what we are and are not buying. 
That will cause those decisions to have to be justified - not only by politicians but also by the 
clinicians. The system will become more open and explicit, and therefore more argumentative. 
I think that must be a good thing, although it will take a little getting used to.”84 Explicit 
rationing at local level was thus hardly an unintended consequence, if a by-product, of the new 
internal market organisational arrangements. However, once the internal market became the 
reality, successive ministers refused to address rationing debates, let alone define priorities 
based on their national government’s initiative. Waldegrave himself, in November that year at 
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a medical conference, took a more cautious attitude towards rationing; while commenting on 
the example of New Zealand, where “[they] have put their toes into the shark-infested waters 
of limiting the services available from the public health service", he declared that "These are 
waters in which we do not intend to swim."85  
The shift in Waldegrave’s political rhetoric might partly reflect a stronger electoral 
incentive for the latter phase, as the 1992 general election was then approaching. More 
important, however, the reluctance of Waldegrave and the successive ministers to engage with 
rationing debates may be driven by a greater level of controversy, and hence political incentive 
to avoid blame, that ministers were faced with in the post-enactment phase of the internal 
market. Instead of taking initiatives in rationing debates and some roles in setting priorities in 
public, ministers hence took a more overt approach, such as facilitating guideline development 
for clinical and cost-effectiveness while leaving unpopular decisions to local NHS managers 
and individual clinicians.  
When it comes to the policies specifically targeting pharmaceuticals, the government 
strategy was somewhat nuanced. Policymakers were wary of drug expenditure, which grew 
faster than general health expenditure.86 In 1992 the Health Secretary announced that the 
government would extend the Selected List to a further ten categories.87 The expansion of the 
List may appear surprising, given the widespread grievance over rationing at the time, 
combined with the government’s reluctance to take up the issue in public. The move could 
have been more controversial than the 1985 scheme, since unlike the latter, which covered 
symptomatic relief such as cough medicines and laxatives, the proposed schemes, as the BMA 
put it, included “significant treatment”.88  
Why did the government expand the scheme for blacklisting drugs on the NHS, while 
trying to avoid responding to the rise of rationing debates? Two interrelated factors may be 
relevant here. First, drug companies failed both to forge an alliance with doctors and to create 
a public backlash by connecting it with the rationing debate. Available evidence suggests that 
public debates regarding the expansion of the scheme were not framed around rationing. The 
government did not regard the Selected List Scheme as something that could be linked with 
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the rationing debates: instead it frequently labelled the List as a part of the rational prescribing 
agendas. Perhaps more importantly, neither did societal actors who addressed local rationing 
decisions manage to link the scheme with the rationing debates.89 Actors critical of the 1985 
scheme, such as doctors, did not attempt to frame the issue around rationing. 
In fact, unlike the fierce counter-mobilisation and public campaigns against the 1985 
scheme, this time doctors’ opposition had somewhat waned. While the BMA wrote in its 
submission to the HoCHC’s inquiry into NHS priority-setting that they were “concerned”, in 
particular, with the proposed inclusion on the list of some specific areas which they perceived 
as cost-effective care, such as oral contraceptives, , little evidence indicates that this resulted 
in salient public campaigns. While the representatives of GPs voted for a resolution to 
condemn the expansion of the List, as the Chair for General Medical Services Committee’s 
Prescribing Subcommittee put it, for doctors the Limited List was acceptable compared to 
other instruments for cost-containment, such as the imposition of cash-limited budgets.90  
The pharmaceutical industry was hence the main loser of the expansion of the scheme. The 
ABPI saw it as implicit additional price-control, through the threat to include drugs on the list. 
Individual companies lobbied heavily, while the ABPI used advertising campaigns. However, 
unlike the 1985 scheme, the industry failed to mobilise doctors, who came to accept the 
proposed expansion. Moreover, what could have been framed as rationing - and a report 
published by the ABPI indeed criticised the scheme as an “unacceptably blunt instrument to 
ration health care”91 - never caught sustained public attention; and in fact, the industry did not 
manage to exploit the frame of rationing well enough for it to galvanise public counter-
mobilisation. In contrast to the ongoing highly salient debates over rationing by local health 
authorities, the expansion of the scheme rarely got publicised by general news media.  
Second, again unlike the 1985 scheme, the government took a more accommodationist 
strategy in an attempt at silencing likely opponents. In translating its announcement into a 
concrete plan the government consulted the ABPI and the BMA. Institutionalised channels 
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such as the Advisory Committee on the NHS Drugs – a committee that gave advice to the 
minister on which drugs to be included to the List - played a role in such consultations. An 
access point to policymakers, which the BMA had won in the battle over the 1985 scheme,92 
the committee became a vehicle for doctors to exert their influence. Hence, as the BMA Chair 
for General Medical Services Committee Prescribing Subcommittee, who was also one of the 
members of the Advisory Committee on NHS Drugs, testified before the House of Commons 
Health Committee: “I am certainly, as a member of the Committee, quite prepared to put my 
neck out and say I disapprove thoroughly of contraceptives being on that list”. 93  This 
government strategy for accommodating societal actors, in turn, explains why the process of 
deciding on the List in the subsequent years took place only slowly and partially: by 1996, 
only 63 drugs were included on the List; and of them, only one was a prescription-only 
medicine.94  
Another indicator to gauge the government’s strategy for drug rationing is what happens 
when ministers encounter exogenous shocks, such as the arrival of a costly new medicine. In 
1995 the Department of Health took the unprecedented step of issuing a circular that restricted 
the prescription of beta interferon, a new drug approved for relapsing or remitting forms of 
multiple sclerosis. Apart from the Selected List Scheme and bans for safety reasons, this was 
considered the first time that the national government explicitly restricted the availability of a 
specific drug. In the circular the Department of Health advised that the drug should only be 
prescribed by neurologists in hospitals and not by GPs, and only in strict accordance with 
approved indications (Walley, et al. 1997, 345). There was some controversy before the launch 
of the drug, not only because its efficacy was disputed but also because it was expensive – the 
drug was likely to cost as much as £10,000 per patient per year, and one estimate projected 
that it could consume10% of the NHS budget (Walley and Barton 1995, 797; Dyer 1995). The 
circular was broadly supported by neurologists and GPs, many of whom were sceptical about 
the effectiveness of the drug (Walley et al. 1997, 346). The patient group the Multiple Sclerosis 
Society was critical of the decision, as the lengthy waiting list to see specialists would 
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effectively mean that beta interferon was rationed, even if the government had not deliberately 
done so.95  
Behind the scenes, Health Minister Gerry Malone was very reluctant to exclude the drug 
altogether. The guidance was prepared in consultation with the Multiple Sclerosis Society and 
the British Association of Neurologists.96 According to his account years later, after the event 
the minister told the Department’s officials to “go away and devise some schemes where 
ministers do not have to take these decisions.”97 While the minister hence tried to reduce the 
likely impacts  of an unpopular decision by accommodating societal actors, in the future he 
wanted to avoid the blame for such decisions through institutionalised mechanisms that would 
protect him.  
If the blame-avoidance strategy helped reduce the level of conflict that could have been 
otherwise generated by the minister’s decision, it did not contain it. During the preceding year 
the Department had asked health authorities to develop “effective management of new drugs 
into the NHS”, and beta interferon was the first nationally-coordinated attempt at such a 
“managed entry”.98 The circular on beta interferon was advisory, and the actual decision to 
fund it was left to local health authorities. This generated variation in funding beta interferon 
across local authorities, as some authorities refused to fund the drug. In one case, the refusal 
led to a judicial review, where the illegality of not complying with the minister’s circular was 
contested. 
The beta interferon episode provided a further catalyst for development of government 
HTA projects, especially with regard to early responses to expensive new or emerging 
technologies.99 The Department of Health developed a horizon-scanning project within the 
NHS HTA Programme, an “early warning” system that identified new emerging technologies 
that were likely to affect the NHS resources and in need of evaluation. 100 In parallel, since 
1996 the National Prescribing Centre identified emerging technologies based on systematic 
scanning of the literature and contact with drug companies and with the drug approval agency 
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(Medicines Control Agency), and disseminated the summary of cost and clinical effectiveness 
information to local health authorities and clinicians.101  
In sum, the introduction of the internal market gave rise to debates over the NHS rationing. 
Despite demands from clinicians and other elite societal actors for the government to publicly 
address the rationing debates, the incumbent policymakers tried to avoid them, leaving explicit 
decisions to the local health authorities. Instead, the government encouraged the development 
of local expertise to aid health authorities’ decisions. As the remainder of the chapter shall 
show, these developments during the Conservative years left important legacies. On the one 
hand, the Conservatives’ emphasis on local-level NHS rationing decisions left both 
controversies and fragmented local-level practices. When Labour took over power, it would 
inherit this institutional landscape and its perceived policy problems. On the other hand, the 
development of local experts and expertise on HTA as an alternative to national rationing 
debates left the resources that policymakers in the Labour government and NICE would later 
draw on. These policy and institutional legacies thus set the scene for institutional reform for 
the regulatory state in the Labour years. 
 
3. The Blair Government and the establishment of NICE 
The Blair government entered office with relatively vague agendas on the NHS reform. 
During the 1997 election campaign, the Labour party leader Tony Blair did not make 
commitments to increasing NHS spending. Labour’s electoral manifestos pledged to increase 
spending in real terms, without any specification; its emphasis was on critiques of the internal 
market and the reduction of waiting lists, among others. The increase in spending compared 
to the preceding year was modest until early 2000, when Prime Minister Blair announced that 
he would raise NHS spending to the average level of the European Union countries.102 In its 
first white paper, The New NHS: modern, dependable, published in December 1997, the 
government attacked the internal market as a source of fragmentation. Instead, it claimed that 
the internal market would be replaced by an emphasis on performance and partnership: it 
promised to abolish GP fundholders, creating Primary Care Groups, later Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs), which had budgetary responsibility and set priorities.103  Contrary to its political 
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rhetoric of criticising the internal market, however, the purchaser-provider split was 
maintained.  
The proposal for establishing the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was 
bundled into its overall plans for a “new drive of quality” in the NHS. The agendas were 
framed around its call for a “national dimension”104. Criticising “unjustifiable variations in the 
application of evidence on clinical and cost effectiveness”, it claimed to “spread best practice 
and drive clinical and cost-effectiveness”. Along with an emphasis on the existing R&D 
Programme for disseminating evidence on cost-effectiveness and the “National Service 
Framework” that set out national standards of care, it promised to set up a National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence which would produce clinical guidelines, together with a Commission 
for Health Improvement (CHIMP/CHI), which would monitor quality of care. The emphasis 
on quality continued in its subsequent green paper, A first class service: quality in the new 
NHS, published in the following July, in which the DH set out detailed proposals for 
establishing NICE.  
In the policy debate for setting up NICE the government stressed the national character of 
its guidance. The green paper noted that NICE would be committed to “promoting clinical and 
cost effectiveness through guidance and clinical audit”. An underlying rationale was to tackle 
so-called “postcode prescribing”: Health Secretary Frank Dobson argued that NICE would 
“help end unacceptable geographical variations in care that have grown up in recent years”, 
by producing guidance used across the country.105 Another rationale that the Health Secretary 
highlighted was that NICE would give a “single, authoritative advice” for clinicians to avoid 
duplication of guidelines. The White Paper also underlined that existing guidelines in some 
areas produced contradictory advice, while others lacked evidence to guide local staff.106 The 
order establishing NICE was formally issued in February 1999, and the Institute opened in 
April. Michael Rawlins, a professor in clinical pharmacology and the chairman of the 
Committee on Safety of Medicines until 1998, was appointed as NICE’s first chair. 
The proposal to establish NICE did not meet visible oppositions from doctors. The BMA 
broadly supported NICE in principle, but expressed concerns about limiting doctors’ clinical 
freedom. 107  Little evidence indicates, however, that doctors openly mobilised themselves 
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against the establishment of NICE. Rather, doctors welcomed NICE as it would address the 
rationing debates at national level, which the BMA had been advocating for years.  
The pharmaceutical industry remained much more cautious about NICE’s implications. It 
warned the government that NICE would become a “bottleneck” for innovative new 
therapies.108 As part of its campaign, the ABPI published a booklet claiming variations in drug 
care existed across the country. Although it came to accept NICE as a measure to “drive up 
standards of care and iron out inconsistencies”, nevertheless, the industry stressed that “there 
is a grave danger that such an activity could be used as a barrier to prevent patients getting 
prompt and ready access to innovative new medicines”109. In the wake of NICE’s launch, the 
industry proposed several alternatives to the procedural design of NICE’s guidance, warning 
that the Institute’s approach could be “anti-innovative” and damage the UK research base.110  
If the Labour government scaled up the explicit choice of rationing to the national level 
through uniform national guidance, its policy preference was far from taking the responsibility 
for it. In opposition, Labour had been highly critical about rationing within the NHS. Once in 
power, however, the Labour ministers were as reluctant as their Conservative predecessors to 
openly talk about rationing. Ministers as well as DH public officials – and indeed also key 
figures within NICE - used the term ‘priority setting’ instead of ‘rationing’ during 
parliamentary debates.111  For its part, it was now the Conservatives’ turn to criticise the 
government for not facing up to the rationing debates.  
Labour ministers’ policy strategy for explicit rationing were reinforced by another high-
profile episode concerning a specific drug – an explicit decision to restrict the use of Viagra 
(sildenafil), a drug for the treatment of impotence (aka erectile dysfunction). Viagra was often 
seen as a landmark case of explicit rationing decisions, because in this case - unlike beta 
interferon – the efficacy of the drug was not questioned; it was considered to be the first time 
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a health secretary had imposed a restriction on the availability of a drug on the NHS purely 
based on its cost.112 
Viagra received extensive media coverage as a “breakthrough drug” for impotence before 
approval in Europe – an expectation which led the minister to worry that the drug would prove 
a “serious drain” on the NHS. The BMA estimated that the drug bill would exceed £1 billion 
if all the men who might benefit from the drug were prescribed it, while the manufacturer 
Pfizer argued that it would cost £50 million after five years.113 Viagra was licensed in Europe 
in September 1998. On the preceding day, the NHS executive issued guidance stating that the 
minister was drawing up policy proposals and in the interim doctors should not prescribe 
Viagra. The Standing Medical Advisory Committee drew up advice for the Minister on the 
drug, pointing out that there were no medical reasons why it should not be available on the 
NHS, nor why GPs should not prescribe the drug. Subsequently in January 1999, however, the 
minister announced that he would be restricting the availability of Viagra: he intended to use 
his statutory powers to issue Regulations, putting Viagra on the Selected List. This restriction 
implied that the drug was to be made available by GPs only for patients with erectile 
dysfunction who had had prostatectomy, radical pelvic surgery, spinal injuries, diabetes, 
multiple sclerosis, or single gene neurological disease. An additional guidance stated that for 
certain patients the drug would only be available after specialist consultation. Just 15% of 
impotent patients were said to be eligible for the drug.114 Dobson emphasised a resource-
allocation imperative in making the decision: “We have to find a sensible balance between 
treating men with a distressing condition, and protecting the resources of the NHS to deal with 
other patients, for example with cancer, heart disease and mental health problems.”115 His 
justified the decision by claiming that impotence is “neither life-threatening nor causes 
physical pain”.116 
Doctors, who had already been frustrated with the interim banning of Viagra, contested the 
announcement. The BMA had seen the temporary restriction as a failure to protect GPs from 
a surge in the demand for the drug.117 It had pressed the government to issue guidance by 
threatening that otherwise it would advise doctors to routinely prescribe the drug. When the 
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decision was announced, the BMA immediately condemned it, noting that the proposal made 
“cruel, unethical, and inequitable distinction between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” forms 
of impotence”. 118 Doctors contested the criteria for distinguishing those who were eligible 
from those who were not, which were not based on clinical reasons but on causes of impotence. 
As the General Practitioner Committee chair noted, the drug proved clinically effective and 
was cost-effective in QALY terms.119 The BMA advised its members to defy the guidance and 
to prescribe Viagra according to clinical needs, although, to the surprise of the BMA leadership, 
the majority of the GPs appeared to abide by the government’s policy for rationing.120 For its 
part, the chief executive of the NHS Confederation (the representative of the NHS trusts) 
backed the announcement.121 After public consultation, in April the government expanded the 
eligibility to include some other conditions; and the protest by the BMA leadership somewhat 
toned down. The guidance went into effect in July. 
The manufacturer Pfizer brought the case to the court. The High Court ruled  that May that 
the guidance announcing the interim ban was unlawful, because it constrained GPs clinical 
judgement under their statutory Terms of Service. It also ruled that the government had 
breached the EU Transparency Directive, which required it to give public notification of its 
reasons based on “objective and verifiable criteria”.122 While this did not stop the Regulations 
from limiting the availability of Viagra, the process amplified the salience of rationing in 
public debates.  
Viagra arrived shortly before the launch of NICE. If Viagra’s “focusing event” did not 
affect the design of NICE, it reinforced the terms of the debates surrounding it in two respects. 
On the one hand, it reinforced perceived rationales of NICE in the eyes of different actors. In 
the wake of Viagra being licensed in Europe the minister Alan Milburn, when asked about the 
government’s position on it in a House of Commons debate, noted, “[f]or a drug such as Viagra, 
the national institute would need also to advise on how such treatments should best be targeted 
to ensure that the most appropriate patients are selected for treatment, and that NHS resources 
overall are used in the most effective possible way.”123 After Dobson’s guidance and the 
eventual High Court ruling, major news media interpreted his handling of the issue as a 
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demonstration of “the flaws of the current system” (BBC News, 6 August 1999).124 This 
interpretation of the guidance was also shared by the BMA, which wanted the minister to refer 
the Viagra case to NICE when it came into being.125 In either case, it was widely assumed that 
once NICE started work it would no longer be the minister but NICE who would make 
rationing choices. On the other hand, the Viagra case provided the precedent of a high-profile 
judicial review by a manufacturer successfully challenging a government’s decisions about 
health care rationing. In short, NICE was launched into an already controversial environment 
vis-a-vis the rationing debate. 
 
4. The structure and the processes of reimbursement decisions   
NICE was established as a special health authority covering England and Wales. In formal 
terms the independence of NICE from the Department of Health was relatively fragile. Its 
creation was based on secondary legislation, or a Statutory Instrument, ordered by the Health 
Secretary under the 1977 National Health Service Act, rather than enacted by primary 
legislation; and like other bodies under the umbrella of the NHS, NICE was sponsored by the 
Department of Health and ultimately accountable to the Health Secretary. Its establishing 
order’s wording exemplifies the formally predominant position of the Department of Health 
to NICE:  
“Subject to and in accordance with such directions as the Secretary of State may give, 
the Institute shall perform such functions in connection with the promotion of clinical 
excellence and of the effective use of available resources in the health service as the 
Secretary of State may direct.”126 
Management rules also followed this formal predominance of the Department of Health. 
Hence NICE’s Chair, seven non-executive members of the NICE Board, and its chief 
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executive were appointed by the Health Secretary. NICE also discussed its work with its 
Partners’ Council, comprised of representatives of different stakeholders, including the 
medical professions, pharmaceutical and health industries and patient groups, appointed by 
the Health Secretary. The Council reviewed NICE’s annual reports and the development of its 
work programme, which would be commissioned by the Department of Health.  
Yet, the picture is different when we look at the procedural rules of NICE’s work. NICE 
carried out “technology appraisals” – recommendations about whether new technologies and 
health care interventions should be available on the NHS. Apart from the above-mentioned 
functions, few legal provisions existed in NICE’s establishing order. Informal rules to guide 
the procedure were instead envisaged in a DH discussion paper circulated shortly before 
NICE’s launch; and then NICE set out its procedure in its official documents.127  
NICE’s technology appraisal process involved (i) topic selection, (ii) assessment, and (iii) 
appraisal. First, topics that NICE appraised were selected and were formally referred to it by 
the health ministers. The pool of potential topics came from the emerging technologies 
identified by Birmingham University’s Horizon Scanning Centre, funded by the NHS HTA 
programme; suggestions by stakeholders, such as the medical professions and patient groups; 
and proposals from the Department of Health. An advisory group within the Department of 
Health then screened and make recommendations to the health minister, who made final 
decisions on the topics for appraisal.  
In the next stage, independent academic groups, organisationally separated from NICE, 
carried out assessment. After NICE set out the scope of the appraisal, identifying relevant 
issues and questions in consultation with different stakeholders (“consultees”, which not only 
included societal actors but also the Department of Health), the NCCHTA commissioned an 
“assessment report”, produced by an independent academic group called the Assessment 
Group, which was normally one of the academic centres of NHS HTA Programme. In writing 
an assessment report, the Assessment Group reviewed the literature and evidences submitted 
by the manufacturer including data on cost-effectiveness. NICE then compiled the “evaluation 
report”, which consisted of the assessment report and other evidences, including comments on 
the assessment report.  
                                                     






The third stage involved appraisal by NICE’s Technology Appraisal Committee. The 
Committee, appointed by NICE, considered the evaluation report. The Committee was usually 
chaired by clinicians and its members were drawn from the NHS, academia, patient groups 
and the pharmaceutical and medical device industries. Once the Technology Appraisal 
Committee agreed a recommendation, called the Final Appraisal Determination, it was 
circulated and stakeholders were given a certain period to submit appeals to a panel comprised 
of five members appointed by NICE. Following the appeal period, NICE guidance was 
published to the NHS. 
 As this description highlights, in making appraisals NICE drew on existing resources and 
the expertise of academic communities developed by both the NHS HTA Programme and 
region-level HTA initiatives. After all, it was the Assessment Groups of academic institutions, 
contracted out by NICE, rather than NICE itself, that produced the assessment report based on 
clinical and cost-effectiveness analysis, which would be crucial for final decisions. As Rawlins 
explained, this organisational choice – NICE as a “virtual” Institute which harnessed a network 
of existing academic centres, rather than developing in-house expertise – was mainly due to 
its small budget; the academic centres forming Assessment Groups, as well as their assessment 
reports, were funded by the NHS HTA Programme, not by NICE.128  
Yet, this organisational adaptation created an unintended consequence for the political 
insulation of NICE’s appraisal process. As Wood (2014) has pointed out, the organisational 
structure whereby the Appraisal Committee appointed by NICE, rather than NICE itself, 
considered and made decisions on technology appraisal guidance, provided a high level of de 
facto insulation of the Committee from both the DH and NICE senior officials. The double 
delegation, from ministers to NICE, and then from NICE management to the Appraisal 
Committees, further shielded the appraisal process from outside pressures including elected 
officials. Yet, the chain of delegation might go even further; the main bulk of evidence, 
especially data on cost per QALY of the technologies under consideration, were produced by 
independent academic centres with their funding organisations, and operation, separated from 
NICE. The independent production of cost per QALY had important implications in the 
subsequent years. As we shall see in Chapter 4, as NICE operated it developed its “case laws” 
of a certain threshold of recommendation, mainly based on cost per QALY of the given drug 
-  data given externally by the assessment report - and the room for manoeuvre was greatly 
                                                     






narrowed down once its cost per QALY gained were established. The informal practices of 
NICE hence would further reinforce its operational independence from any political 
interference.  
Moreover, during the technology appraisal process the hands of elected officials were 
heavily constrained. Few provisions gave specific explicit roles to the minister during NICE’s 
appraisal of individual drugs. To be sure, it was the DH who was formally responsible for 
referring a selected technology to NICE 129 ; the dissemination of the NICE appraisal’s 
recommendation was, at least initially, subject to the minister’s approval 130 ; and more 
generally, as noted, ministers had a formally predominant position to NICE, since NICE must 
act “subject to and in accordance with such directions as the Secretary of State may give”.131 
Yet, once a topic was referred, throughout the procedure the Department of Health remained 
one of the stakeholders. The procedural rules were highly formalised, explicitly codified, and 
transparent; such an “unambiguous” rule would circumscribe the room for manoeuvre of 
outside actors including elected politicians. 132  A high level of judicialisation may also 
reinforce the enforcement of the explicit codified rules, since, as we have seen, any deviations 
from the standard procedure might trigger a credible threat of legal action. There remained an 
apparent contrast to an arrangement where the minister assumed the final responsibility for a 
decision to fund a drug, and the agency’s guidance was merely advisory.  
Two further points should be noted about the minister-NICE relations in technology 
appraisal. First, it was explicitly debated whether NICE would review a drug’s affordability 
to the NHS. The government and NICE alike repeatedly stressed that the issue of affordability 
rested with the health minister and was a separate issue from a drug’s cost-effectiveness.133 
The government, they argued, would decide on affordability of treatments by setting budgets. 
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The health minister also set out overall priorities in the NHS, and through the National Service 
Framework, set standards in specific priority areas.  Second, and as a corollary, NICE was not 
intended as an instrument for cost containment. In fact, a uniform recommendation to make a 
treatment that it judged cost-effective available across the nation may lead to an increase, 
rather than decrease, in expenditure. As Michael Rawlins put it before the HoCHC, if NICE 
considered a drug cost-effective, it would, if necessary, “bully the Department [of Health] into 
seeing things our way”134. 
Two procedural changes during the early years of NICE further reduced the scope for 
government involvement in decision-making. First, in 2001, the government announced that 
NICE’s guidance would no longer require a minister’s approval before dissemination to the 
NHS. It is worth noting that this announcement took place in the context of the government’s 
response to the HoCHC’s inquiry into the Bristol Royal Infirmary scandal,135 which generated 
high-profile debates on the quality of care within the NHS. The report called for a fuller 
independence of NICE and the CHI from the government and making them accountable to 
Parliament. While the government rejected the recommendation, keeping NICE accountable 
to the health secretary, it laid out, among other measures to increase NICE’s independence, 
such as letting it appoints its own committees and structures, and the direct dissemination of 
NICE appraisals without ministerial approval – a change welcomed in the subsequent years 
by a HoCHC inquiry into NICE. 
Second, in December 2001, the government announced that from January 2002 onwards 
PCTs and Health Authorities would have a statutory obligation to fund the technologies 
recommended by NICE within three months. The change can be understood in the context of 
governmental concern about the implementation of NICE guidance. As the government 
wanted NICE to end the ‘post-code lottery’, it was keen on strengthening the capacity to 
monitor PCTs’ implementation. For instance in 2000, Health Minister Alan Milburn stated 
that the government would monitor the progress of implementation of NICE’s appraisals 
across PCTs, first shortly after the publication of NICE’s guidance and then six months later, 
and subsequently followed by clinical governance monitoring by CHI.136 
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The funding obligation was supported by NICE, drug companies and patient groups. The 
ABPI welcomed the government’s direction. As we have seen, it had been calling for an end 
to the postcode lottery. Likewise, patient groups had been advocating for strengthened 
implementation, highlighting persisting unevenness in the availability of drugs. Although 
implementation of guidance was not within NICE’s remit, it also expected PCTs and clinicians 
to follow its advice. Hence NICE’s chair Michael Rawlins stated that doctors should keep a 
note when they deviated from NICE guidance in case of medical negligence claims.137 Now 
that implementing NICE appraisal was mandatory, Rawlins encouraged patients to bring the 
PCTs that would not follow NICE guidance to judicial reviews.138 The threat of legal action 
was not only a rhetorical pose but also increasingly credible in the NHS; partly due to the cost 
of lawsuits shifting through conditional fee arrangements, negligence claims increased 
dramatically, with the rate of new claims per thousand consultant episodes jumping by 72 
percent between 1990 and 1998, and reaching 23,000 outstanding claims as of March 2000.139 
By contrast, the funding obligation put NHS managers under pressure. They were worried 
about the decision, since without an increase in expenditure they had to fund the recommended 
drug out of existing resources. As the policy director of the NHS Confederation put it, unless 
all the possible treatments were examined by NICE, it would be “a big gain for a small group 
of drug companies whose product is being recommended”.140 Health Secretary Philip Hunt, in 
turn, offered reassurance to health authorities that the Treasury’s three-year spending reviews 
would ensure sufficient funding to cover NICE implementation, along with baseline 
requirements, was allocated to them.141 The funding obligation of the NICE-recommended 
technologies thus tied both local health authorities and clinicians further into the chain of 
service delivery. The pressure on local authorities to implement NICE’s guidance was not only 
exercised through the fear of legal action; the reinforced external monitoring and performance 
targets also aimed at ensuring the enforcement of NICE’s recommendations. For instance, the 
Healthcare Commission, which took over the CHI, included whether local trusts followed 
NICE’s recommendations in its performance ratings. 142  Policy efforts were hence geared 
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towards a system that did not allow “second-guessing” NICE recommendations once they 
were made. 
These institutional modifications, in turn, had major implications for the political insulation 
of decision-making. NICE recommendations were directly published throughout the PCTs, 
and if they gave positive guidance PCTs would be legally obliged to make a drug available. 
The revised institutional arrangement thus meant that once NICE guidance was published, 
there were few powers granted to the ministers to overturn it. These institutional features hence 
indicate that policy decisions over drug funding were highly insulated from elected officials.  
 
5. Conclusion   
Until the mid-1980s, the governance structure for drug rationing was informal, whereby 
clinicians had the authority over hidden, individual rationing. This structure was transformed 
throughout the 1990s. By the early 2000s, drug rationing became collective and explicit; for a 
significant proportion of the new drugs, it became the national regulator who issued guidance 
on whether they should be funded by the NHS; the guidance was national and authoritative, in 
that politicians and other actors had no say once the regulator had issued it. For the remaining 
drugs, since the early 1990s the local health authorities had made explicit funding decisions. 
This chapter charted the transformation of regulatory institutions, describing key policy 
debates and actors’ positions and strategies. In doing so it stressed the locus of decisions for 
drug rationing was taken away from elected politicians.  
The English regulatory state over drug funding was a cumulative product of events under 
both the Conservative and Labour governments. The chapter found that incumbent politicians’ 
reluctance to address rationing debates played an important role in the development. Following 
the introduction of the internal market, the Major government consequently faced a surge of 
policy advocacy that demanded a national response to local-level rationing decisions. While 
repeatedly refusing to address rationing debates, the Conservative government supported the 
development of local-level expertise that aided health authorities’ rationing decisions. If the 
Blair government created NICE to tackle the regional variation in rationing decisions, it was 
also reluctant to address rationing by the national government. Hence, despite the difference 
between the Conservatives, who would leave rationing decision to local health authorities, and 
Labour, who would delegate it to a regulatory agency, neither of them would openly take on 






national rationing debates, together with “focusing events” involving high-profile drugs, such 
as beta interferon and Viagra, further alarmed ministers, by highlighting the downsides of 
directly engaging in unpopular decisions. Furthermore, during the early years of NICE, the 
attempt to reduce the implementation gaps via an obligation to fund NICE-recommended 
technologies reinforced NICE’s authoritative statues over drug funding.   
As a result of these developments, the English institutional structure for drug rationing 
exhibits a high level of political insulation. In terms of formal independence, the Health 
Secretary was predominant to NICE in its managerial rules and legal basis. However, when it 
comes to the powers to overturn NICE’s guidance, the minister’s hands were extremely 
constrained by both the funding obligation and detailed procedural rules. Once NICE issued 
guidance, it was expected to be implemented across the nation. As Chapter 4 shall show, when 
NICE began operation, the highly-insulated arrangements would bring about major 







Chapter 3 Ministers decide: The emergence of low political insulation in France, 
1990-2004  
 
The French institutional landscape around drug funding evolved considerably between the 
beginning of the 1990s and the mid-2000s. In the mid-1980s, there was no drug approval 
agency that assessed risk and efficacy of a drug, and assessment for drug approval was carried 
out by an expert committee within the health ministry; the relevant ministries collectively 
negotiated the prices of individual drugs; and the assessment for reimbursement was conducted 
by another health ministry committee. In the mid-2000s, an independent agency assessed drug 
approval; the price of individual drugs was negotiated by a civil-servant-led inter-ministerial 
committee that was organisationally separate from individual ministries; and another 
independent agency assessed effectiveness of drugs for pricing and reimbursement decisions. 
The process of this evolution was hardly linear; multiple institutions within the policy sector 
were proposed, established and then reorganised over time, adding institutional complexities.  
The purpose of this chapter is not to assess every step of these institutional developments. 
Rather, it is to describe the constellation of actors and recurrent policy debates throughout the 
process, exploring how they are related to institutional arrangements established by the mid-
2000s. It demonstrates that, despite repeated impetuses for the creation of regulatory agencies, 
politicians and bureaucrats’ preference for maintaining ministers’ powers to decide on drug 
rationing was built into new institutional arrangements. As later chapters shall show, the 
institutional arrangements with low political insulation established during this period, in turn, 
shaped the subsequent interaction of political actors.  
The chapter shows that the locus of decision-making over drug funding, whereby health 
ministers have the final responsibility for reimbursement decisions, largely reflected the 
government’s policy preferences. Indeed, at several junctures a recurrent theme of policy 
debates was whether an independent agency could take what is called an “economic”, as 
opposed to “scientific” technical, role. The ministers, both left and right, as well as high-level 
civil servants, explicitly rejected the idea of an autonomous agency making decisions in the 
“economic” realm, such as pricing and reimbursement. Instead, they preferred decision-
making powers to rest with ministers. While this demarcation of responsibility kept the 
decision-making process of funding drugs less insulated from elected politicians throughout 
the period (and thereafter), this low political insulation did not mean that ministers did not take 






contrary, the successive French governments repeatedly used de-reimbursement of treatments 
-- total exclusion from the reimbursement list -- or changes in the reimbursement rate as a 
technique for cost containment, and these initiatives sometimes triggered major counter-
mobilisation. The difference between the French and the English institutional and policy 
settings is, hence, not that these two country cases fundamentally vary in the policy history of 
explicit rationing prior to the procedural reform that established the regulatory agencies; in 
both cases, explicit rationing existed and it was unpopular. Rather, the feature distinguishing 
the French institutional setting from its English counterpart is that even after setting up an 
independent agency that assessed drugs’ clinical benefit, the minister firmly held final 
decision-making powers for drug funding. 
With regard to the overall arguments of the thesis, the present chapter thus describes low 
political insulation of the locus of decision as a matter distinct from the independence of a 
regulator. The cumulative changes in institutional arrangements provided the committee 
assessing a drug’s benefit with a greater formal independence from the health minister. Despite 
the changes, however, the health minister maintained the decision-making powers over 
inclusion of a drug on the reimbursement list. The French institutional setting for drug funding 
policy thus represents the low level of political insulation, where elected officials hold the final 
decision-making powers over drug funding.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. It begins with a brief sketch of the French health care 
system and the structure of the pharmaceutical industry in the post-war decades. The legacies 
of these structures shaped policy options, debates, and coalitions of actors since the 1990s. 
Second, the chapter examines key organisational changes in drug pricing and reimbursement 
which took place between the 1990s and mid-2000s, describing government actors’ 
preferences and strategies during the reforms. It shows how the state imposed its preferences, 
leading to a locus of decision-making less insulated from elected politicians. Third, it discusses 
the structure and the process of drug reimbursement decisions. It shows that while the creation 
of an independent agency, Haute autorité de sante (HAS), led to the expert committee 
assessing a drug’s clinical benefit having greater formal independence from the health minister, 
both before and after its inception this minister had the final decision-making powers on drug 
funding.  
 






The French government has exercised strong statutory control over drug prices. The state 
intervention dates back to 1939, when the government imposed a price freeze to tackle 
inflation. In the immediate post-war years drug prices remained frozen against the backdrop 
of the general discretion granted to the Ministry of Finance on the price of products. The 
Ministry’s powers remained unchanged after price controls over other products were lifted. 
From 1948, the price of drugs was governed by the formula of production cost plus margins 
of profit.143 This system of the cadre de prix was replaced with the grille de prix (price 
schedule) in 1967, whereby the new government committee (the Coudrier commission) 
recommended the list of drugs covered by the national health insurance. The modality of 
setting prices was also partially replaced by a comparison of benefits within the same 
therapeutic class.144 In 1980, in an attempt to differentiate innovative drugs, the system was 
reformed: a quasi-competitive logic was introduced, with drug prices depending on a 
comparison of benefits with existing products. To evaluate improvement in therapeutic 
benefits, the Coudrier commission was terminated and replaced by the newly established 
Transparency Committee (commission de la transparence), which gave advice on the 
reimbursement list to health ministers.145 As a result of strict pricing control, for decades drug 
prices were kept lower than in comparable European countries. 146  
The stringent pricing control was often considered, in turn, as a source of firms’ volume-
oriented strategy (Jeunemaitre 1990; Hancher 1990, esp. 90, 254; Thomas 1994; Chauveau 
1999, esp. 297, 667-669; Jacobzone 1998, 47). French drug companies sought to develop “me-
too” products based on their old products, instead of innovative ones. Policymakers repeatedly 
highlighted the domestic industry’s lack of innovative capacities, its relatively low R&D 
spending and its high promotion expenditure. The rationales behind the evolution of pricing 
methods mentioned above partly reflected policymakers’ attempts to address the adversarial 
impact of pricing control. Yet, such attempts were often overridden by the imperative to 
control costs, with repeated impositions of price reductions and price freezes. In the end, the 
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core characteristic of pricing control and low prices largely remained unchanged until the late 
1980s.  
Another characteristic was the persistence of a fragmented industrial structure. The 
domestic industry largely consisted of two categories. The first comprised of large firms 
originating from subsidiaries of the chemical industry, such as Rhône-Poulenc and Sanofi.147 
The second were numerous small and medium-sized firms. Being typically family-owned, 
these so-called “independent” firms often relied on a small number of products and were 
considered lacking in international competitiveness (e.g. Jeunemaitre 1985, 140; Cheauveau 
1999, 665-666). As Chapter 6 will show, these legacies would have implications for firms’ 
reactions and their interactions with the government when the latter attempted to impose de-
reimbursement plans as a form of explicit drug rationing strategies in the 2000s.      
France has a national health insurance system. The freedom of access to both ambulatory 
and specialist doctors remained granted until the mid-2000s.148 Clinicians, protected by the 
principle of freedom of prescription enshrined in the Social Security Code, had little constraint 
on their treatment choice. 149  The fee-for-service payment for outpatient care, the high 
expenditure on drug promotion and doctors’ reliance on such promotion for information, and 
the firms’ volume-oriented strategy -- all contributed to high expenditure on health care, 
including drugs. As the rising health care cost drew policymakers’ attention, they considered 
surconsommation (overconsumption) of drugs a major policy problem in the French health 
care system.  
Explicit decisions about drug rationing also have a long history. Indeed, if clinicians had 
freedom in choosing treatments, the government was still able to control the range of available 
options. Under the 1967 decree, ministerial orders defined the list of drugs reimbursable by 
the Social Security. From the 1970s, successive governments used changes in the 
reimbursement status of drugs in an attempt at cost control. In 1976, the Barre government 
reduced the reimbursement rate of certain drugs to 70%, and in the following year it set out 
rules classifying products into different reimbursement rates: drugs for chronic conditions and 
particularly expensive drugs were reimbursed at 100%, those used for minor pains and so-
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called “comfort drugs” at 40%; and the remainder at 70%. Since then, policymakers have 
repeatedly reduced the reimbursement rate, and sometimes implemented déremboursement 
(de-reimbursement), which means the total exclusion of treatments from the reimbursement 
list. The increase of the co-payment was often intended to tackle overconsumption of 
medicines, based on the assumption that this was caused by the moral hazard of patients; it 
was hence intended to make them responsible for medical costs they incurred.150 At the same 
time, however, the increase in co-payment was compensated by another feature of France’s 
health care system: complementary insurance. Provided by non-profit mutual insurance bodies 
or for-profit private insurers, this covered patient co-payment. By the mid-1980s, more than 
85% of the population purchased complementary insurance. For this reason, politicians tended 
to see the reduction of the reimbursement rate as less politically painful than total de-
reimbursement or other measures that directly impose costs on patients. At the same time, this 
coverage by complementary insurance might diminish the intended policy effect by making 
the costs on the patients less visible.  
Attempts to shift visible costs on to patients, either through reducing existing entitlement 
or imposing direct costs on them, have faced significant political contestation. For instance, in 
1979 the Barre government, led by the coalition of the Gaullist RPR (Rassemblement pour la 
République) and the centre-right UDF (Union pour la démocratie française), attempted to 
introduce the ticket modérateur d’ordre public, a type of co-payment that prohibited 
complementary insurance from full coverage. But after protests mobilised by insurers and 
blockage at the national assembly it dropped the measure.151 Another example of such cost-
shifting measures was the Séguin plan in 1986-1987, whereby the RPR Chirac government 
adopted measures to reform the affections de longue durée (ALD), which exempted patients 
with certain serious and chronic diseases from co-payment for treatments. For patients 
admitted to the ALD regime treatment costs were thus reimbursed at 100%. While the plan 
extended the disease areas subject to ALD to 30 diseases, it also limited its entitlement: only 
prescriptions directly linked to the ALD diseases would now be exempted from co-payment; 
and even the patients admitted to ALD were no longer exempted from co-payment for drugs 
reimbursed at 40%. The ALD reform was so unpopular that one observer noted it 
“undoubtedly contributed to the defeat of the Conservative government [i.e. the incumbent 
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RPR]” in the following 1988 election.152 When the Socialists returned to office after the 
election, they annulled the measure. Politicians, especially those from the RPR, seemed to 
learn from this event. In 1993, when the health minister Simone Veil of the Balladur 
government (the RPR-UDF coalition) proposed a non-reimbursable charge both per treatment 
form (5 francs) and  package of medicine (3 francs), she confronted deputies from the ruling 
RPR-UDF coalition, who saw the measure as a “copy of the Séguin plan”153 and protested. 
They preferred a reduction of the reimbursement rate for fees and prescriptions to the non-
reimbursable user charge.154 As a result, the Veil plan abandoned the proposal, and instead 
introduced a general reduction of the reimbursement rate by 5% and an increase in hospital 
fees. The “education effect” of such a measure, to make patients conscious about their 
consumption, was questionable, as the Fédération nationale de la Mutualité (the federation of 
mutual insurance bodies, also known as the Mutualité) decided to increase its contribution rate 
to compensate for the reimbursement rate reduction.155 
Health technology assessment in France, or “medical evaluation” (évaluation médicale), 
was gradually developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Its emergence was closely related 
to growing pressures about health care costs and the quality of care.156 As early as 1982, public 
university hospitals in Paris (Assistance publique–Hôpitaux de Paris, or AP-HP) established 
the Committee for Evaluation and Dissemination of Innovative Technologies (Comité 
d´Evaluation et de Diffusion des Innovations Technologiques), a group of experts who advised 
the director of the hospitals on purchasing new expensive medical technologies (especially 
medical equipment). In the mid-1980s, the Socialist government began addressing the lack of 
means to evaluate medical practices and technologies. Commissioned by the Ministry of 
Health, a report by a prominent physician recommended creating a foundation, independent 
from the Ministry of Health, dedicated to the dissemination of medical evaluation.157 The 
agenda emerged again in 1989 when the Socialists returned to power. The Ministry of Health 
commissioned a report led by the chair of the Union Nationale des Associations de Formation 
Médicale Continue (a generalist association for continued medical education), involving 
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leading figures in health technology assessment in France.158 The initiative led to the creation 
of the Agence Nationale pour le Développement de l'Évaluation Médicale (ANDEM) in 1990, 
an independent agency that was in charge of assessment of health technology and procedures 
except pharmaceuticals. Based on a systematic literature review, it produced health technology 
assessments examining their safety, efficacy and cost-effectiveness and provided this 
knowledge to its institutional clients, including the Ministry of Health and CNAMTS (Caisse 
nationale de l’assurance maladie des travailleurs salariés).159 
Policymakers used various instruments linked with the rise of medical evaluation in an 
attempt at tackling health care costs. One such strategy targeted doctors’ prescription 
behaviours. Often referred to as “medicalised” control of health care expenditures, as opposed 
to “accounting” control, such a measure included medical practice guidelines. Private 
clinicians came to accept the measures as they considered guidelines a lesser evil than 
alternative options, including capping medical expenditure, which would result in income 
loss.160 An agreement was signed by CNAMTS and medical associations in 1993 on the 
introduction of mandatory medical practice guidelines, Références médicales opposables 
(RMO), which applied to the ambulatory care sector. Since 1995, the ANDEM (replaced in 
1996 by the Agence nationale d'accréditation et d'évaluation en santé, or ANAES, which, in 
addition to clinical guidelines, carried out hospital accreditation) produced an RMO based on 
its assessment of scientific evidence and professional consensus regarding guidelines. The 
RMO was legally-binding in that doctors who did not comply could face fines.161  
Another strategy involved attempts at controlling expenditure and management in the 
hospital sector. In 1983 the Socialist government introduced a new payment system for public 
and private non-profit hospitals, which replaced per-diem payment with global budgeting. In 
the new system, each hospital was set an annual prospective budget based on a national rate 
of increase. At around the same time, based on the Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRG) 
developed in hospital management in the United States, the Ministry of Health began pilot 
projects of a “medicalised” information system, the PMSI (projet de médicalisation des 
systèmes d'information), which measured hospitals’ medical outputs based on the 
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classification of pathologies and treatments. 162  The initial idea behind the pilots was to 
reallocate resources according to clinical activities. To surmount resistance from physicians, 
the majority of whom remained hostile to sharing epidemiological data for managerial controls, 
however, reformers expanded the project gradually, presenting it as a tool for computerisation 
and physicians’ self-evaluation.163 It was only after the Juppé reform in 1995 that PMSI was 
introduced  as a resource allocation tool through modulation of the global budget at inter- and 
intra-regional levels;164 and it was after the 2004 reform, which replaced global budgeting with 
a new payment system, that the DRG-based information about clinical activities was used for 
hospital budgeting. The implications of the latter for the politics of drug rationing are discussed 
in Chapter 7. 
These attempts at French health technology assessment left important legacies. During the 
process of the early institutional development, with physicians dominating bureaucratic 
organisations, economic expertise became subordinate to medical knowledge. Thus, although 
the nascent health economist community contributed to formulations of the proposals for 
medical evaluation, clinicians dominated the operation of ANDEM (Benamouzig 2005, 331-
333; Robelet 1999, 90f). Likewise, as already mentioned, the initial introduction of PMSI was 
converted by physicians into a non-budgetary tool until the Juppé plan reconverted it. The 
organisational balance would remain the status quo until medico-economic evaluation by 
health economists drew policymakers’ attention again in the 2000s (see Chapter 7).   
 
2. Institutional reforms and government policy preferences 
A series of institutional reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s changed the institutional 
arrangements of drug pricing and reimbursement. In the area of pricing, the government 
instituted an interministerial committee, the Comité économique du medicament (CEM) in 
1994-1996, which became the Comité économique des produits de santé (CEPS) from 2000. 
Comprised of the relevant administrative directorates from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance and others, and chaired by a civil servant, the CEM was responsible 
for negotiating and concluding drug prices with companies; from 1994 it was also tasked to 
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sign price-volume agreements with individual firms based on framework agreements with the 
pharmaceutical industry association SNIP (le Syndicat national de l'industrie pharmaceutique). 
As the section will show, the establishment of the CEM was related to organisational changes 
in a neighbouring area of drug approvals, namely the establishment in 1993 of an independent 
agency, the Agence du Médicament (the Medicine Agency, renamed the Agence Française de 
Sécurité Sanitaire des Produits de Santé (Afssaps) in 1999). The area of reimbursement also 
saw organisational changes. The Transparency Committee (la Commission de la transparence), 
which was originally established in the 1980 decree, assesses a drug’s comparative clinical 
benefit - the information that was used for pricing and reimbursement decisions. During this 
period the organisational location of the committee changed over time. Launched as a 
committee within the Ministry of Health, it was transferred to the Medicine Agency on its 
creation. In 2004, the Transparency Committee moved again to a new independent agency, the 
Haute Authorité de Santé (HAS). 
This section describes policy debates around the establishment of the CEM in the 1990s 
and the creation of the HAS in the early 2000s. In both cases, government policymakers 
demanded a clear distinction between the “scientific” technical role of an agency and decision-
making in matters such as pricing and reimbursement. The latter, they considered, must be 
strictly the responsibility of the government.  The section discusses each of the episodes in 
turn.  
 
The CEM (1991-1994) 
The impetus for change came in the late 1980s, when the European Community (EC) 
moved to establish a common standard on drug approval regimes. At around the same time 
policymakers were wary of French industry’s competitiveness, especially in the context of the 
Single European Market expected in 1992. The 1989 government report pointed out the weak 
innovative capacity and the low level of R&D in the French pharmaceutical industry.165 When 
the Socialist Rocard government appointed the rapporteur Jean Weber, a former Director of 
the Pharmacy and Medicine (the head of the directorate in charge of drug approval) to report 
on the new drug approval system, to be in line with the EC directive, in early 1991, it also gave 
a mandate on recommending pricing system changes. While the Weber report recommended 
                                                     






the “Haut comité du medicament” (High Medicine Committee), an independent agency in 
charge of pricing and reimbursement, ministers and high-level civil servants alike rejected the 
proposal; they claimed that ‘while determination of “quality, harmlessness, and therapeutic 
effect” of drugs might be a scientific matter, putting drugs on the market has “social, political, 
and economic implications that should be decided by the state, not by scientists”’ (Nathanson 
and Bergeron 2017, 652).  
Instead of creating an agency, the government, who were hostile to the idea of giving away 
ministerial powers in economic matters, preferred an interministerial committee. In August 
1991, when the government proposed a law to establish the Medicine Agency, the second part 
of the proposed law was dedicated to provisions on a new pricing regime. It set out the price-
volume agreement and the role of the new interministerial committee, the CEM. The 
government had initially considered a profit-based contract, modelled after the British PPRS 
and in line with the Weber report’s recommendation, whereby each firm would contractually 
agree an overall package of price increases for their products based on an annual growth of 
expenditure target.166 The final proposal departed considerably from the British system, but its 
principle of contractual agreement remained. In the proposal, the CEM would negotiate 
contracts with each firm on their products’ price, volume (expenditure of reimbursable 
medicines), and their promotional expenditure. The government explained that with the new 
system the prices of innovative medicines would align with European ones.167 The price-
volume agreement hence aimed at controlling expenditure while stimulating the development 
of the pharmaceutical industry. Although some firms, and the SNIP, welcomed the proposal, 
several others voiced concerns that the new measure would penalise small companies and old 
products.168 
However, once the bill was sent to the parliaments it entailed executive-legislative conflicts. 
Deputies at the National Assembly did not oppose the Medicine Agency, and their criticism 
was focused on pricing regimes. Delegates from the opposition RPR had welcomed the 
government’s initial emphasis that “contractual logic” would replace the “administrative logic” 
of pricing control, but far from seeing such a “liberal” principle, they criticised the eventual 
text as dirigiste. 169  Prime Minister Édith Cresson invoked Article 49-3 of the French 
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Constitution, which allowed the government to halt parliamentary discussions and adopt the 
bill.170 At the opposition-controlled Senate the RPR rapporteur repeated similar criticisms 
against an “inadequate dirigisme”.171  She called for “an independent body, comprised of 
eminent members and with full decision-making power”.172 The Senate made amendments 
which brought back the “Haut comité du médicament” and its strong independent agency 
model. Next, the Senate-National Assembly joint committee adopted a text based on the 
Senate amendments. In the agreed text the High committee would conclude an agreement with 
firms, set the list and prices of reimbursable medicines, and establish the amount of repayment 
the industry would make when exceeding the volume or the promotion expenditure defined by 
the Committee. It also proposed that, within the overall budget, the industry would freely set 
the price, hence introducing partial price liberalisation. 173  This structure adopted by the 
legislative branch clearly deprived the minister of powers; the only prerogative left to the 
minister was setting the target reimbursable medicine expenditure. With the hostility of the 
government, especially from both Pierre Bérégovoy (minister of the economy and finance) 
and Jean-Louis Bianco (minister of social affairs and integration), Édith Cresson opted to 
withdraw the bill.174 
The proposals for the Medicine Agency and the new pricing system were, hence, once 
shelved, but they resurfaced in the subsequent years. First, the plans for the Medicine Agency 
re-emerged during debates triggered by the blood contamination scandal.175 In debates leading 
up to the adoption of a bill to reform the blood transfusion system in December 1992, the 
Senate rapporteur (UDF) proposed an amendment that incorporated the establishment of the 
Medicine Agency. Behind the scenes, according to Nathanson and Bergeron (2017, 665-666), 
in order to surmount the hurdle within the government, the ministers as well as cabinet officials 
agreed to “excise all “industrial” and price-control consideration from the AM [Medicine 
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Agency] bill”. The amendment passed the Senate and the agency was established the following 
year.  
The demarcation between the agency’s technical role and any economic competences was 
important both to government policymakers and the pharmaceutical industry. For instance, the 
following spring, when the government proposed a decree giving detailed rules of the structure 
and the function of the agency, the industry joined UDF and RPR politicians in opposing a 
provision that required drug companies wanting to license a new drug to indicate whether, and 
at what price, they would seek to obtain reimbursement. Threating to boycott meetings, the 
SNIP criticised the provision as it “mix[ed] up the technical analysis of new molecules, which 
should constitute the role of an independent agency, with negotiations on their price that 
should remain the prerogative of the Transparency Committee and the government”. The 
minister, in turn, reassured that “the agency does not have any economic competence”.176 The 
provision was abandoned when the government later proposed a price-volume agreement.177 
For its part, the other half of the 1991 proposal – the pricing system – was brought back to 
the agenda in May 1993, this time by the Gaullist government formed after the 1993 election. 
Health Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy proposed a price-volume agreement with the industry, 
which set an overall target for the annual price and volume increases; the government also 
proposed an agreement with individual companies within this industry-wide agreement. As 
the minister explained, the aim of such a price-volume agreement remained the same as in the 
1991 proposal: to reconcile the objectives of controlling expenditure with industrial growth. 
The concomitant idea of the Comité économique du medicament -- an interministerial 
committee rather than an independent agency -- as the unique interlocutor with the industry 
was also brought back.178 Following negotiation, the government and the SNIP signed an 
industry-wide framework agreement in January 1994. This was followed by negotiations with 
individual firms. Between 1994 and 1996, approximately 130 agreements were signed 
between individual companies and the CEM, covering 95% of the reimbursable medicines 
(Buisson and Giorgi 1997, 136). 
In short, throughout the debate leading up to the institutionalisation of the pricing system, 
government policymakers preferred to keep matters related to pricing and reimbursement 
issues – as opposed to drug approval, which they conceived as a technical or scientific matter 
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-- under the exclusive powers of the government. Indeed, both ministers and civil servants 
were against the idea of creating an independent agency in charge of pricing and 
reimbursement as it would deprive ministers of the decision-making powers. Instead, they 
preferred an interministerial committee. When the Socialist minority government failed to pass 
the bill and the agency model was adopted, the government withdrew the bill. And when the 
successive Gaullist government brought back virtually the same agenda and finally realised it, 
it also preferred an interministerial committee.   
        
HAS (2004) 
We can see a similar pattern in debates over the role of the government in the 
reimbursement system during the formation of HAS, the independent agency assessing a 
drug’s clinical benefit. Government policymakers wanted to draw a strict demarcation line 
between the “scientific” role of the agency and the reimbursement decision, the latter of which 
they considered must be the exclusive power of the minister.   
A proximate event that set off policy debates about the creation of an independent agency 
was a proposal forwarded by the Mutualité, the federated body of mutual insurance companies 
(Fédération nationale de la mutualité française). In June 2003, at its conference, the Mutualité 
proposed an independent body (Haute autorité, or a high authority) in the area of health, which 
would be in charge of determining the benefits of different health care interventions. This was 
part of its broader proposals for reforming the health care system’s governance structure. The 
underlying idea was to limit the state’s role to “a guardian of functioning”, moving towards a 
system based on negotiations among obligatory and complementary sickness funds and 
medical professions.179 The Mutualité hence envisioned a process with strong independence 
from the state, whereby after the high authority’s recommendation the state would withdraw 
from the process and let the obligatory and complementary insurance providers set their 
respective benefits within the framework of the high authority’s recommendation.180 In the 
same vein, it also proposed a national union of sickness funds, a management body that would 
bring together obligatory and complementary insurance firms, to collectively manage 
ambulatory care through negotiation with medical professions.181 
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The Mutualité’s proposal for an independent agency appeared to be related to ongoing 
controversies over the government agendas for de-reimbursement. As we shall see further in 
Chapter 6, in the preceding few years waves of de-reimbursement plans had been heavily 
debated. Started as the Socialist government’s plan in 1998 and carried on by the successive 
both left and right-wing governments, the plans, based on the Transparency Committee’s re-
evaluation of all the drugs reimbursed by the national insurance funds, attempted to de-
reimburse the drugs that the Committee judged as of insufficient clinical benefit, amounting 
to 835 drugs (of the 4,490 reimbursable drugs). In September 2002, Health Minister Jean-
François Mattei of the Raffarin government (UMP) announced a three-wave plan to de-
reimburse 650 such drugs, starting from the following year. 182  In April 2003, he further 
announced reducing the reimbursement rate of 617 drugs with low or moderate clinical benefit, 
according to the Transparency Committee’s evaluation, from 65% to 35%. As a cost-bearer of 
the partial de-reimbursement, the Mutualité heavily criticised the measure.183 The Mutualité’s 
proposal for an independent agency hence meant to limit the state’s unilateral action on 
reimbursement issues, while enabling a greater role for insurance bodies through participation 
in policy-making.  
Health Minister Mattei responded with an agenda for an “Haut conseil du remboursement” 
in charge of the reimbursement of medical and paramedical acts. Covering an area larger than 
the Transparency Committee in charge of drugs, the minister envisioned that such a body 
would provide a fuller justification of health care provisions.184 To be sure, Mattei did not give 
much specification about the body at the time. Perhaps more importantly, while he promised 
that the complementary insurance bodies would be closely involved in specific tasks through 
the new independent body, the state, he noted, would be responsible for reimbursement 
decisions.185 The government thus from the outset did not intend to give away its prerogative 
over the decision-making powers for reimbursement. The proposal was nevertheless 
welcomed both by the complementary insurance and doctors. The largest generalist unions 
CSMF (Confédération des Syndicats Médicaux Français) demanded an independent body that 
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184 Le Figaro 16 June 2003 ; Le Monde 16 June 2003. 
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would not only bring together obligatory and complementary insurance bodies but also include 
the medical professions.186  
The government considered the proposal for the body as a first step towards long-term 
reform agendas in the health care system.187 In seeking broad consensus among actors over 
policy problems, the government created the Haut conseil pour l'avenir de l'assurance maladie 
(HCAAM), a consultative body comprised of the government and societal actors such as 
employers, trade unions, obligatory and complementary insurance bodies, medical professions 
and patient groups.188 Highlighting the the sickness funds’ massive budgetary deficit, expected 
to reach 11 billion euros in 2004, the resulting report addressed an imperative of reforms in 
functioning of the health care system. Among matters related to reimbursement, it introduced 
the notion of “reimbursable scope” (périmètre remboursable) of sickness funds and 
highlighted the lack of its active management. It emphasised the importance of clinical 
effectiveness (efficacité) and cost-effectiveness (efficience) in defining such a scope.189 And, 
in line with Mutualité and Mattei’s claims, it affirmed, without specifying agendas, the 
necessity to reform the governance structure. In particular, it argued for reallocating powers, 
and where necessary delegation of them, in order to re-clarify competence and 
responsibility.190  
The following spring, Health Minister Douste-Blazy, who replaced Mattei, laid out a 
concrete agenda for HAS as part of his major healthcare reform package. HAS, which took 
the form of an “independent public authority of a scientific character”,191  was tasked to 
evaluate the benefit of medical acts, provisions, and products, to elaborate recommendations 
for the admission of reimbursement.192 Taking up the Mutualité’s proposal for governance 
reform, the government also noted that it would introduce greater delegation of managerial 
powers to the sickness funds by creating a management body for them, the Union Nationale 
des Caisses d’Assurance Maladie (UNCAM). 
                                                     
186 Libération 16 June 2003. 
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188 The council was modelled after a similar government-private consultative body in pension policy 
(the Conseil d’orientation retraites created by the Socialist government in 2000).   
189 Hcaam 2004, 16-17, 65-76. 
190 Hcaam 2004, 26-29. 
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In terms of the allocation of decision-making powers between the government and the 
agency, however, the government’s policy preference remained a firm demarcation between 
an assessment, “scientific” technical advice offered by the agency’s experts, and decisions of 
reimbursement made only by the health minister. Responding to a National Assembly deputy’s 
question about whether the HAS would only play a role of providing scientific expertise or if 
it would also have decision-making powers, the health minister stated:  
“We do not entrust the High Authority with decision-making powers, that is clear …  
We consider that the High Authority must give its opinion on the medical benefit of the 
products and the acts that apply for admission to reimbursement. After that, the State 
remains the guardian of the final decision regarding the definition of the reimbursable 
scope.” 193 
Such a clear definition of responsibility for reimbursement decisions was considered 
important for both incumbent policymakers and societal actors, especially in the context of 
controversies over de-reimbursement plans. Not surprisingly, National Assembly deputies 
were quite sensitive about the proposed agency’s relations to de-reimbursement plans. The 
left-wing opposition criticised the agency as an instrument for de-reimbursement. The minister 
defended it by pointing out that it was the Socialist government who had started the de-
reimbursement plan.194 
The concern over the locus of reimbursement decisions can also been seen in an amendment 
made by the National Assembly. The original proposal provided that in conducting its tasks 
HAS would take into account the multiannual framework of expenditure in sickness funds, in 
addition to multiannual objectives of public health interest.195 Both the Gaullist rapporteur and 
Socialist deputies in the legislative committee found this provision problematic, since they 
considered that the HAS must be a “scientific body” and that “the decisions concerning the 
level of reimbursement must remain strictly in the prerogative of the State”.196 To make sure 
of this point they collectively put forward an amendment that proposed deleting the mention 
of the multiannual framework of health care expenditure. With the government’s backing, the 
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National Assembly adopted the amendment. 197  Thus, throughout the legislative process 
incumbent and opposition politicians alike had a shared policy position in that both wanted 
ministers to exclusively keep the reimbursement decision-making powers.   
The bill was adopted at the end of July.198 The Senate agreed an amendment that the HAS 
would absorb the ANAES, which was justified by the overlapping tasks of the two agencies, 
such as elaboration and diffusions of clinical guidelines and good use of drugs. The HAS was 
launched in January 2005. Laurent Degos, a professor of haematology and a former chair of 
Afssaps, became the first Chair of the HAS Board. The eight Board members, based on 
nominations by the President, the Senate, the National Assembly, and the Economic and Social 
Council, included the current chair of ANAES and the Transparency Committee, reflecting 
the character of the agency that took over these organisations; other Board members also 
seemed to reflect the bill’s enacting coalition - they included a former Director of Social 
Security, a former member of Mattei’s cabinet, a former chairperson of the generalist union 
CSMF (who was also in charge of health issues in the Gaullist UMP), and a managing director 
in charge of health and social security at the Mutualité. 
Thus, throughout the process of creating the HAS, the government policymakers’ 
preference for maintaining the powers for reimbursement decisions played an important role 
in the agency’s institutional design. Although the Mutualité had recommended an agency as a 
participatory mechanism of societal actors and the delegation of the state’s powers in drug 
reimbursement decisions, far from achieving these ideas in institutional design the incumbent 
policymakers retained the minister’s decision-making powers over reimbursement. And 
during the parliamentary debate, both government and opposition politicians wanted to make 
sure that the “scientific” agency would not have any economic roles in reimbursement, which 
they considered strictly the minister’s responsibility.    
 
3.  The structure and the process of reimbursement decisions in the mid-2000s 
The HAS represented an independent regulatory agency (autorité administrative 
indépendante, or AAI) and was given a legal entity; it enjoyed a high level of formal 
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independence from the ministers in charge of health and social security. Appointment rules 
followed the template of the AAI in France.199 Hence two of the eight members of the Board 
(“collège”) of HAS were appointed by the President of the Republic, two by the president of 
the Senate, two by the president of the National Assembly, and two by the Economic and 
Social Council. The Board members were appointed by a Presidential decree, for six years 
with renewal once.200. Thus, the HAS did not have a direct delegating relationship with the 
health ministers. In contrast to health minister’s formal predominance over NICE, in 
managerial terms the HAS had an equal footing with the health minister.  
The HAS Committees, such as the Transparency Committee, were also formally 
independent from the health minister. According to rules as of the launch of HAS, 20 full 
members of the Transparency Committee with voting rights, chaired by a Board member with 
expertise in the areas of pharmaceuticals, would be selected based on scientific expertise. The 
full members were appointed for three years and could serve two further terms. The Committee 
adopted opinions on drugs based on majority voting. Its 8 advisory members included 
representatives of the Directorate of the Social Security, the Directorate General of the Health, 
the Directorate of Hospitalisation and the Organisation of Care, the drug approval agency 
Afssaps (Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des produits de santé, later renamed as the 
Agence Nationale de sécurité du Médicament et des produits de santé, ANSM), the directors 
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of three main national insurance bodies, and a representative nominated by the pharmaceutical 
industry association and appointed by the HAS Board.201  
 
The organisational structure of the Transparency Committee, and in particular its formal 
independence from the health minister, was a result of decades-long cumulative changes. 
Originally established by the 1980 decree, the Committee was located within the Ministry of 
Health. With the creation of the Medicine Agency in 1993, the Transparency Committee was 
transferred to it, with the agency providing the Committee with a secretariat. But with 
appointment rules still being held by the health minister, the Ministry’s close connection with 
the Committee continued. Organisational reforms in 2003 and 2004 marked a departure from 
this structure. First, the 2003 change took place after the Conseil d’Etat annulled the 
Transparency Committee’s negative opinion about vasodilators, which it re-evaluated as part 
of the de-reimbursement plan, on the grounds of a lack of sufficient reasoning (see Chapter 
6).202 Faced with the significant setback in the de-reimbursement agenda, Health Minister 
Mattei introduced changes in the Committee’s organisational rules to strengthen its scientific 
profile, hoping to enhance the scientific rigour and reasoning in its assessment.203 Then, with 
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the creation of the HAS in the following year, it became the HAS Board, rather than the 
minister, which appointed the Transparency Committee members. In short, with the 
organisational reforms combined with the greater independence of the agency, expert 
assessments by the Transparency Committee were expected to play an important role in 
making policy choices on drug reimbursement.   
Similar to the relationship between NICE’s appraisal committee and its management, the 
HAS Transparency Committee’s assessment process is organisationally separate from its 
Board. As one observer (a former director of the DSS) put it in the wake of the 2004 reform, 
“it is hard to see the Board or its members interfere in its [Transparency Committee’s] 
decisions, unless to deprive it of all credibility. However, the opinion of the Transparency 
Committee will have greater power by having been taken within the framework of the High 
Authority.” (Bras 2004, 972). Thus, although the establishment of the HAS did not 
fundamentally alter the structure and function of the Transparency Committee itself, the 
creation of the HAS and the concomitant transfer of the Transparency Committee provided 
the Committee with a higher level of independence from the Ministry, which was seen to give 
the Committee’s expert assessment extra credibility.  
However, as we have seen in the last section, when it comes to procedural rules on 
reimbursement, the health minister held a firm grip on the final decision. Once either the 
EMEA or the Afssapps approved a drug based on its benefit/risk ratio, the Transparency 
Committee assessed its clinical effectiveness, issuing an Avis (opinion) on the drug. However, 
the Transparency Committee’s opinion was only advisory; it would inform pricing and 
reimbursement decisions that the CEPS and the health minister would respectively make 
(Figure 3.1). The creation of the HAS did not change this core feature in the process of 
reimbursement decisions.  
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selected based on scientific competences, while representatives from the government departments and 
Afsapps, the pharmaceutical industry, and the national insurance bodies played merely an advisory role. 
Compare Art. R163-15 du CSS Modifié par Décret n°99-915 du 27 octobre 1999 - art. 4 JORF 30 
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The Transparency Committee issued two types of evaluation of a drug in its opinion, which 
assessed the improvement in clinical benefit (Amélioration de service médical rendu (ASMR) 
and clinical benefit overall (Service médical rendu or SMR). On the one hand, the ASMR 
rating, consisting of five categories (ASMR I-V), measured the degree of improvement 
compared to the existing treatments. The rating informed CEPS’s pricing decision. On the 
other hand, SMR, created by the 1999 decree, denoted the actual clinical benefit of a drug. It 
put a drug into five categories, taking into account the following factors: clinical effectiveness 
and safety of the medicine, positions within therapeutic strategy (especially the presence or 
the absence of alternative treatments), severity of the disease, character of the medicine 
(preventive, curative, or symptomatic), and public health interest. The 1999 decree provided 
that the SMR ratings would define the level of reimbursement covered by the national health 
insurance. The same decree also determined that drugs with an insufficient actual clinical 
benefit would not be reimbursed.204 Hence, the drugs given “major” (majeur) or “substantial” 
(important) SMR ratings would be covered for 65% of the cost, while the drugs with 
“moderate” (modéré) and “low” (faible) SMR would be covered for 35%, and drugs with 
“insufficient” (insuffisant) SMR would not be reimbursed.  
Once the Transparency Committee issued its opinion on a drug, ASMR and SMR ratings 
were then used for the parallel process of setting prices and the reimbursement rate, 
respectively. On the one hand, the CEPS took ASMR ratings into account, among other things, 
in negotiating prices with drug companies. The Code of Social Security provided that drugs 
that neither have any improvement in clinical benefit nor save medical costs were not 
reimbursed by the health insurance.205 The prices of non-reimbursable drugs were set freely 
by companies. If a drug was given ASMR V (no improvement) but still recommended for 
inclusion on the list by the Transparency Committee, the rating would be used for lowering 
the price or inducing cost-saving measures.206 
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As to reimbursement, on the other hand, SMR informed setting a drug’s reimbursement 
status, with the health minister having final decision-making powers about including it on the 
reimbursement list. Prior to the 2004 reform, ministers in charge of health and social security 
set the reimbursement rate of a drug, in addition to deciding on its inclusion on the 
reimbursement list. Since 2004, in line with the Mutualité proposal in the preceding year, the 
reimbursement rate became formally set by the newly established Union Nationale des Caisses 
d’Assurance Maladie (UNCAM), which was an umbrella body representing health insurance 
funds and was tasked to negotiate with the state and health care providers. The government 
conferred UNCAM with powers to define the basket of care reimbursed by sickness funds.207 
This change by the 2004 reform, however, did not result in profound alterations in the 
allocation of powers in the drug reimbursement process. The powers given to UNCAM for 
setting reimbursement rate were limited, because the decree already defined the range of 
reimbursement rate associated with the actual clinical benefit as assessed by the Transparency 
Committee.208 And perhaps more importantly, both before and after the reform it remained the 
health minister who made a final decision on whether a drug was included on the 
reimbursement list, which was then published in the Official Journal. The registration of a 
drug on the reimbursement list was valid for five years. At the end of this period, or at any 
time when significant new information was available, the Committee would reassess a drug, 
issuing recommendations about whether to maintain it on the reimbursement list.  
                                                     
for particularly expensive drugs, which are subject to decision by the CEPS. See Chapter 7 for further 
discussions on pricing for expensive drugs and its implications for the politics of drug rationing. 
207 Importantly, while the government framed this agenda as the delegation of management to UNCAM 
(see e.g. Communiqué du conseil des ministres du 16 juin 2004), in practice the change in governance 
structure and the role of UNCAM in defining care packages did not mean a shift towards self-
governance by the delegating power to social partners in the health insurance funds. On the contrary, 
The Director-general of UNCAM, a civil servant appointed by the government and also a director of 
CNAMTS, had extensive power over fund management at the expense of social partners, which had 
hitherto played a role in management through the board of social health insurance funds. Before the 
reform, the board of CNAMTS, consisting of employers and employees, had negotiated collective 
agreements with the medical professions. After the reform it was the Director-general who negotiated 
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health insurance funds. The first UNCAM Director-general was Frédéric Van Roekeghem, who was a 
cabinet member of Douste-Blazy’s. Contrary to the initial Mutualité proposal of participatory 
governance by social partners, UNCAM hence represented a device of greater state control. Bras 2004, 
968-969; Hassenteufel and Palier 2005, 17f; Palier 2015, 107-108; Chevreul et al. 2015, 46.      
208 Cf. Grandfils 2008, p.18. The decree (Décret n°2004-1490 du 30 décembre 2004 JORF 31 décembre 
2004) provided that the participation rate of an insured person was set at either 30-40% or 60-70% 






In short, while the creation of the HAS represented a considerable institutional evolution, 
the ministerial powers over drug reimbursement decisions were unchanged. Both HAS and the 
Transparency Committee enjoyed a high level of formal independence from the health minister. 
During the cumulative changes in organisational rules, the government policymakers 
enhanced the political independence of the Transparency Committee; they also reinforced the 
role of experts in the committee’s composition. Yet, notwithstanding the stronger 
independence and experts’ roles in issuing the Committee’s opinions on a drug’s clinical 
benefit, they remained only advisory; it remained the health minister who had the decision-
making powers over the inclusion of a drug on the reimbursement list.       
 
4. Conclusion  
The transformation of the institutional landscape in the French regulatory regime for drug 
funding led to a proliferation of regulatory agencies in the sector. The “agency” phenomenon 
in the sector has been considered significant for the French institutional structure of policy and 
politics in two major contexts. First, scholars have considered the French regulatory agencies 
as a potential departure from the tradition of the sovereign, unitary state, leading to its 
fragmentation (Rosanvallon 2011, 80; Thatcher 2002, 137; Elgie 2006, 215). Second, scholars 
have regarded agencies in the health sector as part of reforms that would lead to a break with 
the governance structure of the Bismarckian welfare state based on the negotiation of social 
partners (Hassenteufel and Palier 2007). In either perspective, however, through delegation of 
powers to independent agencies, experts in the agencies were expected to play a prominent 
role in the policy process. 
Yet, the chapter revealed the enduring importance of elected officials in decision-making 
over drug funding, even in the era of the “regulatory health care state” (Hassenteufel and Palier 
2007). Even after elevating the scientific profile of the Transparency Committee and the 
subsequent reinforcement of formal independence from the health minister as part of HAS, 
allocations of powers in the reimbursement process remained largely intact. While the health 
minister’s decision was aided by experts’ opinion, it was still up to the minister to decide on 
the inclusion of a drug on the reimbursement list.  
A quick comparison of the HAS with NICE would further highlight differences in 
institutional structures around the agencies, especially the level of political insulation. As an 






the health minister than NICE, at least in terms of its appointment rules and its legal basis. 
However, when one looks at the drug reimbursement decision-making process, unlike NICE, 
whose guidance was the final decision for the NHS, the HAS represents a case of low-level 
political insulation.  
The chapter has shown that the low political insulation in the French drug funding process 
was a product of deliberative choice made by elected politicians and civil servants. Throughout 
the policy debates across different episodes of institutional evolution, bureaucrats and 
ministers systematically preferred maintaining the health minister’s political responsibility for 
drug funding decisions. By drawing a strict demarcation between the “scientific” and the 
“economic” roles, they tried to justify defending the part played by elected officials in the 
latter. Ironically, contrary to the Mutualité’s wish for greater participation of societal actors in 
de-reimbursement plans when it proposed the expert-led independent agency that became the 
HAS, the process of translating the proposals into a concrete institutional structure, far from 
seeing the retreat of the state, instead saw government convert it into a process whereby 
ministers retained the crucial powers to set the terms of (de-)reimbursement. Likewise, by 
excluding reference to sickness funds expenditure, elected politicians ensured that it was solely 
the health minister (on behalf of the state), not experts, that defined the reimbursement. 
Such a defence of the prerogative of the state over reimbursement decisions did not mean 
that the government did not commit explicit rationing. On the contrary, the low political 
insulation in the institutional structure was an important part of the incumbent government’s 
policy strategies. The French government exercised a delicate control over the form and 
magnitude of de-reimbursement and shifting the healthcare costs from the state, by taking into 
account its political impact. While the successive governments repeatedly resorted to changes 
in the reimbursement rate and de-reimbursement, they carefully chose both the forms (total 
de-reimbursement or changes in reimbursement rate, the latter of which would partially shift 
the cost to complementary insurance and hence make it less visible to the electorate) and the 
products subject to de-reimbursement. As later chapters shall reveal, the maintenance of the 
minister’s powers for deciding on the boundary of reimbursement would play a key role in 









Chapter 4 The regulatory state under pressure: England, 1999-2010 
 
English drug funding policy evolved over the course of the 2000s. As Chapter 2 showed, 
the creation of the regulatory agency NICE took away the health minister’s decision-making 
powers over drug funding to a considerable extent. NICE’s guidance on whether a drug should 
be NHS-funded was authoritative in that the minister did not have the powers to overturn it. 
NICE’s negative guidance thus meant an explicit rationing strategy, which limited the range 
of drugs funded by the NHS. Yet, policy modification took place through various measures in 
the latter half of the 2000s, and the trajectory it followed was not linear. These measures, while 
varied in their instruments, all addressed NICE’s explicit drug rationing and were applied to 
the drugs for certain disease areas, especially cancer. Some were designed to make the 
conclusion of NICE’s guidance faster, while others allowed flexibility in its appraisals to make 
the drugs that NICE would have not recommended available. Towards the end of the 2000s, 
we hence saw a partial policy reversal in English drug funding policy. This chapter examines 
the driving forces behind this partial change. 
A key to understanding the trajectory is the role of the endogenous dynamics that stemmed 
from the high level of political insulation. In the highly politically-insulated setting whereby 
NICE’s guidance meant the final decision for the NHS, NICE defended its policy choices 
against constant criticisms and policy debates raised by different stakeholders. The criticisms 
led NICE to develop a consistent, elaborate justification for its policy choices. A highly-
insulated setting also helped the imposition of NICE’s judgement on societal actors, as elected 
officials and bureaucrats were not able to challenge the outputs it produced. The high political 
insulation thus enabled the policy choices for drug rationing that were otherwise too unpopular 
to make. Yet, such policy choices, once imposed, were subject to intense counter-mobilisation 
by societal actors from the producer’s coalition. Those who sought to challenge NICE’s 
guidance expanded this coalition’s base for political mobilisation by raising public awareness 
of the issue. As politicians’ attention was drawn to the rise of public attention, they joined the 
coalition of producers demanding policy changes. Counter-mobilisation in the public and 
electoral arenas thus shifted the coalitional balance over policy change. The partial policy 
change in the late 2000s was a product of public controversy, with the changes being favoured 
on issues with the greatest magnitude of mobilisation, such as cancer drugs. 
The chapter thus demonstrates the role of high political insulation in the post-reform policy 






political insulation created a self-undermining dynamic in the existing policies, and both 
arenas played a mediating role in this process of endogenous change. Even when attempts at 
policy changes via organised channels, such as direct lobbying of policymakers, yielded 
limited results, counter-mobilisation of the producer’s coalition via the public and electoral 
arenas nevertheless still resulted in policy change. By expanding the scope of conflict, those 
who sought to challenge the existing policies were able to broaden their coalition to the actors 
outside the decision-making process. The resulting shift in power balance between actors’ 
coalitions led to policy change. The chapter thus highlights a pathway to endogenous change 
through the public and electoral arenas, stemming from the highly-insulated institutional 
structure. 
This chapter traces the policy development in four steps. First, it examines how the high 
level of political insulation affected policy choices for drug rationing. The rest of the chapter 
then studies how the policy choices created counter-mobilisation that took place in different 
arenas. The second section looks at the industry’s challenge mediated by direct or 
institutionalised linkages to the government, showing its limitation for introducing policy 
change. The third section examines how counter-mobilisation in the public arena led to policy 
changes concerning the greater availability of drugs, while the fourth section looks at policy 
changes that resulted from mobilisation in the electoral arena. In the conflicts channelled 
through the latter two arenas, we see how controversies generated by the past policy choices 
played an important role in shaping policy change.       
 
1. High political insulation and policy choices 
Over the course of the 2000s NICE’s guidance established its authoritative status, both 
domestically and abroad. But this was hardly the case at the beginning. When NICE started its 
operation, it found itself surrounded by several other existing actors who already provided 
expert knowledge and doubted NICE’s guidance. Moreover, its task of recommending drugs 
for the NHS also meant that it must strike a balance between making a new drug available 
quickly and providing credible rigorous guidance. Not surprisingly, this dilemma led to 
confrontation with drug companies, on the one hand, which sought to challenge its negative 
guidance, and with local health authorities, on the other, which doubted its rigour when facing 
demands for the drugs that NICE recommended. In short, the evolution of NICE was hardly 






within the policy sector is something that it earned through its operation. In particular, a highly-
insulated decision-making structure, which excluded elected politicians from its process, 
helped NICE to develop guidance that was consistent across cases; such consistency, in turn, 
resulted in the agency earning credibility and institutional reinforcement. This process was 
facilitated by elite-level policy debates, generated by NICE’s own policy decisions, which 
pushed it to develop elaborate justifications and codify rules that would guide its future 
decisions.  
 
Early years of NICE and the question of its credibility 
From its inception, NICE’s guidance provoked controversy and confrontation. The very 
first appraisal that NICE carried out, in October 1999, on Relenza (zanamivir), a new flu drug 
by Glaxo Wellcome, set off conflicts between NICE and the pharmaceutical industry. In a 
decision widely seen as a “test case” 209  for the new agency, NICE recommended not 
prescribing Relenza for the 1999-2000 flu season on the grounds that there was insufficient 
evidence for its effectiveness in patients in “high-risk groups”, such as the elderly and asthma 
sufferers210; it might review the decision for these groups when additional data was submitted. 
NICE ruled against making it available for general healthy adults.211 
The guidance triggered a strong reaction from the pharmaceutical industry. Glaxo protested 
against the decision, accusing it of contradicting the government’s commitment to 
pharmaceutical industrial policy. It threatened a judicial review and to leave the UK.212 Other 
UK-based multinational firms such as AstraZeneca and SmithKline Beecham joined the 
protest. Through an open letter from the British Pharma Group, which represented the three 
firms, they accused the decision of “potentially devastating consequences for the future of the 
British-based pharmaceutical industry”. Referring to their earlier warning that NICE would 
result in damaging impacts on drug sales worldwide and future innovation, they argued: “our 
worst fears were fully justified”. The firms demanded “an urgent meeting” with Prime 
                                                     
209 Financial Times 3 July 1999. 
210 Glaxo itself had admitted that, in its advertisement to GPs, the clinical effectiveness of the drug for 
high risk groups had not been established due to the limited number of patients participating in clinical 
trials. Financial Times 4 October 1999; The Guardian 4 October 1999  
211 Financial Times 1 October, 1999. 






Minister.213 The largest British firms’ position also shaped the reaction of the ABPI, which 
stated that NICE’s “credibility with the industry, both in the UK and abroad, has been seriously 
damaged”.214  
Health Secretary Frank Dobson supported the guidance. After the submission of additional 
trials that Glaxo had not completed before the initial appraisal, in late 2000 NICE reversed its 
initial judgement and recommended Relenza for high-risk groups. It is noteworthy that the 
Relenza guidance disappointed clinicians for a reason opposite to the industry’s. In response 
to the initial decision, the BMA claimed that Dobson should have given NICE’s 
recommendation legal force and banned the drug. It criticised the government for failing to 
protect GPs from surging demand for the drug.215 When NICE revised its appraisal later on 
and recommended the drug for high risk groups, the BMA chair expressed concerns about 
“enormous demand”;216 one group of GPs protested against the revised decision, declaring that 
they would be refusing to prescribe the drug.217  
The reversal of the judgement about Relenza for high-risk groups raised doubts about 
NICE’s credibility among stakeholders. Several from the medical community, including the 
dissatisfied BMA, claimed that NICE’s credibility was undermined due to the political 
pressure and the power of the pharmaceutical industry. The title of the British Medical Journal 
(BMJ) editorial following the verdict about Relenza read “The failing of NICE”.218 The same 
criticism was raised by the payer’s side; for local health authorities this was particularly serious 
because with their fixed budgets NICE’s positive guidance meant cutting other treatments and 
services (e.g. Cookson et al. 2001; HoCHC 2002a, 22-23). Criticisms abounded when the 
House of Commons Health Committee (HoCHC) held its first inquiry into NICE in 2002. 
Comments from both the medical and pharmaceutical communities and local health authorities 
questioned the quality of NICE’s guidance; they pointed out what they considered errors and 
mistakes in appraisals, while advancing the suspicion, as one health authority put it, that 
                                                     
213 Financial Times 6 October 1999; “UK's NICE turns nasty, rejecting Glaxo Wellcome's anti-flu drug 
Relenza” Pharma Marketletter 11 October 1999. 
214 Financial Times 9 October 1999. One informant noted that the fact that the President of ABPI at the 
time was from Glaxo contributed to the position of the industry as a whole. Interview with an economist, 
10.05.2018. 
215 Financial Times 9 October, 1999; Yamey 1999. 
216 Financial Times 22 November 2000. Cf. “Guidance on Relenza leaves GPs 'vulnerable'” Pulse 2 
December 2000. 
217 Financial Times 8 December 2000. “GPs vote to boycott Relenza on the NHS” Pulse 9 December 
2000. 






“NICE was widely viewed as pursuing a political agenda at the expense of clinical credibility” 
(HoCHC 2002a, 10). The Committee’s report reflected: “NICE clearly operates in an 
environment populated by information providers who are already established and respected by 
clinicians. This means that if NICE is not able to produce  guidance  which  clinicians  find  
credible,  then  it  is  likely  and  reasonable  that clinicians will use these other sources of 
information.” (Ibid.) It recommended a greater collaboration with the existing “respected” 
bodies such as the British National Formulary and the Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin. In short, 
far from having an established status, NICE’s guidance was subject to doubt, especially given 
the existence of other knowledge providers that had already earned a reputation among the 
medical professions. Any efforts for institution building that NICE attempted to make hence 
must surmount the hurdle of providing justifiable reasoning for its guidance and being seen as 
a credible regulator, especially in the eyes of different stakeholders who already possessed 
sector-specific knowledge.  
 
The pattern of policy choices 
From its launch, NICE restricted a considerable number of the technologies it appraised. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show an overview of NICE’s decisions based on the list of guidance 
published on its website. Overall, NICE judged around eight out of ten cases as either 
“recommended” or “optimised for a subgroup of patients”. In the latter, NICE did not refuse 
a drug altogether, but recommended a restricted use for a smaller subgroup of patients than the 
one covered by the drug’s licence. Between 2000 and 2015, approximately 40% of the drugs 
(232 of 571 technologies) NICE appraised resulted in some form of restriction compared to its 
approved usage.219     
NICE’s negative decisions often provoked contestation. One indicator of this may be the 
number of appeals submitted against decisions. Among 401 technologies appraised from 2000 
to 2011, appeals were submitted in 86 cases (see Figure 4.3). Although NICE upheld a 
                                                     
219 This is based on the total number of the technologies falling in one of the following categories of 
NICE’s guidance: “Not recommended” “Only in Research” “Optimised” or “Terminated”. The last 
category means the appraisal was terminated before its completion as the manufacturer did not submit 
evidence. Given the PCTs’ refusal to fund the treatment during NICE’s appraisal, this was considered 
a form of explicit rationing. If we exclude the technologies falling in this category, about 38% of the 







substantial proportion of appeals, the majority (52 out of 86 cases between 2000 and 2011) 
were still dismissed by a panel. Drug manufacturers and patient groups regarded NICE as the 
“fourth hurdle” to drug access. In a few instances, manufacturers contesting NICE’s guidance 
brought the case to the court. The most notable was the 2007 guidance for Alzheimer’s disease 
drugs, where the Court of Appeal, reversing the earlier High Court ruling, judged that NICE 




Figure 4.1 The annual distribution of the NICE technology appraisal guidance outcomes 
(The overall trends in technology appraisal programme)  
Source: Author’s elaboration based on NICE’s technology appraisal data221  
                                                     
220 Dyer 2007. Following the Court’s ruling in 2010 NICE updated the guidance and recommended the 
drugs.  


























































































Figure 4.2 The annual distribution of the NICE technology appraisal guidance outcomes 
(The rapid Single Technology Appraisal process only) 
Source: See Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Appeal decision outcomes 
Source: Compiled based on NICE’s website information. 222 
                                                     
222 The careful interpretation of the graph is required, because it counts the number of technologies 
rather than the number of guidances. The same guidance contains a number of technologies (in the case 
of MTA), and therefore some decisions may be over-represented. For instance, the appeals decided to 
be “upheld” in 2004 (n=7) was for one particular technology appraisal. I nonetheless used the number 
of technologies rather than that of decisions, because it was also the case that only some of the 
technologies within a decision were subject to appeals, and that an appeal may be upheld for some 


































Two issues in NICE’s impact on explicit rationing at the NHS prove particularly 
controversial. One was the speed of NICE’s guidance. In the mid-2000s, it typically took NICE 
18 months to issue guidance. When the drug was licensed but NICE technology appraisal was 
still not completed, it was the local Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) who made funding decisions. 
As NICE began operating, it became widely observed that local PCTs tended to wait for 
NICE’s guidance being issued, leading to delay in access to a new drug even though the drug 
was licensed – a gap that the pharmaceutical industry and patient groups called “NICE blight”. 
This time lag between drug licensing and publication of NICE guidance happened despite a 
DH circular instructing PCTs not to use NICE as their reason for not funding technologies.223  
Another criticism was with regard to NICE’s negative judgements. Criticisms pointed to 
how NICE evaluated a drug’s benefit in making judgements, and in particular the role of cost-
effectiveness. Specifically, NICE used Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) to measure how 
much a medical technology improved both the quantity and the quality of life. The cost per 
QALY gained, or the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), then, indicated cost-
effectiveness of a drug. It was initially observed, and then made explicit by NICE, that it used 
an ICER of £20,000-30,000 per QALY as a threshold range for judging whether a technology 
was considered “value for money” on the NHS. As NICE itself recognised, there was no 
theoretical basis for assigning these particular values, and the threshold was therefore 
arbitrary. 224  Not surprisingly, the threshold became the subject of intense debates and 
contestation.  
The role of the cost-effectiveness threshold was well-observed in practice (Devlin and 
Perkins 2004; Raftery 2006). By the mid-2000s, it was established that NICE typically gave 
ICER gained in its appraisal report unless stating that the manufacturer’s submission lacked 
such data. The major reasons why a particular drug was rejected or restricted were either 1) 
ICER was higher than the above-mentioned threshold; or 2) the manufacturer had not provided 
evidence showing the drug’s clinical or cost-effectiveness. A decision to grant “restricted” use 
for a subgroup of patient population typically occurred when the ICER calculated for that 
subgroup proved to be less than the threshold of £20,000-30,000 per QALY.  
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High political insulation and the reproduction of policy and institutions 
The high political insulation under which NICE operated contributed to shaping the 
patterns of policy choices. Within a broad framework given by the Health Secretary, NICE 
was responsible for developing its own methods and process for technology appraisal. The 
authoritative status of its guidance for the NHS meant that once it started operation NICE 
constantly faced contestation of its decisions. Moreover, as an agency operating in a policy 
area already crowded by actors with expertise and knowledge, NICE was often forced to 
defend its positions in the face of policy debates and criticisms. Amid these in the dense field 
of expert audiences, NICE attempted to develop consistency in reasoning in its decisions by 
deploying its own expert community. Through justification of its policy decisions as being 
consistent with its precedents, the appraisal process gradually accumulated a set of informal 
doctrines that the appraisal committee drew on – or what those around NICE sometimes 
retrospectively called “case laws”225. Furthermore, by explicitly codifying such doctrines as 
they emerged through its operation, NICE attempted to earn credibility in its decisions.  
The use of the cost-effectiveness threshold in technology appraisal was a product of such 
an attempt by NICE to justify its policy choices in the face of criticisms and policy debates. In 
NICE’s early years its appraisal reports did not necessarily cite cost per QALY, partly due to 
the lack of reliable data on impacts on quality of life.226 Moreover, as appraisals where NICE 
referred to cost per QALY of the technologies in question were accumulated, a growing 
speculation emerged among stakeholders about whether NICE was following a particular 
threshold of acceptable maximum cost per QALY.227 NICE was initially reluctant to address 
the existence of such a threshold.228 For instance, in 2002 a Technology Appraisal Committee 
chair stated before the HoCHC that “the Appraisal Committee does not consider the threshold 
… and has not been given instructions about a threshold and has not discussed a threshold per 
se at all”229; NICE chair Michael Rawlins also maintained before the Health Committee that 
                                                     
225 Cf. Chalkidou 2012, 395ff. 
226 Raftery 2001, 1302. Taylor 2002, 168. The 2002 HoCHC inquiry into NICE cited a criticism by a 
Health Authority, who found that NICE had used cost per QALY in only about a half of its appraisals. 
HoCHC 2002a, 31. 
227 Devlin and Parkins 2004; HoCHC 2002a, 31-32. For instance, in a joint workshop organised by an 
independent think tank, The King’s Fund, and an ABPI-sponsored think tank, the Office of Health 
Economics, Towse and Pritcard (2002) argued that NICE was operating an implicit threshold range of 
£20,000-30,000 per QALY. 
228  Interview with a former NICE appraisal committee member, 03.05.2018; Interview with an 
economist, 10.05.2018.   






“the Institute does not have a cost threshold beyond which a technology would be 
automatically rejected.”, calling the threshold “an urban myth”.230 As the pressure continued 
to grow, however, Rawlins, in a British Medical Journal article co-authored with health 
economist and NICE vice chair Tony Culyer, set out a threshold range that NICE took into 
account in its judgements (Rawlins and Culyer 2004). While NICE rejected an absolute 
threshold for judgement, it elaborated a range of values that changed the probability of 
rejection. NICE was unlikely to reject a technology if the cost per QALY was below £20,000; 
the likelihood of rejection on grounds of cost-effectiveness increased if the cost per QALY 
was above £30,000. As NICE admitted, there was no empirical basis for assigning these 
particular values to the threshold; it claimed to have arrived at the threshold range through its 
case-by-case operations (see also Pearson and Rawlins 2005; Rawlins et al. 2010).  
NICE not only publicised the threshold range to external actors but also codified it in its 
internal rules for decision-making. At around the same time as the publication of Rawlins’ 
article, NICE released an updated version of its Guide to the Methods of Technology Appraisal, 
a guidance document describing methods and concepts used for Technology Appraisals. While 
the previous 2001 version was criticised for the lack of clarity in how NICE arrived at 
decisions,231 the updated guide specified principles and methods for Technology Appraisal 
judgements in greater detail, including the role of cost-effectiveness.232 The document clarified 
that above an ICER of £20,000 per QALY the Technology Appraisal Committee’s judgement 
about acceptability of technology took into account factors such as the uncertainty around 
calculation of ICER, the innovative nature of the technology, features of the condition and 
patient population, and (where appropriate) wider societal costs and benefits; and that “above 
an ICER of £30,000/QALY, the case for supporting the technology on these factors has to be 
increasingly strong” (NICE 2004, 33). In line with Rawlins’ earlier statement mentioned above, 
NICE thus claimed that it made judgements not solely based on the threshold; rather, it set out 
how the threshold guided its decision.233 By responding to policy debates and making the 
                                                     
230 Quoted in Littlejohns 2002, 32. 
231 HoCHC 2002a (HC 515-I), 30. 
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forward”, since its development “involved lots of practitioners in the field … and tried to incorporate a 
“good science””.  Interview with a former NICE Committee member, 03.05.2018.  
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criteria of “accountability for reasonableness” – a fair priority-setting process requires publicity, 
relevance, appeals, and enforcement – as an underlying doctrine for NICE’s process. NICE also codified 






threshold range explicit, NICE retrospectively developed rules and doctrines that made its 
decisions consistent with each other. Such a codification reflected its attempt to justify its 
policy decisions. Moreover, once established the codification of an explicit threshold not only 
justified the appraisal committee’s past decisions but also constrained future ones as the 
committee would refer to it in making decisions. It also shifted policy debates among 
stakeholders from whether NICE had a particular threshold to whether the values of the 
threshold were adequate and whether the threshold satisfactorily captured the benefits of a 
drug. All in all, NICE’s attempt at earning credibility through clarification of a cost-
effectiveness threshold and its consistent application strengthened both institutions and policy 
orientation.  
The high political insulation whereby NICE’s guidance was the final decision for the NHS, 
without elected officials’ involvement, strengthened these attempts by NICE at establishing 
credibility in its decisions. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Direction issued in 2005 provided 
that, in performing an appraisal NICE should take into account, among other things, any 
guidance issued by the Secretary of State. In practice, however, this provision was never used; 
DH officials’ communication with NICE during an appraisal process was mostly about how 
the former would implement the guidance given the funding obligation for NICE-
recommended technologies. 234  Moreover, once NICE issued its appraisal, the Health 
Secretary’s room for manoeuvre was extremely constrained by both rules and standard 
operating procedures. If NICE recommended a drug, PCTs were legally obliged to make it 
available within three months. And if NICE did not recommend a drug, little evidence 
indicates that the Health Secretary attempted to ignore or overturn the guidance. The absence 
of such an intervention by ministers might be partly due to the lack of procedural rules guiding 
their action: in contrast to France, where the Health Minister firmly held the final responsibility 
for reimbursement stipulated by law, in England while ministers formally had powers to issue 
a decree for the NHS there were few specific procedures for ordering PCTs to fund a drug 
rejected by NICE. But the lack of specific rules was reinforced by ministers’ and bureaucrats’ 
underlying expectation and strategy. A DH official recalled that, while there were a few 
instances in which ministers had been leaning towards ignoring the fact that NICE had not 
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recommended a drug, the Department’s officials had warned the ministers that doing so 
“would undermine NICE and the credibility of NICE”.235 In the end, according to this account, 
ministers have never instructed the NHS to ignore NICE’s negative guidance. 
As NICE developed elaborate consistent justification of its decision-making methods, 
NICE’s reputation as an HTA body outgrew initial suspicion of its credibility. An early 
example of positive evaluation by outside actors was a 2003 report written by the World Health 
Organization (WHO), which affirmed that “in only four years, NICE has developed a well-
deserved reputation for innovation and methodological developments that represent an 
important model for technology appraisals internationally”.236  The report commended, in 
particular, “the Institute’s commitment to using the rigorous methodology throughout the 
technology assessment”, arguing that “Published NICE appraisals are already being used as 
international benchmarks—an obvious recognition of their credibility”.237 The same actors 
who were once suspicious of NICE also reversed their judgement. Following the WHO report, 
the BMJ published an editorial entitled “The triumph of NICE” – in a contrast to its criticism 
for NICE’s “failing” after Relenza.238 Likewise, in 2007 when the HoCHC carried out another 
inquiry into NICE, unlike its previous inquiry that had highlighted stakeholders’ doubts about 
NICE’s credibility, it stressed the agency’s reputation for “well-established and robust” 
processes, in addition to its international recognition (HoCHC 2008, 26-27). 
Efforts to strengthen the implementation of appraisal continued after the introduction of a 
funding requirement for NICE-recommended technologies. A 2005 study by the Audit 
Commission found that only 25% of PCTs implemented technology appraisals within three 
months (cited in HoCHC 2008, 72). While it was not NICE’s remit to ensure PCTs followed 
its guidance, it made considerable efforts to help local implementation through its newly-
created implementation directorate, which assisted PCTs in funding recommended 
technologies, and through collaboration with Royal Colleges (HoCHC 2008, 71; DH 2008a 
(Cm 7331), 12-13). The government commitment to ensuring the implementation of NICE 
guidance and ending the postcode lottery was reiterated in Health Minister Lord Darzi’s report 
for the NHS Next Stage Review in 2008, which set out a decade-long plan for NHS reform. 
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Based on the report’s recommendation, the government introduced a legally-binding NHS 
Constitution, where the right of NHS patients to NICE-recommended technologies was made 
explicit.239 The continual strengthening of the funding obligation was made despite the NHS 
Confederation’s criticism that PCTs had to disinvest in other more cost-effective treatments to 
fulfil it (HoCHC 2008, Ev.180; Maynard et al. 2004). The Darzi Review also led to expansion 
of the remit of NICE into the area of quality, including providing indicators for the Quality 
and Outcome Framework (QOF), a primary care pay-for-performance scheme; NICE’s budget 
was also set to be tripled for the next five years to support its expanded roles (Hitchen 2008; 
cf. Rawlins 2009; Littlejohns et al. 2009). As QOF indicators became aligned with NICE 
guidance on cost-effectiveness, they were used to give financial incentives to doctors to abide 
by NICE’s decisions. The introduction of the QOF indicators hence placed further control on 
doctors, in an effort to build them further into the chain of service delivery flowing from 
NICE’s guidance. These expansions may be an indicator of the agency’s growing reputation 
for credible guidance -- a reputation which also provided a prerequisite for strengthening the 
implementation regime, where NICE guidance was expected to have an authoritative status in 
health care rationing. 
 In sum, the operation of the regime exhibits reinforcement of existing institutions and 
policy orientation. NICE backed more elaborate reasoning for its judgements, trying to make 
consistent, systematic guidance development in the face of policy debates and criticisms. By 
doing so it attempted to create credibility as a regulator. The high level of political insulation 
reinforced such a strategy. All in all, institutional reinforcement went hand in hand with hard 
policy choices despite – or rather, because of – the pressure that NICE confronted.   
 
Gradual rule change for a greater flexibility   
However, at around the same time as NICE consolidated its reputation for the credibility 
of judgement and reinforced its institutions, there was a gradual policy change to make more 
drugs available more quickly. A number of measures to improve drug access were introduced 
in the latter half of the 2000s. These measures, while some were more explicit than others, had 
in mind a particular type of new, expensive treatment—and hence patient population. First, in 
terms of the speed of its guidance, in 2005 NICE introduced a new appraisal process that 
                                                     






enabled it to issue guidance more quickly. Unlike the existing technology appraisal process -- 
now called Multiple Technology Appraisal (MTA) -- which systematically compared several 
technologies for the same condition, the new Single Technology Appraisal (STA) process was 
used for a single technology for a particular indication. Moreover, while the existing process 
involved modelling carried out by an independent academic group, evidence used for the STA 
was solely based on the manufacturer’s submission. These features were aimed at reducing the 
length of technology appraisal for a new drug close to obtaining a license so that the gap 
between the licensing decision and the publication of NICE’s guidance was closed. 
Changes also took place related to cases where NICE issued negative guidance on the 
grounds of lack of cost-effectiveness, as several measures were introduced to make such drugs 
available. One such measure was a pricing instrument called a risk-sharing scheme, which was 
designed to attenuate the uncertainty and high price of new drugs. The 2009 Pharmaceutical 
Pricing Regulation Scheme (PPRS) formally included a form of such an instrument named the 
Patient Access Scheme. Under the Scheme, the manufacturer could offer to pay part of the 
cost of the drugs that NICE otherwise judged as not cost-effective. If the Department of Health 
agreed a Patient Access Scheme with a company, NICE would then recalculate a drug’s ICER 
to examine whether it was below the cost-effectiveness threshold when taking the scheme into 
account. Another measure was a set of appraisal criteria that NICE’s Technology Appraisal 
Committee specifically used for drugs for end-of-life (EoL) care. These criteria were 
introduced in 2009, and applied to “treatments which may be life-extending for patients with 
short life expectancy, and which are licensed for indications affecting small numbers of 
patients with incurable illnesses.” 240  When a drug met the criteria, NICE’s Appraisal 
Committee would then give a special weighting on the benefit of the drug in making its 
judgement, which might enable the Committee to recommend a drug exceeding the upper end 
of the threshold (i.e. £30,000 per QALY). Perhaps the most apparent change in this regard, 
however, was the Cancer Drugs Fund. Launched in 2010 by the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government, the Fund provided a ring-fenced amount of £200 million 
annually, within the overall NHS budget, which specifically covered the cancer drugs rejected 
by NICE. The Cancer Drugs Fund thus enabled overriding NICE’s guidance without directly 
undermining its process. 
                                                     








These episodes of policy change resulted in a significant redistribution of power among 
different actors – producers, payers, and different patient populations. The remaining sections 
of this chapter will examine the endogenous forces, generated from the very institutional 
structures of high political insulation that enabled an unpopular policy choice, which 
ultimately drove the change. 
 
2.  Counter-mobilisation through business-friendly arenas 
The following three sections examine how the policy choices for funding or rationing drugs 
led to counter-mobilisation in different political arenas over the course of the 2000s. By doing 
so, they examine endogenous sources of policy change for a greater availability of a particular 
type of drugs on the NHS. Confronted with policy choices that imposed significant costs, drug 
companies sought to change existing policy orientation on several fronts. Mediated in different 
arenas, such counter-mobilisation involved distinct strategies and outcomes. This section 
examines mobilisation efforts channelled through the industry’s direct institutionalised access 
to policymakers, while the next section will explore attempts at mobilisation mediated in the 
public arena. Finally, Section 4 examines mobilisation in the electoral arena in the 2010 
general election.  
The first NICE guidance on Relenza in 1999 was also marked by the beginning of the 
pharmaceutical industry’s counter-mobilisation by lobbying the government. Responding to 
three British firms’ call in the wake of the guidance not to recommend Relenza, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair met with the companies in November. The meeting led to the establishment of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force (PICTF), a business-government forum 
accountable to the Prime Minister. Jointly chaired by Health Minister Philip Hunt and 
AstraZeneca Chief Executive Tom McKillop and comprised of ministers in charge of Health, 
Trade and Industry, and the Treasury, among others, as well as representatives of the industry, 
the forum was tasked to look into ways to strengthen the UK-based pharmaceutical industry’s 
competitiveness. 241  While NICE’s impact on the industry and the role of the NHS in 
supporting international competitiveness remained chief concerns of the Task Force, its scope 
went well beyond the area of health policy in a narrow sense; it hence examined issues 
including the UK market and the industry’s competitiveness, intellectual property rights, 
                                                     







clinical research, and the EU drug approval regime. Business-government dialogue dedicated 
to the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry continued after the PICTF published its 
final report in 2001, as the report led to a regular forum called the Ministerial Industry Strategy 
Group (MISG), which again comprised ministers from the Departments of Health, Trade and 
Industry, and Treasury and senior industry executives.  
Yet despite the existence of such an institutional arena favourable to the industry, the 
business-government forum did not lead to policy change related to NICE. The PICTF’s 2001 
report called for a full review of NICE’s operation, scheduled in July, which would involve all 
stakeholders and would address “broader impacts on market access and the resulting 
competitiveness of the UK as a global player, as well as NHS perspectives”. 242  To the 
industry’s disappointment, the government review was subsequently subsumed into the 
government’s response to Ian Kennedy’s inquiry into the Bristol Royal Infirmary scandal.243  
Another business-government forum that channelled the industry’s mobilisation was the 
Bioscience Innovation & Growth Team (BIGT), a group launched in 2003 by the Department 
of Trade and Industry, in partnership with BioIndustry Association and the Department of 
Health. It set out “Bioscience 2015”, an industrial strategy programme that envisioned the UK 
medical bioscience sector as a global leader by 2015. BIGT was vocal in challenging NICE’s 
practice. The 2003 “Bioscience2015” addressed impacts of NICE on biotechnology medicines, 
maintaining that “NICE has an emphasis on mainstream drugs, whereas the bioscience 
industry often has niche products where the patient numbers involved falls below NICE’s 
economic threshold”.244 In its review of biotechnology research funding in 2006, BIGT’s chair, 
David Cooksey, argued that to accelerate uptake NICE should be involved earlier in the 
medicine development process. He recommended that the government, regulators, and 
industry should jointly develop a regulatory process through a pilot project in which NICE 
was involved in an earlier stage of clinical trials.245 Furthermore, in the interim review of 
Bioscience 2015 published in early 2009, Cooksey proposed an independent inquiry into NICE. 
Referring to the UK’s low uptake of cancer drugs compared to other European countries, the 
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review argued that “[i]ndustry believes that the way these decisions were reached have been 
damaging for the industry and their public sector allies seeking to make the UK an attractive 
location for conducting clinical trials of new medicines.”246 The report hence emphasised that, 
in addition to assessing NICE’s long-term impact on uptake of drugs, the focus of the inquiry 
should be on the way in which NICE valued medicines so that it could take into account the 
value of innovation. 
In response to Cooksey’s call, NICE appointed Ian Kennedy, who, since the public inquiry 
into the Bristol Royal Infirmary scandal mentioned above, had chaired the Healthcare 
Commission (the body which replaced CHI in 2004), to carry out a review on appraising the 
value of innovation at NICE. Contrary to the industry’s criticism that had led to the inquiry, 
the Kennedy Report, published in July 2009, largely supported the methods of appraisal, 
claiming that the ICER/QALY approach was “quite simply the best tool available to do the 
job which NICE has been set”.247 He recommended that NICE’s appraisal should keep being 
based on cost per QALY. Moreover, while acknowledging the necessity to review the health-
related benefits that NICE considered, he rejected the idea of taking into account wider social 
benefits that a drug may bring, including easing the burdens of carers, allowing patients to 
work, or increasing tax revenues. 248  On valuing innovation, Kennedy acknowledged the 
“societal needs for innovation” and recommended that NICE formulate the definition of 
innovation, while suggesting ways to make some adjustment in approach to such an 
“innovation” to incentivise the industry without undermining NICE; in addition to the Patient 
Access Scheme, ideas for such adjustment included a scheme whereby NICE would agree a 
higher cost-effectiveness threshold for an innovative medicine for a fixed time.249 Kennedy’s 
support for its existing approach to appraisal helped NICE defend its practices. In its response 
to the Kennedy Report NICE argued that it already had flexibility in evaluating the 
technologies whose cost-per QALY was above the normal threshold, taking into account 
innovation that may not be well captured in the measurement of cost per QALY.250 Referring 
to a stakeholder workshop on the threshold range held earlier that year, it also argued that 
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changing the threshold was unnecessary.251 NICE’s proposed change was hence in line with 
other recommendations of the report, most of which were focused on better communication 
with stakeholders. All in all, to the disappointment of the pharmaceutical industry, which 
criticised the QALY approach as too narrow to fully capture benefits of a drug, the inquiry did 
not result in major change. The industry considered it a “missed opportunity”.252  
The increasing attention to NICE’s impact on innovation that the industry addressed 
through lobbying was not limited to the BIGT. In January 2009, Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
met with representatives of the ABPI, who warned of the fierce international competition that 
the industry was facing. They advocated measures to protect the industry’s scientific base in 
the UK, which, in addition to changes in taxation and patent legislation, would be aimed at 
making NICE “a champion of innovation and speed up patient’s access to new medicines”.253 
The Brown government took pharmaceutical industrial policy seriously, installing senior 
cabinet members such as Health Secretary Alan Johnson and Business Secretary Peter 
Mandelson in the MISG, which had usually been led by junior ministers.254 The summit with 
the industry led to the creation of yet another government-industry forum: the Office for Life 
Sciences. Led by Science and Innovation minister Paul Drayson, a founder of a vaccines 
company and seen as “very much a biotech/pharmaceutical insider”255, the Office was tasked 
to set out national initiatives jointly with the industry. As part of its “Life Sciences Blueprint” 
industrial strategy launched in July, it proposed a scheme which would enable rapid access to 
certain innovative medicines. In the “Innovation Pass”, selected drugs targeting patients with 
rare conditions but with insufficient data for a NICE appraisal would bypass appraisal and be 
granted immediate use within the NHS for a limited time period while more data was collected. 
After this period they would be subject to a regular NICE appraisal. The government allocated 
the pilot project for the Pass a £25 million budget in the 2010-11 year, and the DH asked NICE 
to develop the selection criteria.256 Despite a modest budget, from the industry’s perspective 
the Pass hence represented a potential departure from the existing practice of NICE, which it 
had seen as the fourth hurdle to new innovative technologies. The pharmaceutical industry 
considered it as a “precedent of recognising that not all medicines can achieve a positive NICE 
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appraisal at launch”.257 For their part, proponents of the existing approach saw it with suspicion. 
The publication of the Kennedy Report came just after the launch of the Life Sciences 
Blueprint. Kennedy was critical of the Innovation Pass; if it is adopted, he noted, the use of 
the Pass for drugs with yet limited evidence must not be “a back-door to approval by NICE”.258 
Thus, despite its repeated attempts the industry’s mobilisation through business-
government fora resulted in little, or at best modest, policy change. Business actors, with their 
possession of superior technical expertise and knowledge compared to other actors, are often 
considered to have an advantage in influencing policy-makers via lobbying and business-
government fora. (cf. Culpepper 2010; Dal Bó 2006; McCarty 2014). However, in a policy 
arena crowded with expert knowledge suppliers who could counter the industry’s arguments, 
the industry’s ability to influence policymakers through expertise-based lobbying was 
attenuated. 
One might expect that, in addition to institutionalised access to government departments, 
another location of the industry’s lobbying might be special committees in the legislative 
branch. Unlike the “iron triangle” metaphor – the closed community among the industry, 
Congressional committees, and the bureaucracy -- developed in American politics (cf. Lowi 
1979), in executive-dominant Britain a prevalent view tends to see the Parliamentary 
committees of little significance in the policy process. Recent scholars challenge this 
prevailing image of a weak Parliament, arguing that non-legislative oversight committees such 
as the House of Commons Select Committees, which are not given legislative roles but are 
tasked to review government policy, play a significant role in agenda-setting (Benton and 
Russell 2012; Russell and Gover 2017). If we take into account this revisionist argument, it 
may be worth a look at whether the pharmaceutical industry’s mobilisation efforts effectively 
shaped the activities of oversight committees in relation to NICE and pharmaceutical policy. 
Over the course of the 2000s, the HoCHC held inquiries dedicated to NICE twice. However, 
although improving access to drugs was addressed, the larger concern among the committee 
members was the pharmaceutical industry’s influence on the government and NICE. 
Following the Vioxx scandal in the US the Committee held a separate inquiry in 2005 into the 
influence of the pharmaceutical industry.259 Its members were also critical of the risk-sharing 
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scheme and other measures for flexibility in drug funding policy. The HoCHC’s inquiry 
claimed that the earlier example of the scheme applied to beta interferon was a “costly 
failure”260 as its evaluation failed to yield reliable information on the drug’s cost-effectiveness. 
As we shall see later, the Committee criticised EoL criteria as “both inequitable and an 
inefficient use of NHS resources”.261 In the end, for the same reason as in the mobilisation 
through business-government fora, business power via the parliamentary channel was 
moderated by knowledge and counter-arguments supplied by other “expert” actors. 
Thus, it is unlikely that the policy changes for a greater flexibility were triggered by the 
industry’s direct lobbying of the government. Rather, as the following sections show, it was a 
wider mobilisation of societal interests that led to policy change. Such a mobilisation occurred 
in the public arena, where heightened public attention drew politicians into the producer’s 
coalition. The mobilisation was the most intense around treatments for certain disease groups 
that were exceptionally salient both among politicians and the general public--such as cancer. 
 
3. Counter-mobilisation in the public arena: Battles over cancer drugs 
Cancer drugs exemplify a daunting dilemma of funding drugs through health systems. 
Despite their often incremental innovation, the latest generation of biopharmaceutical drugs 
cost much more than existing ones with simpler structures, partly because it targeted a small 
subgroup of patients or conditions. The sky-rocketing prices and modest improvements in 
effectiveness tended to result in negative NICE judgements: between March 2000 and March 
2015, 40% of the cancer drugs NICE appraised through the STA process were not 
recommended for use, which was significantly higher than the share of the drugs across areas 
that NICE did not recommend via STA (24%).262  
The status of cancer drugs as a defining issue in policy development partly stems from the 
fact that cancer is perhaps the most politically salient disease area in the UK. Emotionally-
gripping stories and hopes for “life-saving” drugs readily enable the media to attract public 
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attention. Organised interests were highly vocal; not only the pharmaceutical industry and 
patient groups, but also charities funding non-commercial research, actively campaigned for 
making drugs available. Large charities such as Cancer Research UK and Macmillan Cancer 
Support are among the most resourceful organisations in the entire UK non-profit sector.263 
The mobilisation of these actors for publicity campaigns on the issue helped to raise public 
attention to it.  
To further probe the role of public attention in policy development, and in particular 
attention to NICE and NICE’s guidance for cancer drugs therein, I examine newspaper 
coverage. This provides a simple but useful proxy to capture variation in salience and public 
attention to a given issue (cf. Baumgartner and Jones 2010). Figure 4.4 shows longitudinal 
trends in newspaper coverage related to NICE and NICE’s activities in selected disease areas. 
I use the sum of coverage in The Times and The Guardian, two national broadsheet papers, to 
measure the level of public attention. The use of two papers with different ideological 
orientations -- usually associated with the centre-right and centre-left respectively – has an 
advantage in tackling biases due to a news source compared to relying on a single one. In terms 
of disease areas, I look at coverage related to NICE’s activities on cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, 
and multiple sclerosis -- three major disease areas in which NICE performed technology 
appraisal for expensive new drugs and that dominantly affect different types of patient 
population (mortal, old but not mortal, and predominantly young and chronic respectively) -- 
and diabetes, a major chronic disease that also affects the risk of several other diseases and 
hence the subject of a number of NICE’s clinical guidelines and public health-related activities 
in addition to its technology appraisal. To count the newspaper coverage for each topic I first 
performed searches in each newspaper’s database on LexisNexis and then excluded articles 
unrelated to NICE’s work (e.g. Queen’s honours, obituaries except those of patient 
campaigners). 
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Figure 4.4 Newspaper coverage in The Times and The Guardian  
Source: author’s elaboration based on LexisNexis 
 
Several observations stand out. First, the longitudinal trends suggest that NICE drew a 
significant level of public attention over time but the coverage related to its activities on cancer 
pushed up the overall coverage of the agency. Within NICE’s activities, cancer captured much 
more significant attention than any other disease areas. Each year, the newspaper coverage on 
NICE’s cancer-related activities accounts for from approximately a quarter to a half of the 
coverage on NICE as a whole. This hence suggests the special status of cancer in public 
debates on NICE. Second, the level of public attention appeared to be driven by NICE’s 
guidance on a particular drug. For example, for both multiple sclerosis and Alzheimer’s 
disease the peak year in newspaper coverage corresponds to high-profile cases of NICE’s 
technology appraisal on particular drugs – guidance on beta interferon for multiple sclerosis 
(2000-2002) and on Alzheimer’s disease drugs and a subsequent judicial review on one of 
them (Aricept, or donepezil) (2006-2007). Apart from these years, public attention to NICE’s 
work in these disease areas was waned. Public attention was hence at least partially 
endogenous to NICE’s guidance; in other words, NICE’s guidance triggered public attention. 
This interpretation also leads us to expect that the exceptionally high level of issue salience in 
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NICE’s activities on cancer compared to other disease areas may not only be due to public 
attention to cancer per se but also because of NICE’s outputs on cancer drugs. Third, and 
related to this, while NICE’s activities on cancer was always important in terms of public 
attention, the level of issue salience became particularly unprecedented after 2005 and then 
stayed high throughout the latter half of the 2000s, with its peak being reached in 2006. Indeed, 
as the rest of the section details, controversies that NICE’s activities evoked in the public arena 
played a significant role in policy development. 
 
A faster guidance: The introduction of Single Technology Appraisal 
The timeliness of NICE’s appraisal guidance was the subject of policy debates since its 
early years. As early as 2000, the ABPI had demanded the government to tackle “NICE blight” 
by pressing local health authorities not to use the lack of NICE guidance as an excuse to issue 
blanket bans on the drugs awaiting its appraisal.264 Patient groups made a similar demand.265 
The HoCHC took up the criticism about slow appraisal in its 2002 inquiry into NICE, 
recommending the agency rearrange its work programme to enable the publication of its 
guidance closer to the time of drug approval; another inquiry in early 2005 recommended 
increasing NICE’s budget to speed up the process. 266  For its part, NICE underlined the 
necessity of an early referral to carry out appraisals in parallel to the licensing process, while 
rejecting curtailing parts of the appraisal process, which, Rawlins argued before the Committee, 
would lead to less robust judgments or damaging stakeholder participation.267 Yet tensions 
were building up. Patient groups criticised NICE over several treatments awaiting guidance. 
A charity, Cancer BACUP, argued that as of September 2005 there were 23 licensed cancer 
treatments pending NICE guidance, some of which were due for completion only in 2007.268  
In November 2005, NICE announced the introduction of a new rapid process, the Single 
Technology Appraisal (STA). Unlike the existing MTA, which compared several technologies, 
under STA the NICE appraisal committee would produce guidance for a single drug for a 
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single indication based on the submission from the manufacturer. An independent academic 
group, the Evidence Review Group, then would assess – or “critique”, as several informants 
around NICE described it – the manufacturer’s propositions about the drug’s clinical and cost-
effectiveness. The process would enable NICE to issue faster guidance, not only because it 
involved an individual medicine but also because NICE would use a drug company’s data as 
opposed to published materials that were available only after the completion of drug approval. 
NICE expected that under STA it would develop guidance within 6 months, a much faster 
timeframe than the existing MTA, which typically took 18 months.  
The Single Technology Appraisal process was designed for, and in practice applied to, any 
technologies for single indications, but cancer drugs had a special weight in its introduction. 
In both the announcement of STA and the earlier statement made in September that year when 
NICE’s Board agreed to submit a proposal to the Department of Health, the agency’s chief 
executive Andrew Dillon emphasised NICE’s responsiveness to criticisms of its slow appraisal 
process, while explicitly referring to cancer drugs: “We have listened to what patients and 
healthcare professionals have told us about the need for timely advice on the use of new 
medicines, particularly for life-threatening conditions such as cancer.”269 This was not merely 
a rhetorical justification of a new programme; among the first 14 drugs that STA was initially 
applied to, 13 were cancer drugs.270  
In fact, NICE’s announcement of the launch of STA was made amid an unprecedented 
level of public controversy around a particular drug: Herceptin (trastuzumab) for the treatment 
of early stage breast cancer – one of the first drugs that the STA process was used for.271 
Manufactured by Roche, Herceptin was a new generation of targeted therapy that attached a 
particular protein called HER-2 to interfere with the growth of cancer cells; it was widely seen 
as a major breakthrough in breast cancer treatment. NICE recommended the drug in 2002 for 
use in women with advanced metastatic breast cancer; for women with early-stage breast 
cancer, manufacturer-commissioned clinical trials subsequently discovered a dramatic 
response. Following Roche’s announcement of the trial results in May 2005, patient groups 
launched a major media campaign to press the government to make Herceptin available as 
soon as possible. A surge in demand for the drug followed, although at that time Herceptin 
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had neither been licensed for early-stage breast cancer nor had Roche even submitted evidence 
for drug approval. The publicity of the issue was escalated in early autumn, when local PCTs 
rejected a number of requests to fund Herceptin from patients with early-stage breast cancer. 
A high profile case of a PCT reversing its initial refusal after a patient threatened legal action 
particularly grabbed media headlines. There was also a notably high level of pressure from 
elected officials. In July, the government made an early referral of Herceptin to NICE, ahead 
of its normal work programme, together with Velcade (bortezomib) for multiple myeloma, so 
that NICE would start preliminary work on developing guidance and issue it as soon as the 
drug was licensed.272 As the public pressure reached its peak, Health Secretary Patricia Hewitt 
promised in October that all early-stage breast cancer patients would have access to the test to 
assess whether they would benefit from Herceptin.273 Hewitt declared: “I want the licence for 
Herceptin to be granted as quickly as possible [...] and to be available within weeks of the 
licence being given. I share the huge frustration of many women about the delays in getting 
Herceptin licensed”.274 She also stated that trusts should not refuse to fund Herceptin solely 
on the grounds of cost.275 In early November, a PCT reversed its earlier decision not to fund 
Herceptin after Hewitt demanded the evidence base of the decision and called a meeting with 
the PCT officials.276 NICE’s announcement on the introduction of STA was thus only weeks 
after Hewitt’s intervention into PCTs. It began appraisal the following February, when Roche 
submitted an application to the European Medicines Agency. In early June, within weeks of 
the drug being licensed (itself a “record time”277 in the EMA’s speed of evaluation), NICE 
released draft guidance that recommended Herceptin for women with early-stage HER-2 
positive breast cancer; the final guidance was issued in August.  
It is worth noting that Herceptin was clearly an exceptional moment in both levels of public 
pressure and political intervention in the history of NICE. While cancer patient groups 
welcomed Hewitt’s action, the opposition party and later the bipartisan Health Committee 
criticised it for undermining NICE’s independence by making it difficult not to recommend 
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the drug.278 Contrary to the concern several expressed at the time, the kind of intervention that 
Hewitt took did not become a precedent, and little evidence suggests that a similar ministerial 
intervention took place in other appraisals. Thus, Herceptin did not change the high political 
insulation in the drug funding decision-making process.  
Yet, the exceptionally high level of public controversy around the speed of drug appraisal 
in general, and cancer drugs such as Herceptin in particular, helped the agency to justify the 
introduction of the new programme. To be sure, the introduction of STA was not without 
criticism. Unlike the comprehensive appraisal based on a systematic literature review that 
characterised MTA, STA’s evidence base was solely the manufacturer’s submission on 
clinical and cost-effectiveness. While this enabled NICE to use confidential data held by the 
manufacturer, since the manufacture may try to underestimate ICER to get a positive 
recommendation, concerns were raised about the possibility of biased or less robust 
appraisal.279 Given the high stakes for its credibility and robustness and its earlier defence 
against shortcutting the appraisal process, NICE would change the process only when the 
pressure led it to believe that its existing process was no longer justifiable. This is not to argue 
that NICE began developing STA as a response to Herceptin; it is also not an argument that 
ministerial intervention prompted NICE to develop a new process – this is unlikely, as the 
NICE Board was presented with a proposal for STA in September, before Hewitt’s October 
intervention with PCTs. Rather, a regulator could risk inducing a change that could potentially 
damage its appearance on credibility only when a greater cost of non-action might justify the 
change. NICE was hence not willing to change its practices until it confronted the exceptional 
intensity in public controversy around Herceptin. 
 
Cancer Reform Strategy and the expansion of STA 
The public controversies over NICE’s practices were hardly diminished after the 
introduction of STA. If the exceptional intensity of the Herceptin controversy affected the 
introduction of STA, the subsequent debates over cancer drug availability further contributed 
to its expansion. Specifically, debates over the UK’s cancer mortality fuelled controversies 
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about attributing the blame for lagging cancer drug access and cancer survival to NICE, while 
policymakers’ responses to them led to the expansion of the faster STA process.     
In the late 1990s, the Blair government identified the fight against cancer as a prioritised 
policy problem. Similar to health care rationing, it found a significant regional variation in 
cancer care performance. The government appointed a prominent cancer physician and 
academic, Mike Richards, as the National Director for Cancer (dubbed the “Cancer Tsar”) to 
draw up a comprehensive strategy, from prevention, diagnosis to treatment, to improve cancer 
care. The 10-year Cancer Plan was announced in 2000. NHS cancer care improved in the 
subsequent years. The National Audit Office’s inquiry in 2005 confirmed substantial progress 
in a range of areas.280 Richards’ 2006 report likewise found that the use of cancer drugs had 
risen steeply since 2004, with less regional variation. 281  Cancer charities pressed the 
government to update the cancer plan, and in late 2006 the review process was started.282 
However, as NICE’s guidance provoked contestation, especially since the mid-2000s, the 
issue of its guidance on cancer drugs became increasingly debated in connection to a 
persistently higher cancer mortality rate than other European countries. Those who contested 
technology appraisal and access to new drugs attempted to frame the speed and negative 
judgement of NICE’s guidance as cross-national “health inequality”. A watershed in 
establishing such a connection was the publication of a report in 2005, which highlighted the 
relationship between patients’ access to newly-launched cancer drugs and survival rates. The 
study, funded by Roche and presented at the European Parliament, was carried out by 
researchers from the Stockholm School of Economics and the Karolinska Institute in Sweden. 
The Karolinska Report highlighted “imbalance and inequality” in patients’ access to new 
cancer drugs across Europe depending on the country of residence. Using the cancer mortality 
database which had resulted from the EUROCARE project, a European Cancer Registry-based 
study on survival and care of cancer patients, they found that later drug vintage was associated 
with the increase of the cancer survival rate.283  
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Throughout the report, the authors were explicitly critical of Britain, especially NICE. 
Noting that “[n]owhere in the world is the decisive role played by economic evaluations more 
evident than in the UK,” they claimed that NICE’s capacity to cope with the growing workload 
for review and the failure of budgetary allocation to new drugs during the NICE review process 
“le[d] to further delay for cancer patients in the UK getting access to new innovative drug 
therapies and this is clearly demonstrated by the comparison of the UK with other countries 
studied in the report”.284 The report thus maintained, “It was the explicit objective of Nice to 
avoid any significant delays in bringing innovations to market in the UK. There is yet no 
evidence that this objective is met”.285  
The Karolinska Report gained wide coverage in the UK media. The timing of publication, 
which coincided with Patricia Hewitt’s intervention on the Herceptin case, capitalised on its 
news value. The media criticised an “excessive bureaucracy and penny-pinching attitude to 
life-saving drugs”.286 The media scramble resurged in May 2007 when the updated version of 
the Report was published in an oncology journal. This time, following the controversies over 
Herceptin and the ongoing reform agenda on the Cancer Plan, the public attention paid to the 
issue was even higher.287 Newspapers, both broadsheets and tabloids, spread the narrative of 
the “sick man of Europe for providing cancer drugs”:288 Britain was “bottom of the league”, 
and “worst in western Europe” 289 in cancer survival rates, because “British patients are being 
denied access to life-saving cancer drugs that are widely available in the rest of Europe and 
the developed world”.290 Although the Karolisnka Report relied on the existing EUROCARE 
dataset for survival rates, and therefore its key findings were not about the mortality itself, the 
media played a considerable role in disseminating knowledge not only on drug access but also 
on lagging survival rates.  
The way that newspapers reported the news varied largely along their ideological 
orientation. Whereas the papers usually associated as right to centre-right drew a rather 
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negative image, the blaming tone was somewhat moderated in coverage by the centre-left 
Guardian. It put down the Karolinska Report with a critical comment from a researcher at the 
healthcare think tank The King’s Fund, who said that “Roche and other drug companies 
wanted Nice scrapped in order to increase their profits”.291 Yet this kind of remark remained 
the minority among the overall coverage. The negative tone was not limited to media with a 
clear pro-Conservative orientation. The BBC News headline for the initial report read: “UK 
'worst' on cancer drug access.”292 It asked, “Why France is so good at cancer care”, where, in 
addition to the difference in waiting time, it identified access to new cancer medicines as 
“perhaps the starkest difference in treatment between France and the UK”. 293  
In contrast to the media reaction, expert communities reacted to the report in a rather critical 
tone. Several articles and commentaries questioned it, from its measurement, model and 
estimation, to its interpretation.294 As the research was funded by Roche, some also pointed to 
the commercial motivation behind the report.295 NICE shared this perception in an attempt at 
defending itself from the mounting criticisms. NICE’s chief executive Andrew Dillon hence 
publicly condemned the report: "This drug industry-sponsored report is flawed, inaccurate and 
directly contradicts itself in places’.296 He pointed to a faster appraisal achieved through Single 
Technology Appraisal and NICE’s implementation programme that assisted PCTs’ funding of 
NICE-recommended technologies. 
A further blow to the government came about in August, when results of the latest wave of 
EUROCARE were released. The results were for two cohorts of patients diagnosed in 1995-
1999 and in 2000-2002, meaning that the wave covered patients treated under the early phase 
of the Cancer Plan, and policymakers hoped for a closing of the gap in the survival rate with 
other European countries. However, it was revealed that survival rates for several major areas 
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of cancer in England remained lower than the European average. Moreover, despite the Cancer 
Plan, the increase in survival rate remained similar to other countries, without catching up with 
them. The results inevitably led to questioning performance of cancer policies. As the editor 
of The Lancet Oncology maintained, “Overall, survival for all cancers combined in the UK as 
a whole is not only below the European average, it is also noticeably similar to some eastern 
European countries that spend less than one third of the UK’s per capita healthcare budget”.297 
Not surprisingly, the results again fuelled newspaper reports and parliamentary debates.  
The debates over causes of cancer survival rate could have had immediate impacts on 
policy agenda on cancer, as the Cancer Reform Strategy drafting process, to update the 2000 
Cancer Plan, had been underway since the beginning of the year. Yet, key figures reviewing 
the Cancer Plan did not believe that the uptake of the latest drugs accounted for survival rates. 
A week after the publication of the Karolinska Report, Cancer Research UK, a charity that 
formed a partnership role with the government in the review, set out policy goals to be 
achieved by 2020. In the announcement, the charity highlighted that in the past ten years the 
cancer survival rate had indicated its sharpest rise since 1971. Referring to the Karolinska 
Report’s criticism, the charity’s chief executive nonetheless emphasised “significant 
improvement”.298 Likewise, while National Cancer Director Mike Richards maintained the 
necessity of speeding up the appraisal process, he also commented, "Drugs are only one part 
of the answer." He instead stressed the importance of screening and early detection, based on 
the idea that the UK’s poor results were largely attributable to patients diagnosed at the 
advanced stage.299    
This perception of the incumbent policymakers was reflected in the Cancer Reform 
Strategy announced in December. While acknowledging improvements made since the Cancer 
Plan, it set out a wider range of goals than the first Plan. It reiterated Richards’s idea of 
prevention and earlier diagnosis as a key to improve survival rates. With regard to treatments, 
it stressed surgery, pointing out that it cures more patients than any other interventions; an 
emphasis was also placed on radiotherapy treatment. As to access to chemotherapy drugs, the 
Strategy largely maintained the existing policy orientation, but advanced an important 
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proposal. It recommended that, “as a default position all new cancer drugs and significant new 
licensed indications will be referred to NICE”.300 Acknowledging NICE’s effort to improve 
guidance timeliness via the Single Technology Appraisal, it recommended that the government 
should “ensure that all appropriate cancer treatments are considered by the Single Technology 
Appraisal process and that this process works as effectively as possible.”301 The use of STA 
pledged in the Strategy thus reinforced the policy orientation for rapid appraisal of new drugs. 
Within the next few years, as Figure 4.4 shows, STA came to be dominant in NICE’s 
technology appraisal programme.   
 
Figure 4.5 The number of technologies processed through rapid Single Technology 
Appraisal and Multiple Technology Appraisal   
 
Source: author’s elaboration based on NICE website information. Note that the graph shows 
the number of technologies rather than of guidances; since an MTA, by definition, contains 
several technologies, the dominance of STA can be even starker in terms of the number of 
guidances.  
 
Thus, the review of the Cancer Plan reinforced both the policy agendas and controversies 
mediated by public arena. The Cancer Reform Strategy expanded NICE’s work on cancer 
drugs and in particular the use of STA. Moreover, while the controversy over the relationship 
between cancer mortality and drug access did not result in immediate changes, it shaped 
subsequent policy debates by drawing public attention to the comparison of UK healthcare’s 
performance with other countries. The contestation took place by offering an interpretation 
                                                     
















































































about why the UK was lagging in cancer survival rates. It further strengthened the public 
debate that blamed NICE as a barrier to drug access. 
 
Drug access and the “top-up” controversy  
The public controversy over cancer drug availability was further intensified and prompted 
changes for greater availability through the issue of so-called “top-up” payments. Under the 
NHS, a patient has to be either a private patient or an NHS patient who receives publicly-
funded free treatments for a single visit. In other words, they cannot mix public and private 
funding by paying privately for certain parts of treatment on top of NHS treatments – or 
making “top-up” payments. This prohibition of top-up payments was claimed to be based on 
the founding principle of the NHS in 1948 that “care should be provided to all on the basis of 
need and not according to ability to pay”, which was also stipulated in the Department’s code 
of conduct.302 However, this ban became subject to public debates as a growing number of 
patients pressed to obtain the treatments that NICE did not recommend or PCTs refused to 
fund. For the drugs not recommended or not yet apprised by NICE, local PCTs made funding 
decisions. If clinicians wished to prescribe the drugs unavailable on the NHS, they could apply 
to local PCTs for so-called “exceptional funding”. Yet in the cases where PCTs declined 
requests from clinicians, it could lead to demands for private payment while maintaining 
entitlement to NHS care.  
Some patient groups and clinicians had pressed for a reform to lift a ban on top-up payments, 
which became vocal since the mid-2000s. In 2006, Doctors for Reform, a group of 900 NHS 
doctors critical of government health policies and supported by a market-oriented think tank 
Reform, sent an open letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair, calling for an urgent review of the  
NHS funding structure. It argued that the current tax-funded system would be unsustainable 
to meet growing patients’ needs. It advocated a “mixed-funding system” by drawing on 
examples of social insurance systems in continental Europe such as France and Germany, 
which it considered to have more equitable services and higher standards.303 Health Minister 
Patricia Hewitt rejected the idea; so did the British Medical Association (BMA) at its annual 
meeting, on the grounds of continuation of the NHS’ “free at the point of delivery” founding 
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principle.304 The advocacy of the group continued. In a report published in 2007, they claimed 
that free at the point of delivery was a “political mirage”, as top-up payments became a 
growing reality on an ad hoc basis through cases where patients sought to privately receive 
additional treatments. The group argued, “Without reform to health funding, the use of 'top up' 
payments is likely to increase due to the upwards pressure on medical costs, the limits to tax 
financing and, most importantly, the increasing importance of consumer choice”.305  
Throughout the campaign, again, cancer drugs not recommended by NICE became the 
vantage point. Some private insurance providers announced a scheme for top-up payments that 
specifically applied to cancer drugs unavailable on the NHS.306  Tensions grew as it was 
reported that some patients were planning to take legal action against their PCTs to obtain the 
right to receive a cancer drug, Avastin (bevacizumab), not yet recommended by NICE.307 They 
claimed that they had been threatened with the withdrawal of NHS care if they sought to 
receive Avastin. The Patients Association backed the legal action. The support was not limited 
to the patients’ side; the NHS Confederation, which represented NHS hospital managers, 
expressed sympathy saying that denying care for receiving private drugs was “perverse” and 
against “common sense”.308 
The campaigns for top-up payments gained further momentum in early June 2008. It was 
triggered by media reports of a bowel cancer patient’s death after being withdrawn from free 
NHS treatments because she had privately purchased a cancer drug, Erbitux (cetuximab), 
which was neither recommended by NICE and nor NHS-funded – a case subsequently taken 
up in the House of Commons by a Conservative MP who was also a former shadow health 
minister.309 Both the Department of Health and ministers initially denied the possibility of 
reform, claiming that it would create a two-tier health service.310 However, facing mounting 
pressure, Health Secretary Alan Johnson soon changed his position and announced that he had 
asked Cancer Tsar Mike Richards for a review on top-up payments.311  
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The top-up payments debate inevitably touched upon the issue of whether the NHS’s core 
principle, “free at the point of delivery, regardless of the ability to pay”, could be maintained 
if top-ups were allowed – an issue that Richards himself addressed in the review, by noting 
that the heart of the issue was the tension between equity and patients’ autonomy since the 
inception of the NHS.312 Those sympathetic with the core principle of the NHS repeatedly 
expressed the concern that allowing top-up payments would pave the way for a two-tier health 
system. 
The debate reached its peak in the summer. NICE draft guidance issued in August further 
fuelled the controversy as it rejected four cancer drugs for renal cell carcinoma on the grounds 
of insufficient cost-effectiveness.313 Patients’ groups and the pharmaceutical industry pressed 
for permitting top-up payments. Although the medical professions were “overwhelmingly in 
favour”314 of top-ups, the issue was still controversial among them. At its annual conference 
the BMA voted in favour of a motion that “patients should have the choice to buy additional 
treatment that is not available on the NHS without being forced to pay for all their treatment 
privately”. But it rejected another motion, with a narrow margin (49.8% vs 50.2%), to demand 
the government to introduce co-payment immediately. Instead they called for a Royal 
Commission to review the issue and to allow for wider debate.315 
Patient groups and charities were also divided. Those who opposed top-up payments argued 
that the NHS as a whole should be improved so that all patients could get access to these 
drugs.316 Some patient groups were actively involved in defining the policy problem. For 
instance, in its survey Rarer Cancer Forum found a significant variation among PCTs in both 
the processing of exceptional funding requests and their outcomes, with approval rates ranging 
from 0 to 100%.317 It advocated policy reform of NICE to accommodate new cancer drugs, 
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based on the finding that a significant proportion of exceptional funding requests were for the 
latest generation. These results were again widely reported.  
Political parties’ responses also varied. The Liberal Democrats were the first major party 
to express support for top-up payments.318 The Conservatives took a notably more cautious 
approach; their white paper for NHS reform published a year before had denied top-up 
payments.319 In the wake of the controversy, though the leader David Cameron reportedly said 
that he was “tempted” to support top-up payments,320 the party did not make statement until it 
finally reversed its previous policy and backed the top-ups.321 Instead, it launched its own 
consultation on top-up payments. As we shall see, this inquiry would lead to an electoral 
pledge to overhaul both NICE and drug pricing. 
With more than 400 stakeholder consultation responses, Richards’ report released in 
November addressed the availability of drugs on the NHS. From the outset, Richards explicitly 
rejected the idea advanced by “a small minority of shareholders” that allowing top-ups would 
be “a precursor to moving towards an insurance-based system”.322 He instead proposed “a 
clear framework for how the NHS should handle situations where patients might wish to 
purchase additional drugs, but also to keep to an absolute minimum the number of patients 
who will be placed in this position in the future by ensuring that the NHS provides as many 
clinically effective drugs as possible on the NHS.”323 Thus on the one hand, Richards discussed 
PCTs’ administration of the exceptional funding process and in particular arrangements of top-
up payments. But on the other hand, as the title of the report -- Improving Access to Medicines 
for NHS Patients -- suggested, Richards considered the policy problem not only a matter of 
NHS management but also of drug access. He hence set out an agenda for providing “as many 
clinically effective drugs as possible on the NHS”.   
The call to minimise the number of the patients purchasing top-up payments was based not 
only on results of stakeholder consultation, where the majority of respondents supported 
comprehensive care within the NHS, but also on policymakers’ perception of the scale of the 
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issue. According to the Department of Health’s survey that the report drew on, it was estimated 
that there were 15,000 patients each year who asked PCTs for exceptional funding for around 
50 drugs, of which 30 were for the treatment of cancer. The largest portion of such requests 
was for the drugs which NICE had not yet issued technology appraisal guidance on. Richards 
went on to conclude, “Application for off-label use are largely related to non-cancerous 
conditions and are numerous. True ‘exceptional case’ requests for drugs that have been 
declined by NICE appear to be uncommon”.324   
The fact that the largest category of exceptional funding applications was for drugs not yet 
appraised by NICE therefore led to reiteration of the idea that speeding up NICE’s appraisal 
process was “extremely welcome” and “strongly supported”.325 By this time, the government’s 
view on the speed of NICE’s guidance had converged. When the report was presented, Alan 
Johnson made a commitment to Parliament that by 2010 NICE would achieve a timeline for 
issuing technology appraisal guidance as short as six months after receiving an appraisal 
reference.326 The controversy over top-up payments thus further reinforced the agenda for 
faster NICE appraisals. 
Perhaps more importantly, the review for top-up payment opened a pathway to policy 
change. It yielded two immediate modifications. First, Richards’ report advocated a “greater 
flexibility” in NICE’s guidance on drugs used near the end of life. This claim was based on 
the “common perception” that “the value that society places on supporting patients nearing the 
end of their life is not sufficiently reflected in assessing the cost-effectiveness of new drugs”.327 
In response to the recommendation, NICE developed End-of-Life (EoL) criteria in late 2008. 
It clarified appraisal criteria specifically for drugs for terminal illnesses affecting small 
numbers of patients. More specifically, it suggested that above £30,000 per QALY, EoL 
criteria should be applied if (a) the treatment is indicated for patients with a short life 
expectancy (normally less than 24 months), (b) the treatment offers extension of life (normally 
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at least an additional 3 months) compared with current NHS treatments, and (c) the treatments 
is indicated for small patient populations.328  
In introducing EoL criteria, NICE developed justifications built around the existing 
practice in value judgements. As NICE’s chair Michael Rawlins clarified before the HoCHC, 
the NICE appraisal committee had been given “latitude to go above and below it [the threshold 
of £20,000-30,000 cost per QALY] and that the guidance had made this approach clearer”.329 
EoL criteria were intended to make this practice explicit by creating a set of codified rules. At 
the same time, despite criticism, Rawlins and others around NICE cautiously rejected raising 
the normal threshold of £20,000-£30,000 per QALY. 330  From NICE’s perspective, 
consideration of EoL fell within the conditions that appraisal committees would give “special 
weighting” when making judgements of cost-effectiveness.331 By framing EoL criteria in this 
way, NICE managed to maintain its strategy of justification based on the consistent application 
of explicit doctrines.  
But what circumstances would justify “special weighting” or “greater flexibility”? NICE’s 
justification was, in line with the Richards report’s claim mentioned earlier, that the public 
place special value on treatments that extend life at the end of life.332 NICE also drew on its 
Citizen’s Council’s meeting in November 2008 about the conditions under which appraisal 
can deviate from the cost-effectiveness threshold.333 Such a rhetoric reflected its attempt at 
justifying policy change through an image of the regulator as responsive to public preferences.  
Notwithstanding such a justification, the distributive consequences of the criteria remained 
controversial. The HoCHC’s 2009 inquiry into top-up payments argued that the EoL criteria 
were “both inequitable and an inefficient use of resources. By spending more on end-of-life 
treatments for limited health gain, the NHS will spend less on other more cost-effective 
treatments.” 334  This concern was not just theoretical but proved real when the appraisal 
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committee began using EoL criteria in practice. Based on the appraisals completed between 
2009 and 2011, one study estimates that EoL criteria resulted in substantial loss in QALY 
(5,933 per year); it cost £549 million annually to fund the drugs recommended based on the 
criteria.335 
The other changes for “greater flexibility” that the Richards report recommended 
concerned approaches to pricing. Such flexibility should be achieved, it argued, in the context 
of negotiating the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS). Since 2007, the 
Department of Health had been renegotiating the renewal of the PPRS with the ABPI. The 
recommendation for flexibility in pricing was also quickly realised. The agreement of the 2009 
PPRS included the Patient Access Scheme, a mechanism designed to facilitate patients’ access 
to the drugs that NICE would have otherwise judged as not cost-effective.336 In fact, this was, 
too, built on the precedent. Under the label of a “risk-sharing scheme”, the Department of 
Health and drug companies had agreed a mechanism to make a few drugs that were rejected 
by NICE available. The agreements for each drug were subject to future assessment, thereby 
mitigating the uncertainty associated with them at the time of launch. In 2002, NICE had 
rejected beta interferon and glatiramer acetate for the treatment of multiple sclerosis. The 
manufacturers and the Department of Health agreed to make the drugs available on the NHS 
as part of 10-year trials, or “monitoring studies”, to collect data from clinical practice.337 
Another path-breaking example of a risk-sharing scheme would be the guidance for Velcade 
(bortezomib) for multiple myeloma in 2007. NICE initially rejected Velcade as the cost per 
QALY was too high (£38,000). The manufacturer, Janssen-Cilag, subsequently proposed a 
response-based rebate scheme, whereby the NHS would pay for patients who responded to 
Velcade; otherwise the manufacturer would pay. An agreement was reached and the proposal 
was incorporated in NICE’s appraisal guidance. In its press-release NICE claimed that it saw 
risk-sharing schemes as a “win-win solution” for patients and the NHS.338 It was these earlier 
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projects that the PPRS drew on and generalised as the Patient Access Scheme.339 Although the 
Department noted that the Patient Access Scheme was an “exception rather than the rule”, the 
number of agreements under the scheme expanded in the subsequent years.340  
The narrative presented here has highlighted the role of controversies in the public arena in 
policy change. Through a wider base of political mobilisation that brought politicians into their 
coalition, those who were sympathetic with the producer coalition successfully shifted 
ministers’ initial position to lift the top-up ban, which led to policy change in drug rationing. 
Yet one may wonder to what extent NICE itself initiated the change. If Rawlins and NICE 
publicly stated, after the introduction of EoL criteria, that the public place special values on 
end-of-life drugs and that EoL criteria that went above the threshold were built on existing 
practices, did NICE also anticipate such change and informally adjust their behaviour before 
the Richards review took place? In such a scenario, recommendation by the Richards review 
might merely mean a formal endorsement of the changes in practice that NICE had already 
made. Considering this alternative interpretation is important for the chapter’s argument, 
because it points to an alternative pathway to change. Rather than pressure from outside, via 
the  public arena, leading to the change, according to this interpretation, the change occurred 
from within, either through direct lobbying of NICE or NICE’s own anticipated reactions. 
What looked like a pathway to change through public arena mobilisation might, then, have 
merely been a spurious correlation.  
To consider this possibility, it is useful to look at the cancer drugs for end-of-life conditions 
that NICE examined just before the completion of the Richards review of top-ups. This should 
serve as a “more likely” case of anticipated behavioural change by the regulator: given the 
heated debates that policymakers were already facing when the Health Secretary changed his 
initial position and launched a review of top-up payments, if NICE had anticipated such 
change and acted beforehand, we should observe some evidence of behavioural change in its 
appraisals.  
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Yet, as already mentioned, in August 2008 at the height of debates over top-up payments, 
NICE’s preliminary guidance rejected Sutent (sunitinib) for first-line treatment of advanced 
and/or metastatic renal cell cancer, alongside another three drugs. Following the introduction 
of EoL criteria in January 2009, NICE reconsidered its initial judgement to examine whether 
sunitinib for this condition met EoL criteria. In this case the risk-sharing scheme was also 
instructed, whereby the manufacturer Pfizer offered a 5% price cut and one free course of 
treatment (6 weeks), and the NHS would then pay for the treatment in responding patients. 
Although cost per QALY gained was still £72,000-105,000 per QALY (with a different 
assumption, £54,400 per QALY) when taking the scheme into account, NICE judged the drug 
met EoL criteria for the condition, and recommended its use.341 The other cancer drugs rejected 
together with Sutent, and a drug rejected even later (Revlimid, or lenalidomide), were also 
subject to re-examination once the EoL criteria were introduced.342 While hardly offering a 
definitive test, even this cursory look hence suggests that the appraisal committee was unlikely 
to adjust its behaviour before the completion of the Richards review. Indeed, the initial 
rejection of the drugs, which took place despite ongoing controversy outside the regulator, 
even further magnified the public controversies and pressures on the agency. NICE thus 
appeared not to change its policy choice, either until the agency’s senior management realised 
existing practices were no longer justifiable in the face of even greater public and political 
pressures that the rejection of these drugs triggered, or when the Richards review instructed 
NICE to review its practice.  
In sum, a series of public controversy over cancer drug availability led to gradual policy 
adjustments. These took place by codifying, clarifying, and thus in effect formally granting, 
exemptions applied to expensive drugs, especially those for end-of-life conditions such as 
cancer, alongside the existing technology appraisal.  
 
4. Mobilisation in the electoral arena: The 2010 General Election and the Cancer Drugs 
Fund 
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The rise of public controversies over cancer drug availability over the course of the 2000s 
not only triggered the Labour government policy response. As the leaders of the opposition 
Conservative Party drew their attention to the controversy, they also developed reform agendas 
to capitalise on the issue for their own advantage. The Conservatives’ pledge concerning the 
Cancer Drugs Fund for the 2010 general election was a product of such a response to the public 
controversies. Generated from the ongoing policy practices, the salient controversy over 
cancer drug access thus further prompted policy change through mobilisation channelled by 
the electoral arena.  
Electoral pledges on health policy for the 2010 election revolved around the controversies 
that we saw in the 2000s over drug access, especially for cancer. Both Labour and the 
Conservatives considered cancer care an important electoral agenda. Consistent with existing 
policies in the Cancer Reform Strategy, the incumbent Labour Party’s emphasis was on earlier 
diagnosis and intervention. They promised that patients in England would receive results of 
diagnostic tests for cancer within a week of referral.343 For its part, the Conservative Party, led 
by David Cameron, proposed a specialised fund for cancer drugs, valued at £200 million a 
year, which would fund any cancer drugs licensed since 2005 and which had been 
recommended for a patient by a specialist.344  
Both the significant level of public attention to cancer drug availability and the electoral 
incentive attached to it played a role in the genesis of the Conservative’s proposal for the 
Cancer Drugs Fund. During the opposition years, shadow health secretary Andrew Lansley 
was a vocal critique of NICE and existing policies about drug access, including NICE blight.345 
This does not mean, however, that the Party was against the reinforcement of NICE in itself. 
On the contrary, its 2005 plan for NHS reform included expansion of NICE’s remit to wider 
clinical standards of most aspects of healthcare.  Lansley maintained “the bureaucratic ‘risk’ 
posed by a growth in NICE standards … would be obviated by the fact that they would be 
'evidence-based', 'produced in part by those who have to implement them' and take into account 
'cost-effectiveness'”. 346  Its 2007 white paper proposed strengthening the operational 
independence of NICE by giving it a statutory base, which may have leveraged the criticism 
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of the Health Secretary’s intervention in the Herceptin case. While – perhaps reflecting the 
Party’s past policies – the white paper emphasised bringing the funding decisions back to the 
hands of clinician-led local commissioning, apart from a general remark that NICE would 
continue to conduct appraisals of new drugs while “taking into account wider societal costs 
where appropriate”, nothing in the plan suggested an overhaul of NICE especially related to 
the provision of cancer drugs.347 Thus, a policy agenda specifically targeting the drugs for a 
particular disease area such as the Cancer Drugs Fund was likely to have taken shape only 
after the significant issue salience over cancer drug availability led to the shifting of the Labour 
government’s positions in the late 2000s, where its electoral value drew Conservative leaders’ 
attention with a general election on their horizon. As we shall see in the next chapter, following 
the general election Lansley unveiled a bold proposal for reforming the drug pricing and 
reimbursement system, which would fundamentally alter the roles of the government, NICE 
and the pharmaceutical industry in explicit drug rationing strategy. In this proposal, the Cancer 
Drugs Fund would be justified as a step towards the far-reaching reform.   
Following the Conservatives’ electoral victory and the formation of the coalition 
government with Liberal Democrats, the new government immediately turned the Cancer 
Drugs Fund pledge into reality. In July it announced the injection of an additional £50 million 
as an “emergency fund” until the launch of the Cancer Drugs Fund in April 2011. The fund 
was intended to cover anti-cancer drugs not approved by NICE. In announcing the introduction 
of the fund, Andrew Lansley, who was now the Health Secretary, noted: “I promised that I 
would help patients in England get cancer drugs that are readily available in the rest of Europe. 
It's a scandal that we are strong in cancer research and participation in clinical trials in the UK, 
yet NHS patients aren't always seeing the benefits from the research swiftly enough”.348 He 
hence highlighted findings of a report on cross-national variation in drug usage, which was 
commissioned by the Department of Health and led by England’s National Cancer Director 
Mike Richards -- a mandate that resulted from his own 2008 review on top-up payments.349 
Presented alongside the announcement of the injection of the fund, the report highlighted 
significant gaps in drug uptake with other countries: among 14 developed countries, the UK 
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ranked high in some areas, such as the use of statins and drugs for acute myocardial infarction, 
but was ranked low in drugs for certain other diseases, including 11th for dementia, 12th for 
multiple sclerosis, and 13th for cancer drugs launched within five years.350 Improving access 
to cancer drugs was therefore, once again, justified by the claim that Britain was lagging 
behind other countries.351  
Subsequently, in October, the government released the Cancer Drugs Fund consultation 
document. The Treasury Spending Review, having affirmed the Cancer Drugs Fund, 352 
confirmed that it would ensure £200 million was available for the Fund each year for three 
years starting from April 2011. Perhaps most significantly during this process, the DH’s 
impact assessment for the Cancer Drugs Fund, which was required by the Treasury’s “Green 
Book” guidance on appraising public investment, estimated a net loss for NHS patients in the 
options of both the regionally-administered fund (a £456 million net loss for the three-year 
period) and the nationally-administered fund (£496 million).353 It also concluded, against the 
claim behind the introduction of the EoL criteria in the past and now the Cancer Drugs Fund, 
that “there is no firm evidence regarding the nature or magnitude of any social preference for 
treating ʻsevereʼ conditions such as cancer.”354 
Thus, although the Conservative Party created the Cancer Drugs Fund through its electoral 
agenda, it hardly created it from scratch. If the Labour government responded to the public 
controversy over drug availability – which was itself generated from the very institutional 
structures around NICE it had created – through EoL criteria and other measures for greater 
cancer drug availability in the late 2000s, the same salient public debates shaped the 
Conservative politicians’ consideration of their policy agenda. The measures to allow for 
greater flexibility in cancer drug access having been extended during the last few years of the 
Labour period, the Conservatives now pushed further in the same direction through the Cancer 
Drugs Fund. These measures by Labour and the Conservatives resulted in a partial policy 
reversal from the NICE-led explicit rationing strategy. In this process, political incentives not 
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only helped Conservative politicians shape the electoral agenda for the Fund by drawing their 
attention to salient public debates but also enabled them to surmount hurdles in the post-
election policy-making process. Policymakers were thus able to override the negative results 
of the Cancer Drugs Fund’s impact assessment because of the significant political incentives 
involved. In short, endogenous political dynamics stemming from the high political insulation 
gave rise to both the Labour and Conservatives measures to improve cancer drug access, 
leading to a partial policy reversal. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Throughout the 2000s, the English regulatory state for drug rationing came under 
significant pressure. As the Relenza case showed, from its inception NICE found itself 
between the competing criticisms for not making new drugs available and for questioning the 
credibility and robustness in its guidance. NICE attempted to achieve a delicate balance 
between these contradictory pressures from different audiences by developing consistent 
reasoning and elaborate justifications that were made explicit in codified rules. And with the 
highly insulated institutional setting whereby NICE’s guidance was the final decision, 
ministers dared not overturn NICE’s guidance. All of these factors contributed to enabling 
English policymakers to produce policy choices that would otherwise have been too politically 
costly.  
At the same time, however, such tough policy choices were subject to intense counter-
mobilisation over the course of the 2000s. Mediated by the public and electoral arenas, those 
who sought to change policies managed to widen their base of political mobilisation by 
elevating public attention to the issue and bringing politicians into their coalition. As a result 
of the shifting coalitional balance through conflict expansion, from the mid-to-late 2000s the 
gradual policy reversal began taking place, especially for cancer drugs where the magnitude 
of counter-mobilisation was the greatest. This gradual change was achieved through a number 
of measures, including the Single Technology Appraisal, risk-sharing scheme, End-of-Life 
criteria, and the Cancer Drugs Fund. The measures contributed to making more new expensive 
drugs (especially for cancer) available on the NHS.    
Because different arenas were endowed with different actors and strategic environments, 
both the industry’s strategies for counter-mobilisation and their outcomes varied across policy 






lobbying policymakers, the arena it fought in was the full of other elite actors who provided 
knowledge and expertise. In such an environment, the strategy for achieving policy change 
was to provide superior knowledge and persuasive reasons to win policy debate battles.  
Yet, despite being a powerful actor in the policy process, the industry’s ability to win elite 
battles in policy debates on drug rationing was limited. To be sure, the industry’s repeated 
attempts created institutionalised fora with the government that favoured the industry. Allied 
with naturally sympathetic industry-related ministries and often involving top-down initiatives 
by Prime Ministers, such forums provided it with an institutionalised lever for the industrial 
policy agenda. When it comes to the negative impacts of NICE on the industry, a claim behind 
creating these forums, however, the business-government forums resulted in little, or at best 
modest, results. The industry’s arguments were often counterbalanced – especially outside of 
the favourable circle of business-government forums – by the arguments of other actors. In the 
case of the Kennedy Review, for example, NICE appointed someone experienced in health 
policy and neutralised the industry’s assault. For the same reason, the industry’s power to 
shape bipartisan Parliamentary oversight committees was also limited. At the HoCHC, the 
industry remained one of many stakeholders. The Committee did give some recommendations 
that were consistent with the industry’s claims – such as a timely NICE appraisal closer to the 
time of a drug’s launch – but the industry was not the sole advocate for the issue. In short, the 
industry’s counter-mobilisation through direct lobbying achieved limited results because it did 
not manage to overwhelm the policy debates in an area crowded with other elite actors who 
could advance alternative arguments to its own.     
If the industry did not win battles within policy processes involving elite actors, however, 
it still achieved a partial policy reversal through counter-mobilisation in the public arena. In 
contrast with the lobbying battles confined to a space involving a limited number of elite actors, 
when the industry attempted to influence policy via the public arena, it did so by expanding 
the scope of conflict and bringing actors outside the policy process into their coalition. Those 
who allied with the industry in the battles about drug access, such as patient groups and 
charities, helped to expand the coalition base by drawing public attention using varied tactics, 
from public campaigns and mass media commentary to assistance in judicial reviews. The 
issue’s heightened public attention, which was often intensified through “focusing events” 
involving particular patients’ episodes or specific new drugs, helped to bring politicians into 
their coalition. The media played an important role during this process of expanding the 
coalition, since – as shown in the cases of Herceptin and the cancer mortality controversy -- it 






not get access to the new drugs that those in other countries got, and why the UK was lagging 
behind other countries in both drug access and health performance. The external pressures 
arising from intense public attention, then, shifted the position of elected officials who worried 
about the existing policy orientation’s electoral consequences. With their ability to attract 
greater public attention, cancer drugs occupied a special place both in the magnitude of 
counter-mobilisation and in the resulting policy changes.  
 Elected politicians played a pivotal role in these episodes of gradual policy change. As a 
default, their policy and institutional strategy was to shift the blame for negative decision to 
NICE. The high political insulation shaped such a strategy of not overturning NICE’s guidance. 
For, in ministers’ calculus, overturning NICE’s guidance meant taking on the risk of being 
blamed for undermining NICE’s credibility versus claiming the credit for making the drug 
available, where, as an institutionalised default option, the former always won over the latter. 
Yet, with the exposure to the intense sustained public pressure through the steep rise in 
attention, politicians, both left and right, were leaning towards minimising the perceived risk 
of the blame and giving a greater weight to the credit, and hence responded to the public 
pressure. Thus, the Labour Health Secretaries, from Hewitt to Johnson, shifted their position 
to improve access to expensive drugs especially for cancer; the former intervened in the 
Herceptin case, while the latter initiated changes to lift the top-up ban. The opposition 
Conservatives, such as Cameron and Lansley, then tried to take over the issue of cancer drug 
access by pledging the Cancer Drugs Fund. Again, cancer drugs remained special here 
precisely because they gave a clearer, foreseeable credit to the politicians who were making 
the changes.   
Pressures from the outside environment also played a somewhat subtle role in shaping 
NICE’s behaviours. When NICE began operating, it confronted other actors with expertise 
and knowledge who questioned its credibility, including the industry, medical and 
pharmaceutical communities, NHS and academics. Faced with criticisms and policy debates, 
it deployed its own experts to develop well-elaborated reasoning for its decisions. Under the 
moderate level of pressure from elite actors within the policy space, NICE then made its 
detailed rules and doctrines explicit to justify its decisions. By doing so, it attempted to secure 
consistency in its judgments and credibility as a regulator. Ministers’ non-involvement as a 
default policy strategy further contributed to reinforcing the existing policy orientation. It was 
only when NICE faced much more intense outside pressure from an enlarged coalition of 
counter-mobilisation involving not only elite actors but also the public and politicians, that it 






its existence was threatened. Yet, NICE was much more risk-averse in making any changes 
than politicians; the much greater value it placed on sustaining its credibility and ensuring 
consistency and rigour in its guidance made NICE resist changes until the last minute. And 
when NICE finally changed its behaviour – as the cases of EoL criteria and the introduction 
of STA demonstrated – it then attempted to defend its legitimacy by claiming a retrospective 
consistency with its existing practices and offsetting the potential loss in any appearance of 
credibility and rigour, while emphasising the credit due to it as a regulator responsive to public 
concern about drug availability. Perhaps the slow nature of its response to outside pressure 
was clearest in the case of the introduction of EoL criteria, where NICE kept rejecting cancer 
drugs amid intense public controversies surrounding top-up payments, which led to exposing 
itself to even greater public and political pressures. 
The policy development resulted in significant distributive consequences. While NICE’s 
negative guidance imposed significant costs on the users and producers of the excluded 
technologies in order to achieve a rational resource allocation within the NHS, NICE’s positive 
guidance, with its reinforced enforcement regime, was made at the expense of the NHS 
commissioners and users of other parts of the NHS as it led to displacement of other treatments 
and services. The Cancer Reform Strategy’s recommendation to refer new cancer drugs to 
NICE as a default option and the rapid STA process that came to dominate NICE’s guidance 
favoured patients with particular diseases and the manufacturers for expensive new drugs, 
especially for cancer. To be sure, the magnitude of this displacement effect of NICE’s positive 
guidance was unknown, as is whether, and to what extent, the displacement was offset by the 
historic increase in the NHS budget during the Labour years. Yet, it is perhaps safe to say that 
the trend of (re-)distributing towards cancer drug users and producers at the expense of users 
of other services became even starker when the EoL criteria and the Cancer Drugs Fund were 
introduced.      
More broadly, battles over drug availability in the 2000s revolved around a recurring theme, 
namely, what values should justify funding drugs? NICE’s criteria on cost-effectiveness 
repeatedly became the subject of intense policy debates and public controversies. Throughout 
the review of top-up payments and the subsequent introduction of EoL criteria, the underlying 
justification for a greater flexibility in NICE guidance was that people place special values on 
life-extending treatments and the way they do so was not captured by cost-effectiveness. 
Likewise, in the business-government forums one of the central criticisms addressed against 
NICE’s methods, and which led to the Kennedy Review, was that they did not adequately 






up these debates on what values a drug should reflect, it would lead to bold policy agendas for 







Chapter 5 Bounded policy change in a “hybrid” governance: England, 2010-2016  
 
Policy change leading up to the Cancer Drugs Fund in the late 2000s constituted a partial 
reversal in the English regulatory state for drug rationing. If the existing regulatory regime 
created by the early 2000s made NICE’s guidance the final decision for drug rationing, the 
changes that allowed for greater flexibility applied to cancer drugs meant a growing space 
within the regulatory regime whereby decisions about drug funding were driven by political 
considerations rather than expert-led appraisal. The Cancer Drugs Fund exemplified such a 
politician-led decision. When the Coalition Government set up the Fund, the structure of 
decision-making for drug funding was thus driven by two different logics: on the one hand, 
NICE continued to appraise drugs based on their clinical and cost-effectiveness, while, on the 
other, for the cancer drugs that NICE rejected the Cancer Drugs Fund and other measures for 
allowing flexibility were applied. Through its agenda for a major reform in drug pricing and 
reimbursement, the Coalition Government set out to push further the boundary between these 
different, “hybrid” logics of expert- and politician-led governance.355  
Yet, as this chapter shall show, the Coalition Government’s effort did not result in a full 
policy reversal from the existing expert-led rationing. The agenda for pricing reform was 
shelved; the Cancer Drugs Fund’s budget was expanded but eventually re-reformed, with 
expert-led logic being brought into its management. The present chapter examines why the 
Coalition Government’s reform agendas only partially materialised.  
The chapter argues that the past institutional choices over drug funding created their own 
beneficiaries, which obstructed the Coalition Government’s reform attempts. By stripping 
NICE of decision-making powers for explicit rationing, the reform agenda would have given 
back to local-level clinicians the central responsibility for drug provision. At the same time, 
by making drug prices paid by the NHS reflect a broader value than the cost-effectiveness that 
NICE used, the government hoped to simultaneously achieve better drug access and reward 
the pharmaceutical industry for its innovation. Yet, the government’s agenda was subsequently 
stalled in the face of resistance from different political actors, including both clinicians and 
the pharmaceutical industry. The existing regulatory structure, where the blame for rationing 
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of new expensive drugs was attributable to NICE, had benefited clinicians who, while being 
aided by NICE’s expertise, no longer had to face rationing decisions. The pharmaceutical 
industry had also adapted to the structure centred on NICE as a hurdle for drug access and had 
changed its business model. Moreover, in addition to losing benefits from the existing pricing 
regime, such as mid-term certainty and elements of free pricing, the industry feared that it 
would lose out in the new pricing model that was trying to benefit several different clienteles 
at the same time. In the absence of a clear foreseeable advantage, the industry opposed the 
reform, which would shift the accountability for rationing from NICE to clinicians and drug 
companies.   
If the government’s agenda for pricing reform failed to materialise due to the opposition of 
political actors who had adapted to the existing regulatory structure, the Cancer Drugs Fund 
also faced a momentum for re-reform through its own operation. The Fund’s excessive 
spending, driven by its political logics and little consideration for fiscal monitoring, soon met 
counter-mobilisation from elite political actors close to the payer’s coalitions. The underlying 
electoral consideration of the Fund meant that it could not be removed once it was installed, 
but widened mobilisation by the payer’s coalition led to a compromise solution under NICE’s 
involvement in the Fund’s management. All in all, both in the cases of the value-based pricing 
reform agenda and the Cancer Drugs Fund, endogenous forces limited the Coalition 
Government’s attempts at shifting away from expert-led drug rationing by NICE.  
The present chapter traces the political process of policy reform, from the formation of the 
Coalition Government’s agendas to its negotiations with different political actors. It begins by 
examining the agenda for a value-based pricing (VBP) system, showing how the government 
built their reform plan on existing policy debates over drug rationing. It also highlights the 
radical reallocation of power and responsibility for rationing decision envisioned in the reform 
and its political implications for different actors, especially clinicians who would be 
responsible for local rationing decisions. The second section looks at the political process of 
translating the agenda into a pricing reform negotiation with the industry. It shows how the 
government failed to convince the industry, who had adapted to the NICE-centred rationing; 
the government agenda for improving drug access through widening the value that justified 
NHS drug funding failed to materialise in the face of resistance from the industry and other 
actors. The third section shows how the operation of the Cancer Drugs Fund endogenously 
generated the impetus for re-reform, leading to it being partially subsumed into the NICE-led 







1. Value-based pricing agenda 
The origins of the agenda 
The origin of the agenda for VBP can be traced back to a report written by the competition 
regulator, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). In an inquiry report on the PPRS published in 
early 2007, the OFT called for a major reform replacing current arrangements with a “value-
based approach” to drug pricing, one in which price would reflect clinical and therapeutic 
values.356 It argued that neither the current profit cap nor the price control under PPRS allowed 
prices to reflect such values. It found that some drugs widely prescribed within the NHS were 
up to ten times more expensive than substitutes with similar clinical benefits. As a result, price 
failed to reward investment. Nor did it ensure value for money for the NHS as it did not use 
the fund in an efficient way; it estimated over £500 million spent in 2005 could have been used 
more cost-effectively. Value-based pricing, it claimed, would allow the NHS to use the 
expenditure in a more cost-effective way, while sending a better signal for investment in future 
research and development. The OFT gave a positive affirmation to NICE’s role in pricing and 
reimbursement, regarding its technical expertise as “world class standard”.357  It therefore 
argued that NICE “should play a central role in any value-based pricing schemes”.358 As for 
new value-based pricing arrangements, while the OFT laid out several options, it preferred an 
“ex-ante” approach, in which a cost-effectiveness assessment would provide information to 
set initial prices, subject to later modifications depending on new effectiveness data.     
The OFT report started off policy debates among stakeholders. The pharmaceutical 
industry was generally negative about the report in several respects. In its view, PPRS, with 
its initial free pricing, had allowed the industry to invest in R&D, which had helped push it 
towards being the most research-intensive sector in the UK.359 They feared that the incremental 
nature of innovation, which was especially the case in later generations of drugs, would be 
ignored and discouraged if the new pricing scheme was implemented. It also claimed that the 
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new pricing mechanism would entail large set-up costs and uncertainty in the business 
environment. Figures from the sector repeatedly warned about future disinvestment in the UK, 
thereby trying to pressure the government to reject the proposal.360       
The OFT report also triggered government action. In August, Health Secretary Alan 
Johnson announced that the Department of Health would renegotiate PPRS, taking into 
account and discussing the OFT’s reform proposals with the industry.361 Thus, when top-up 
payments were proposed and Mike Richards recommended “greater flexibility” in drug access, 
negotiations in that direction were already under way; his recommendation took over the 
debate that the OFT’s proposal started. In addition to the Patient Access Scheme described in 
Chapter 4, the revised PPRS set out “new flexible pricing arrangements”, which provided 
drugs initially at low prices and subsequently revised these if there was additional evidence of 
greater value. In sum, in response to the OFT’s agenda setting, the governments opened a path 
towards changes in drug pricing policy, although those made were modest at the time. 
 
The Coalition Government’s agendas for pricing reform  
The Conservative Party (especially Shadow Health Secretary Andrew Lansley) 
subsequently picked up the OFT report’s value-based approach to drug pricing. In November 
2008, amid the top-up controversy, the Party published a policy document on “a plan to renew 
NICE”, setting out proposals to reform drug funding policy. On explicit drug rationing, along 
with expanding the use of risk-sharing schemes, it expressed support, albeit still vague, for a 
progressive move towards “the principles of value-based pricing (VBP) to new medicines”.362 
After the 2010 election, the new government’s commitment to achieving its pledge on 
pharmaceutical policies was situated in the broader health care reform context. The underlying 
idea was to bring back the clinicians’ role in decision-making on resource allocation. In its 
White Paper Liberating the NHS, which set out its healthcare reform agenda, 363  the 
government hence planned to replace the Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) with “commissioning 
consortia” comprised of GPs, called Clinical Commissioning Groups. On the budgetary 
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implications of such a shift in the commissioning role from PCTs to GPs, the government 
claimed, “GPs are well placed to design care packages for patients, which should lead to 
improved health outcomes and tighter financial control”.364 The Cancer Drugs Fund, which 
was announced to launch in the following April, was considered as part of the larger reform 
on clinician-centred healthcare. In the wake of the formation of the new government, it stressed 
the role of clinicians’ judgement in cancer drugs access. The aim of the Fund was thus “to 
enable patients to access the cancer drugs their doctors think will help them”.365 
Yet, for the Coalition Government, the Cancer Drugs Fund was only an interim measure to 
bridge the transition to value-based pricing which would replace the existing PPRS upon its 
expiry at the end of 2013. Lansley argued that “using our cancer drugs fund in the interim, and 
value-based pricing for the longer-term, we will move to an NHS where patients will be 
confident that where their clinicians believe a particular drug is the right and most effective 
one for them, then the NHS will be able to provide it for them.” 366 In its consultation document 
released in December, the government reiterated the idea of improving NHS patients’ access 
to effective drugs by ensuring that price reflects the value it brings.367 While acknowledging 
measures that allowed for greater flexibility in drug access, including the Patient Access 
Scheme and the Cancer Drugs Fund, it claimed that these were not long-term solutions. 
Likewise, it criticised the current approach to technology appraisals for failing to fully reflect 
wider societal values, including helping patients back to work and reducing the burden on their 
carers.  
The government laid out broader policy goals for the new pricing system than the current 
PPRS’, including improving patients’ access, encouraging innovation, and ensuring value for 
money.368  Corresponding to these objectives, the government proposed that in addition to the 
“basic” cost-effectiveness threshold, like that currently used by NICE, the new pricing 
threshold should be adjusted by weighting two other factors: a “Burden of Illness” and a 
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“greater therapeutic innovation and improvements”.369 A higher “Burden of Illness” referred 
to drugs with unmet need or which were particularly severe; “therapeutic innovation” would 
reflect “any additional health gain not captured by the normal health gain because of the 
measurement difficulties”370. These weightings were, in large part, built on existing measures 
to allow for a greater flexibility in drug access, and indeed would systematise them. Thus, the 
emphasis on Burden of Illness reflected the idea underlying End-of-Life criteria as well as the 
Cancer Drugs Fund; and the greater innovation was the policy goal of the 2009 Innovation 
Pass371 and was, as the previous chapter documented, discussed at the government-industry 
forums and in Ian Kennedy’s report. The new system would be applied to branded medicines 
placed on the market from 2014 – thus generics would not be included -- and in addition to 
them, the government proposed including some existing drugs, subject to discussion with 
industry; the medicines already covered by the PPRS were to be subject to a successor scheme, 
which would be developed alongside VBP.372  
The proposal meant a major organisational change in the drug pricing and reimbursement 
process. According to the consultation paper, ministers would, with the advice from expert 
bodies, define a maximum threshold for the price of a drug to negotiate with the industry. 
NICE would carry out a “pharmaco-economic assessment” to give advice to ministers and 
manufacturers; in addition to such a “basic” threshold based on cost-effectiveness analysis, it 
was proposed that “expert panels”, though not specifying details of their composition and 
status, would review evidence produced by the company to assess weightings for “burden of 
illness”, “therapeutic innovation”, and “wider societal benefits” for a new medicine. 373The 
company could propose a price, and if this was higher than the government’s threshold the 
company could either lower it or give further supporting evidence for the proposed price. If 
the company did not follow either of these options, “it would be the company’s responsibility 
to explain to the public why it was not prepared to offer that drug at an appropriate price”.374 
And the new GP consortia would take a commissioning role in determining the use of drugs.375 
The government argued that the new scheme would increase the access to medicines, because 
                                                     
369 Ibid., paras. 4.5-4.25 
370 Ibid., para. 4.2 
371 Innovation Pass was to be terminated in July 2011 due to its duplication with the Cancer Drugs Fund. 
372 DH 2010b, paras. 4.1.-4.4.    
373 Ibid., paras. 5.2.; 5.6. 
374 Ibid., para. 5.7. 






GPs with more clinical autonomy and the consortia can be more flexible in meeting patients’ 
needs: “They [GPs] can be confident that, at a time when consortia have increasing 
responsibility for NHS resources, the drugs their patients receive reflect value for money.”376  
Thus, the value-based pricing reform proposal would represent a significant departure from 
the existing allocation of powers and responsibility for drug rationing. NICE, whose guidance 
meant the final decision for the NHS, would become merely one of the advisory bodies 
informing the minister, who set drug prices. At the same time, by making it the price taker, the 
government shifted the accountability—and also the blame -- for denying access to a costly 
drug to the manufacturer. Finally, by transferring the power of funding decisions to clinician-
led local consortia, clinicians would be accountable for their own rationing decisions.   
For NICE, the reform meant a major overhaul as its technology appraisal would lose 
decision-making power over whether a drug should be funded. In October it was reported, first 
in trade journals and then general newspapers, that Health Minister Earl Howe had stated at 
an industry-led conference that with the introduction of VBP, NICE would become “somewhat 
redundant” and the NHS pricing of drugs would reflect “everyone’s agreed perspective”.377 It 
was followed by the Department of Health’s confirmation that NICE would focus on “what 
matters most” 378 --its role would become centred on providing clinicians with clinical 
guidelines and developing quality standards for health and social care; but it would no longer 
decide on whether a treatment should be covered by the NHS.379 Instead, individual GPs and 
local GP consortia would make the decision, and the central role of NICE would be to issue 
guidelines to support these clinician-led decisions. Instead of the current mandatory status of 
the NICE technology appraisal for the PCT, in the new systems it would become a mere 
advisory role. Likewise, the VBP consultation document stated that NICE would be “the key 
source of advice on the relative cost-effectiveness of new medicines”380 in the new pricing 
systems, and although it acknowledged its expertise and regarded it as playing an important 
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role in any new systems, it stated that the details of its role would depend on responses to the 
consultation. 381 
It should be noted that curtailing NICE’s power over rationing went in parallel with shifting 
its focus and strengthening its legal basis. While the Coalition Government set out to undertake 
a major “quango cull”, reducing 18 arms-length bodies in the health sector to 8 or 10, NICE 
survived and its remit would be expand to include social care;382 the government also planned 
to strengthen its statutory footing by establishing it through primary legislation, the upcoming 
Health bill based on the White paper, transforming it from its current status as a Special Health 
Authority, an arms-length body of the Department of Health set up by secondary legislation, 
to a Non-Departmental Government Body accountable to Parliament. Thus, rather than simply 
demolishing it, the government would convert the usage of NICE’s expertise and analytical 
capacity while taking rationing decisions away from it.  
The majority of the various stakeholders – the pharmaceutical industry, patient groups, 
clinicians, the NHS and academic communities – were supportive of the broad idea of VBP 
that linked the price of a drug to the value it delivered. The basic idea itself was also appealing 
to NICE, as unlike the existing regime where it was only involved in drug pricing indirectly, 
VBP allowed a form of price-volume agreement whereby NICE would be able to start 
negotiations with the industry early on.383 Rather, the problem lay in what it would mean in 
practice. Several actors highlighted the proposal’s lack of details; they also pointed out 
practical difficulties in implementation, including how to apply the price for different 
indications with different “values” of the same drug. Given the opacity and potential 
distributive implications of the agenda, it was not surprising that the pharmaceutical industry 
was cautious during the months leading up to the adoption of the consultation paper. Some 
firms were sceptical when the new government announced the agenda, expressing concerns 
that value-based pricing would lead to administered prices and slower approval, resulting in 
more price cuts. 384  
Not surprisingly, when the consultation paper was adopted, diverse responses emerged 
when it comes to specific arrangements of defining “values”, notably in terms of who decided 
them and how values were measured. The two issues were mutually related. For instance, in 
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its written response to the consultation the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry 
(ABPI) argued that, with its focus on “breakthrough” drugs, the proposal overlooked the 
incremental nature of drug innovation. It emphasised a “co-creation” process between the 
government and the industry in developing thresholds and weightings, thereby envisaging the 
PPRS-like government-business negotiations to continue. 385  By contrast, several patient 
groups worried that, with such a government-business dialogue, patients’ voices wouldn’t be 
heard. They advocated for bringing patients into the process of defining the value of a drug.386 
Finally, payers were concerned with the reform’s budgetary implications. The NHS 
Confederation, a representative body of NHS organisations, claimed that “these proposals may 
drive up the cost of the drug to the NHS without increasing access to treatments,” which may 
result in disinvestment elsewhere, especially effective non-pharmaceutical treatments. They 
regarded the greater weighting of a higher burden of illness “a contentious and politicised act”; 
they highlighted weighting innovation would risk “double counting”, and questioned whether 
innovation would be a sufficiently important attribute to merit a premium, claiming that the 
value of a drug should be cost and clinical-effectiveness. Instead they argued for tasking NICE 
with developing the approach to value-based pricing, and for developing a process separate 
from NICE, such as an independent panel, to define the cost-effectiveness threshold.387 
NICE’s role in drug funding policy was also debated. The pharmaceutical industry was 
active on this issue. In October, ABPI director general Richard Barker called for “a parallel 
debate on the role and focus of NICE” to the one over VBP: “If we want the NHS and the UK 
economy to benefit from a vigorous life sciences sector, the reshaping of NICE’s remit is an 
urgent priority”.388 His proposal overlapped with the government position about NICE on 
several points, such as broadening NICE’s definition of values and reflecting early uncertainty 
in the assessment, refocusing NICE’s task on clinical best practice, and most notably not 
involving NICE in reimbursement negotiations and leaving them to the Department of 
                                                     
385 ABPI’s response to the consultation, 14 March 2011, 3. 
386 Alzheimer’s Society’s response to the DH consultation. Patient groups criticised exclusion of patient 
groups from pricing negotiation. ABPI argued in return that given its global implication, “the 
negotiation of any new pricing scheme has to be a bilateral negotiation between the industry and the 
government”. “Drug pricing must remain "absolute domain" of companies, says ABPI,” Pharma Times 
15 November 2012.  cf. “Cancer charities warn govt over drug price talks”, Pharma Times 13 November 
2012. 
387 NHS Confederation’s response to the consultation, n.d. 







Health.389 Barker stressed the idea of business-government dialogue when the DH announced 
changes to NICE’s role, envisioning a system where the manufacturer discussed the price with 
the DH and NHS, rather than having another body set up.390 This position was consistent with 
a later ABPI written response, where it recommended the NHS Commissioning Board’s 
involvement in the access and uptake of medicines priced by the new arrangement.391  
Patient groups were divided on the proposal to transfer NICE’s decision-making power 
over coverage to local commissioning groups. Some advocated for rethinking NICE’s role; in 
response to the Department of Health’s confirmation that NICE appraisal would no longer be 
mandatory, Macmillan Cancer Support commented that “NICE has too often misread the 
public mood in rejecting clinically effective drugs for rare cancers”.392 Others were opposed; 
the Alzheimer’s Society response to the consultation document expressed concern that 
removing the mandatory status of NICE appraisals would see a return to the postcode lottery 
of the pre-NICE period. They concluded, “We do not feel the case has been made for making 
NICE guidance optional”.393 Yet others suggested a third alternative: the Multiple Sclerosis 
Society likewise worried that local decision-making by GP consortia would be “unduly 
influenced by financial constraints”, which would reduce access to treatments, but instead of 
supporting NICE’s current role, it suggested setting up a “central drug fund” to supplement 
“value-based” prices of treatments in addition to nationally agreed prices paid by GP 
consortia.394   
Yet perhaps most importantly, the medical professions strongly opposed the measure to 
withdraw NICE’s power over rationing. Resistance came from clinicians themselves, 
especially those who were involved in primary care. They feared that the government’s idea 
of putting clinicians on the front line of decision-making, coupled with stripping NICE’s 
power, would result in postcode prescribing whereby GPs would face pressures from patients, 
and therefore get the blame for rationing. 395  From the outset, the government’s agenda 
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provoked counter-mobilisation among General Practitioners.396 The Royal College of General 
Practitioners claimed that the removal of NICE’s responsibility would result in patients 
“shopping around” to receive treatments, inflating the drug budget, and placing individual GPs 
in “invidious positions with regard to patients” when making decisions. They warned that the 
proposal would erode the trust of patients in doctors and ultimately in the NHS.397 The British 
Medical Association’s written response likewise warned that “leaving the commissioners to 
make decisions on specialist drugs could widen ‘postcode rationing’ and the pillorying of 
commissioning groups”.398 These strong reactions against clinician-led rationing were also 
seen in the wider health agenda, including reactions to the government White Paper and debate 
over the incoming Health bill.399 
The counter-mobilisation by clinicians appeared to have influenced the subsequent 
fluctuation in the government’s position. In June 2011, the government stated that patients 
would retain “the right to drugs and treatments recommended by NICE” after the introduction 
of value-based pricing in 2014.400 GPs welcomed the reversal, who, as NICE’s chair Mike 
Rawlins put it, “wanted a ‘blame quango’ to be responsible”.401 To be sure, the government’s 
position about NICE’s role remained unclear in the subsequent years; and it was not until 2013 
when, in response to the HoCHC’s inquiry into NICE, the government officially maintained 
that NICE would be given “a central role in the value-based pricing system” by not only 
assessing cost-effectiveness but also undertaking the “full value assessment” of a drug, that its 
reversal about NICE’s role was confirmed.402 Still, clinicians’ opposition, driven by the fear 
of getting the blame for rationing, represented a considerable obstacle to the agenda of 
stripping NICE of its role in explicit rationing decisions.  
The government confirmed its commitment to advancing its policies. In April 2011, it 
launched the operation of the Cancer Drugs Fund. With the electoral mandate and mostly 
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positive reactions to its consultation, the design of the fund was largely unchanged from the 
initial porposals: it took a “regional” approach, allocating money through clinically-led panels 
of local Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs); and based on a “population-based approach” to 
decision-making, SHAs developed “priority lists” of drugs to be routinely available through 
the fund, which was regularly updated.  Likewise, in July, the government responded to the 
stakeholder consultation, noting that the proposed objectives of value-based pricing gained 
“broad support”. It stated its preference for “negotiated agreement” with the industry, similar 
to the current PPRS, announcing that the negotiation would begin “sometime in 2012”.403    
 
2. The political trajectory of value-based pricing 
Value-based pricing, however, struggled to materialise in the subsequent years. The 
government launched its negotiation with the ABPI in August 2012. In the joint statement the 
government declared its wish that “value-based assessment is carried out as fully as possible, 
as early as possible”, and that the arrangement should be “stable and not bureaucratic” to make 
it predictable for the company. 404  Towards the end of 2012, the Department of Health 
organised a series of workshops with NICE and different stakeholders to draw up directions 
for the values. 405  Meanwhile, in the HoCHC’s inquiry into NICE, MPs criticised the 
government for failing to clarify the new arrangements years after initiating the consultation: 
“There is a lack of clarity around the whole issue which has persisted for too long. Decisions 
need to be taken, and the details of the scheme made public,” claimed Stephen Dorrell, the 
committee chairperson.406 The resulting report stated, “We do not regard it as acceptable that 
the arrangements for value-based pricing have still not been settled and that those who will 
have to work with those arrangements are still unclear about what value-based pricing will 
mean in practice.”407 This concern was widely shared among stakeholders and, as the deadline 
for the new scheme was approaching, by the end of that year speculation arose as to whether 
VBP would take place or PPRS would continue, as well as about what role NICE would play 
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therein.408 Nobody except the Department of Health and the ABPI knew the answer since their 
PPRS negotiations were confidential.      
The government’s response to the growing concern was to hand NICE the task of defining 
values. As already mentioned, in response to the Health Committee’s report, the government 
announced in March 2013 that NICE would be responsible for assessing the full value of a 
drug.409 This implied that NICE would be tasked to assess not only the clinical and cost-
effectiveness as it currently did, but also broader benefits valued in the new pricing 
arrangement. Subsequently, in June, the government announced that it had directed NICE to 
develop the method for assessing “full value”, and given NICE terms of reference. It also noted 
that value-based pricing would be introduced in January 2014. 
Despite the stated commitment of the government, however, the agreement between the 
government and the ABPI reached in November did not represent a shift to value-based pricing. 
The new PPRS would launch in 2014 and run for the five years. As was the case for the 
previous PPRS, it would give companies the discretion to decide on the prices of drugs. At the 
same time, the new PPRS would introduce a cost-containment deal -- a fixed cap on NHS drug 
expenditure, on which the ABPI president Deepak Khanna stated, “It should not be 
underestimated how difficult this will be for the industry”.410 NHS spending on prescription 
drugs, which was £12 billion in 2011/12, would be kept flat for the first two years, followed 
by a growth rate allowing for up to 2% increases for the next three years. The industry would 
be required to pay back in order to hold the growth of the expenditure at the allowed rate, 
which was set at 3.74% of estimated total sales in 2014.411 Alongside PPRS, government also 
introduced the statutory pharmaceutical price regulation scheme, which covered branded 
medicines by companies who chose not to participate in the voluntary PPRS. It imposed a 
compulsory price cut of 15%, which appeared to threaten companies into joining the PPRS. 
As to Value-based Assessment, the new PPRS document noted that NICE would be working 
on the broader definition of value, which, according to the Department of Health, would be 
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introduced in autumn 2014 after public consultation.412 The document also stated that the basic 
cost-effectiveness threshold that NICE used for its appraisal would be “retained at a level 
consistent with the current range” for the five years covered by the new PPRS.413 In sum, the 
government and the industry failed to arrive at agreement on value-based pricing and 
continued the existing PPRS based on profit-based control with tight fiscal terms imposed on 
the industry.  
Why did value-based pricing fail to materialise? For several reasons the industry’s position 
never got closer to the government’s VBP proposal. First, the industry’s preference was to 
retain elements of PPRS that were favourable to it, notably free pricing. In starting negotiations 
for VBP, ABPI chief executive Stephen Whitehead stated, "We would like there to be a single 
holistic scheme that is low on bureaucracy, efficient, patient-focused and reflects an element 
of freedom of pricing which we have with PPRS because it's profit controlled." 414  The 
preference for PPRS-like free pricing appeared stable throughout the period. The industry 
repeatedly warned that under the new pricing arrangement Britain would lose its attractiveness 
as an early launch market. The industry was concerned the introduction of pricing control and 
lowering the list price in the UK would result in the drop of the price globally, since the UK 
is used as a reference country for pricing drugs in a number of other countries.415  They 
repeatedly claimed that UK drug prices were among the lowest in Europe, and “already a good 
value for money”, referring to the recent PPRS report to Parliament. 416  From such a 
perspective, VBP was seen as a threat to the free pricing system.    
The industry was also against the emphasis on the local-clinician-centred decision in the 
value-based pricing proposal as it would generate significant uncertainty over volumes. This 
would be compounded by the increase in local marketing costs, especially because by that time 
the operation of NICE had already changed the business structure. The past business model of 
the pharmaceutical industry that emphasised marketing at local clinicians had been replaced 
by the increasing focus of its resources on research demonstrating cost-effectiveness to meet 
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NICE’s appraisals.417 The industry did not favour the reform as it would force companies to 
re-localise its now-centralised resources. The industry’s institutional adaptation to NICE-
centred rationing thus further diminished the appeal of the government’s proposal. 
Furthermore, the industry remained unconvinced by the government’s claim that VBP 
would contribute to industrial policy. Again, they warned repeatedly throughout the agenda-
setting and negotiation process that the government’s proposal did not understand the value of 
incremental nature of innovation. The industry remained negative about the notion of the 
proposal’s emphasis on wider societal benefits, such as production and employment, as it 
feared that by weighting wider societal benefits when measuring the value of a drug, end-of-
life treatments such as cancer drugs and drugs for the old – drugs that were much of the 
industry’s focus at the time and aimed at incremental improvement rather than curing the 
disease or getting people back to work -- were disadvantaged. 418  Conversely, from the 
government’s perspective, by looking only at the upside that a drug could bring, the industry 
did not understand the notion of the opportunity costs of funding the drug – a notion that is 
required by the Treasury Green Book. 419  While the Coalition Government introduced a 
number of measures to stimulate innovation through tax credits and others instruments, the 
industry hence considered VBP to contradict these emphases on industrial policy. The ABPI’s 
response to the VBP consultation argued for a more “joined-up approach” to the industrial 
policy, creating a more explicit reference in VBP to the government’s industrial strategies for 
the life sciences sectors. 
In the absence of the reward as part of the industrial policy, and given the loss of pricing 
freedom and increase in uncertainty, to the pharmaceutical industry VBP appeared as just a 
strategy for shifting the blame for rationing from NICE to the industry. As one industry 
observer put it, “instead of putting NICE in the hot seat when it recommends denying access 
to a drug the new regime will put onus back on the industry—patients will be knocking on 
company doors for that essential explanation of why a price doesn't measure up to bringing it 
to market”.420 
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Turning to the government side, we can see its position shifting away from the industry. 
Some changes can be observed in the DH’s response to the 2013 HoCHC’s inquiry into NICE, 
which confirmed NICE’s role in full value assessment.  First, the idea of having “expert panels” 
separated from NICE to examine such broad benefits appeared to have been abandoned by this 
point, and among the stakeholders who responded to the 2010 consultation, government’s 
position on institutional design seemed to be getting closer to the NHS Confederation’s as the 
purchaser. Second, in contrast with the government’s emphasis in its 2010 consultation paper 
and contrary to the industry’s continued advocacy, innovation was dropped from the weighting 
of the threshold of a drug. On “incorporating a broader assessment of a medicine’s benefits 
and costs”, the government claimed that NICE would be “taking into account factors such as 
burden of illness and wider societal benefits” but never made reference to therapeutic 
innovation.421 The reference to innovation appeared not to have returned in the subsequent 
terms of reference given to NICE. Finally, the government statements came to give more 
emphasis on cost control than innovation. Hence, when the government tasked NICE to 
develop the assessment of a drug’s broader value, Health Minister Earl Howe justified the 
mission by stating that, “We cannot simply spend more and more on drugs – this would mean 
spending less and less elsewhere.”422  Moreover, this remark was reportedly made in the 
context of taking steps to achieve savings of GBP 20 billion from the NHS by the next 
election.423   
In sum, contrary to its initial rhetoric of improving access and encouraging innovation, the 
government failed to convince the industry that moving from PPRS to VBP would achieve 
them. Although the fiscal climate and the fall in drug prices might well be prerequisites, they 
always existed during this period, and hence did not automatically result in the policy outcome. 
Rather, the policy preference of the industry remained diverged from that of the government, 
and the latter in balancing different policy goals failed to steer its direction towards linking the 
measure to the industrial policy in a convincing enough way for the industry to support it. It 
was not surprising, then, when an industry negotiation participant reportedly commented, “We 
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are perplexed and confused by the inconsistent messages.”424A comment from a think tank 
funded by the industry represented the widespread sense: “Doctors, charities and the media 
may see value-based pricing not as something in which the government believes, but rather as 
a way [to hide behind] jargon and intellectual dishonesty . . . to justify what will increasingly 
feel like largely arbitrary rationing of expensive drugs.”425        
NICE’s full value-based assessment (VBA) struggled too. The government terms of 
reference stated that “burden of illness” and “wider societal benefits” should be incorporated 
in the NICE appraisal. There was an explicit reference to End-of-Life criteria, which should 
be taken into account within the weight of burden of illness; Wider Societal Benefits were 
measured based on the shortfall of productivity and consumption as a result of the condition. 
The government’s intention behind this emphasis on Wider Societal Benefits was that the 
VBA should take into account not only impacts on the NHS but also on wider public policy 
such as employment and production. Yet, NICE was struggling to operationalise these 
considerations. There was little evidence that supported these weightings; and NICE was 
concerned that they could result in gender or age discrimination –an unintended consequence 
that would run counter to the NHS’ equity principle.426  
In January 2014, NICE refused to incorporate the concept of “Wider Societal Benefits”, as 
the concept could result in prioritising the young over the old. Although any approach to wider 
societal benefits would “inevitably take age into account to some degree”, it argued: 
“regardless of the way the proposals in this paper are incorporated into the appraisal process, 
NICE will not allow age itself to tip the balance of a recommendation against the use of a 
treatment”.427 It instead proposed an alternative concept called “Wider Societal Impacts”, 
which, instead of measuring production and consumption, measures absolute shortfall of 
QALYs resulting from the condition. NICE would set a maximum weight of 2.5 accumulated 
by Burden of Illness and Wider Societal Impacts, which meant the threshold of £20,000 per 
QALY would be increased to £50,000 per QALY.  
The proposal for value-based assessment that NICE put forward in March attracted much 
criticism from different stakeholders. The consultation gathered 900 responses, the 
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overwhelming majority of which were negative.  Patient groups strongly opposed the proposal, 
especially on the ground of discriminating against older patients.428 The industry worried that 
incorporating EoL criteria into Burden of illness might result in reduced availability.429 It 
argued against the fixed threshold of £50,000 per QALY.430 Both the industry and patient 
groups preferred to retain EoL criteria. Most notably, in its consultation response the 
Department of Health stated that it now wished to retain the current approach to EoL criteria, 
with the maximum of £50,000 per QALY.  
In response to the consultation, NICE decided to shelve the proposal; it stated that there 
would be no change in appraisal methods and EoL criteria would be retained. In the end, with 
the inevitable discrimination as a result of the weighting being expected, NICE preferred to 
keep its existing case-by-case approach rather than to make the appraisal Committee hard-
wired to the assessment weighting.431 NICE presented this withdrawal as a call for a “wider 
review of the NHS’ arrangements for supporting innovation and evaluating and adopting new 
treatments.” It claimed, “it’s clear that just changing NICE’s methods will not overcome 
concerns about how the NHS accesses new treatments”. The proposal put forward in the 
statement included the creation of “an office for innovation” inside NICE to work early with 
the company from development to evaluation, and a “more productive sharing of risks”.432 
Indeed, this emphasis on regulatory communication, early entry and a “wider review” 
somewhat resonated with what the industry was calling for since it allowed more flexibility in 
entry.433 While welcoming such an initiative, the ABPI kept advocating reform of NICE’s 
appraisal methods.  
In short, while NICE attempted to reconcile various imperatives while meeting the 
government’s requests when translating the government’s agenda into a concrete proposal for 
assessment, it was not able to create political compromise among different stakeholders. With 
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the massive criticism upon receiving the task to establish the full value assessment – a task 
that one informant close to the industry aptly called “a hospital pass”434 – NICE now passed 
back the ball to the government by calling for a “wider review”. The pharmaceutical industry’s 
advocacy for allowing flexibility in a drug’s market entry and its attempt at seizing the 
opportunity to reform NICE was also seen in the policy debate on the Cancer Drugs Fund, to 
which the chapter now turns.  
 
3. The political trajectory of the Cancer Drugs Fund 
The organisation of the Cancer Drugs Fund’s operation reflected the government’s policy 
to put clinicians at the centre of decision-making. As discussed above, the Fund was initially 
run by local clinician-led panels at Strategic Health Authorities for its allocation, with regional 
priority lists of drugs routinely available. In early 2013, NHS England changed this policy on 
listing drugs; instead it would draw up a single national list of cancer drugs available from the 
Fund.435 This change was again intended to tackle regional variations in the Fund. The national 
list would be written by the Clinical Reference Group for Chemotherapy at NHS England. The 
management of the Fund at the national level was led by the National Cancer Drugs Fund 
Panel within the Group, mostly comprised of clinicians, pharmacists, and patient 
representatives.  
As the negotiation over value-based pricing generated doubts about its feasibility, patient 
groups also expressed concerns about the future of the Cancer Drugs Fund, which would be 
expiring in March 2014. In September 2013, the government announced that the Fund would 
continue to run until 2016. Prime Minister David Cameron declared that the Fund was a 
“massive success”, showing his willingness to continue it beyond 2016 should he be re-
elected.436 
Ironically, however, as a fiscal consequence of its “success”, the operation of the Fund 
increasingly found itself the subject of political battles. In the first two years, the Fund was 
underspent; but it started exceeding the budget in the 2013/14 year, with £32 million overspent. 
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In August 2014, the Department of Health announced that the Fund’s annual budget was 
increasing from £200 million to £280 million a year until 2016. At the same time, with the 
proposal from the CDF Panel, NHS England decided to ask the Panel’s experts to re-evaluate 
drugs on the list. 437  “To ensure patients continue to have access to the best innovative 
treatments now and in the future, we must re-evaluate some of the drugs on the list,”438 stated 
the CDF chair, the oncologist Peter Clark, noting that the Fund had a “minority of drugs of 
much less clinical value”. Sharing the critique that the Fund had allowed companies to keep 
prices high, he recognised that the Fund “offered an alternative funding source on price terms, 
which in some cases have represented poor value".439 At the same time, NHS England sought 
options to develop “greater alignment between CDF and NICE”.440 The alignment of the two 
bodies was also advocated by NICE, with its chief executive Andrew Dillon stating that NICE 
could take over the Fund’s work.441 
The budgetary situation was increasingly alarming to NHS policymakers. NHS England 
had a deficit of around £500 million, and the planned target surplus to offset the deficit fell 
short by £184 million in the 2014/15 year, with two-thirds of the overspend being reportedly 
attributed to the CDF.442 This should have alerted policymakers to tackle the CDF, since 
government was trying to close the gap of a forecast £30 billion in spending by the 2020/21 
year.443   
The re-evaluation of drugs at the CDF resulted in rationing. The NHS intended removing 
not only drugs with lesser clinical benefit from the list but also effective but “excessively 
priced” ones unless the price was reduced.444 It would hence leave the manufacturer the option 
of cutting the price of a drug so that it could remain on the list. In January 2015, NHS England 
announced that it would withdraw eight drugs from the list and reduce another eight drugs’ 
indications to be covered by the CDF. In total, 25 out of 85 indications would be removed in 
March 2015. It also estimated it would save £80 million through negotiated price cuts to retain 
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drugs.445 At the same time, the Fund’s budget was again increased: it became £340 million per 
year, 1.7 times larger than the initial £200 million budget. The NHS forecast, however, that 
the Fund’s spending would reach £410 million for the 2014/15 year.446   
The delisting announcement triggered strong reactions from patient groups and drug 
companies. In March it was announced that a few drugs retained their positons after appeals 
from companies. In September, 16 drugs for 23 indications were delisted. Roche’s drug 
Kadclya (trastuzumab emtansine) – which cost £90,000 per patient and was controversial since 
NICE had rejected it in 2014 - was later that year announced to back on the list, as a result of 
price negotiations between the industry and the NHS amid a petition for the company to lower 
the price.447 Patient groups hence blamed not only NHS England for removing drugs from the 
Fund but also pharmaceutical companies for their drugs’ prices. 
During the controversy, there appeared some convergence of views among different 
organised interests, the government, and the NHS that the Cancer Drugs Fund was fiscally 
unsustainable; that it was also a temporary fix; and that greater alignment between NICE and 
the CDF would be a possible means of reform. Notably, while deploring the delisting decision, 
the ABPI stated that the Cancer Drugs Fund was just a “sticking plaster” and emphasised the 
role of NICE:  it called for an “urgent reform of NICE” to allow for more flexibility over 
expensive drugs.448 The industry’s advocacy for NICE reform persisted throughout the debate; 
early on, in 2014 in response to the announcement of boosting the Fund, while welcoming the 
increased budget the ABPI called for “the development of sustainable aligned solutions 
involving NICE, NHS England, and the industry working together”.449  ABPI hence also 
wanted the integration of the CDF within NICE, and saw this as an opportunity to realise their 
policy goals for reforming NICE appraisals. 
The electoral logic behind the creation of the Fund meant it was again a subject during the 
2015 General Election. While the Conservatives pledged for the continuation of the Fund, the 
Labour Party proposed to set up a “cancer treatment fund” with a budget of £330 million per 
year, which would cover not only drugs but also radiotherapy and surgery – an emphasis 
consistent with their policies in the 2000s. Thus, even though the Fund remained heavily 
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criticised for its overspending and stakeholders believed it unsustainable, the budgetary 
vehicle’s policy legacy kept attracting office-seeking politicians, regardless of their 
partisanship, who in turn continued to prioritise cancer care over others. 
In November 2015, NHS England proposed a reform of the Cancer Drugs Fund after its 
expiry in March 2016. Building on the idea of integrating the CDF within NICE, it proposed 
making the Fund “a ‘managed access’ fund for new cancer drugs, with clear entry and exit 
criteria”.450 In addition to recommendation and rejection, NICE would give a conditional 
recommendation, whereby the CDF would fund the drug for a pre-determined period during 
which further evidence would be collected. At the end of the period the drug would be subject 
to a further NICE appraisal in light of the new evidence gathered. NICE would give initial 
draft guidance prior to drug approval, and issue final guidance within 90 days after the 
Marketing authorisation.451 Hence, these designs intended to enable patients’ early access to 
the Fund, while attempting to limit overspending. The managed access fund proposed was 
consistent with recommendations from the new Cancer Strategy that the NHS accepted earlier 
in July, which was drawn up by the Independent Task Force chaired by Cancer Research 
UK.452 Its report summarised the perception of incumbent policy-makers: “… because it has 
also enabled some pharmaceutical companies to bypass NICE cost-effectiveness assessments, 
it is widely acknowledged that it is no longer sustainable or desirable for the Cancer Drugs 
Fund to continue in its current form”. Part of the solution, it hinted, would be for it to “continue 
to be a national fund to make new cancer treatments available prior to NICE assessment or 
which are subject to a conditional approval”. Meanwhile, Cancer Research UK itself publicly 
advocated for early access to the Fund. In sum, the agenda for a managed entry fund was a 
reflection of converged views between NICE and the NHS (and the CDF) and some cancer 
charities close to the incumbent policymakers – the latter two remained largely similar to the 
policy community seen in the debate over the 2007 Cancer Reform Strategy that we saw in 
the last chapter. 
In addition to the policy debate among actors inside the policy sector, fiscal consequences 
of the operation of the Fund triggered reactions from actors outside the sector. In 2015, the 
National Audit Office stepped in to investigate the CDF. It highlighted that despite the deficit 
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the DH and the NHS England did not take action until November 2014; and that despite their 
initial pledge, they did not monitor patient outcomes for those who received funding from the 
CDF. 453  The NAO report was followed by the House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee hearing, which criticised the management of the Fund.454 It urged the NHS to “take 
tough decisions to ensure that the Fund does not overspend”, while asking the DH to draw 
“lessons” from the Fund’s negotiations with companies to ensure a fair price and value for 
money. These critiques did not seem to affect the content of the reform agenda that had already 
taken shape, but helped the Department of Health and the NHS to justify tightening the fiscal 
grip on the use of the Fund in the post-enactment phase when they faced resistance from the 
industry. 
The resulting reform adopted in February 2016 was largely unchanged from the original 
proposal. Under the new Fund, a joint group of NHS England and NICE called the CDF 
Investment Group, would, based on recommendation from NICE, decide a drug’s entry to the 
Fund, determine a managed access agreement, and monitor use. Despite the industry’s wishes 
to seize the opportunity to reform NICE, NICE’s appraisal was largely unchanged. The ABPI 
responded with disappointment, once again calling for “the wholesale reform” of NICE.    
     
4. Conclusion  
Although the Coalition Government envisioned a far-reaching reform that would have 
changed the structure of drug rationing through value-based pricing, it confronted different 
political actors, including drug companies and doctors. In the end, the value-based pricing 
agenda yielded little concrete results, and drug pricing in England continued to operate under 
the PPRS’ framework of profit-based control. What was left was the Cancer Drugs Fund, 
whose introduction was justified as an intervening step towards more comprehensive reform. 
Despite its budgetary overload gathering criticism, the electoral logic behind the introduction 
of the Fund meant that once it was introduced it was hard to remove; by remodelling it as a 
fund to manage drugs’ early entry to the market, NICE, the industry, NHS, and cancer patient 
groups reached a negotiated settlement, which continued to favour cancer patients through 
their improved drug access.  
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The story behind the fall of the value-based pricing agenda revealed the power of the past 
choices. Both clinicians and the pharmaceutical industry adapted to the existing regulatory 
structure centred on explicit drug rationing led by NICE. Clinicians opposed the agenda 
because it would mean a return to postcode prescribing whereby local clinicians must make 
rationing decisions. Against the government’s rhetoric of clinical autonomy and clinician-
centred provision of care, clinicians no longer want to take back that responsibility. Likewise, 
part of the reasons drug companies opposed the reform was that they had also changed their 
business model in response to  the existing regulatory structure centred on NICE. Through 
political actors’ institutional adaptation, existing institutional arrangements of drug rationing 
hence created their own support basis, which in turn limited policy reversal.   
At the same time, the trajectory of policy debates in the early 2010s showed the role of the 
“blame game” in shaping political struggles over an unpopular policy such as rationing. While 
the government would shift public accountability and the accompanying blame for rationing 
decision from NICE to clinicians and drug companies, hoping that it would lead to more drugs 
being available, neither of them would take on that burden. In the end, the agenda’s demise 
meant the continuation of the final decision on drug funding being shared by NICE (for new 
drugs that it appraised) and local NHS commissioners (for the others). Ironically, although the 
Cancer Drugs Fund facilitated drug access and benefited drug manufacturers, it also implied 
the diffusion of responsibility and blame for drug rationing. The existence of a Fund that could 
override NICE’s judgement failed to incentivise manufacturers to reduce their prices. The 
episode of removing drugs from the CDF suggests that unlike the earlier period of blaming 
NICE, patient groups started blaming not only the NHS for rationing drugs but also drug 
companies for putting high prices on the drugs that in turn led to the rationing. The continued 
role of the CDF as an instrument for early access may hence hint at the coming of the era in 
which the blame for expensive drug access is shared by both the payers and producers.  
The English regulatory state for drug rationing has, in the past two decades, experienced 
pendulum swings between movements for expert-led logic and for politician-led logic of 
rationing. The two chapters that examined the policy trajectory revealed the endogenous forces 
that created these swings. While NICE’s high political insulation enabled otherwise politically 
costly decisions based on experts’ judgements, it also generated a greater magnitude of 
counter-mobilisation that led to political reactions. In the process, the regulatory regime was 
exposed to constant high-profile conflicts and salient political battles channelled through the 
public and electoral arenas. At the same time, however, the political reactions did not lead to 






own beneficiaries by facilitating actors’ adaptation through its day-to-day interaction in the 
realm of the organised channel of politics. It was these interactions between the different 







Chapter 6 Ministers’ choices in low political insulation: France 1999-2016 
 
French drug funding policy has remained a site of political struggles since the late 1990s. 
After the Socialist Jospin government defined actual clinical benefits as the criteria for drug 
reimbursement, the successive governments attempted to apply the criteria to exclude the 
drugs that an expert committee judged clinically ineffective from the reimbursement list. 
Given the persistently high drug consumption in France, the government considered de-
reimbursement a major tool for rationalisation of drug funding. With the establishment of the 
independent agency HAS, one might expect that, with its greater formal independence from 
the health minister, the HAS expert committee charged with drug assessment played a greater 
role in shaping the trajectory of drug funding policy. 
But the low political insulation of the decision-making – that is, the institutional 
arrangements whereby the health minister held the final decision-making powers over drug 
funding – meant that even if the expert committee concluded that a drug was ineffective and 
therefore should not be funded by national health insurance it was still up to the elected official 
how to react to the experts’ opinion. As Chapter 3 has shown, the demarcation of powers 
between the minister and the expert committee was a key issue throughout policy debates over 
institutional arrangements of drug funding leading up to the creation of HAS; and both before 
and after the creation of HAS, the health minister always had the formal decision-making 
powers over the admission of a drug to the reimbursement list. Drawing on diverse cases of 
the drugs that were subject to the HAS expert committee’s evaluation, this chapter examines 
the consequences of the low political insulation for policy choices over drug funding. 
The chapter argues that, in an institutional setting with low political insulation, the 
anticipated political costs of a policy decision shaped ministers’ policy choices over whether 
to de-reimburse a drug. In making such choices about a drug that experts have judged clinically 
ineffective, a minister takes into account the likely negative impacts of their policy decision 
on both the manufacturer and consumers of the drug. If the minister believes that the political 
implications of de-reimbursing the drug are too significant she chooses, against the experts’ 
opinion, to maintain the reimbursement of the drug. The chapter finds that the establishment 
of HAS did not lead to a fundamental change in this ministerial strategy. Even though the 
independent regulator’s autonomy-seeking behaviour led to open conflicts with ministers, as 
long as the latter had the final say on drug funding ministers’ consideration of the political 






the ministers’ behaviour altered after a major drug scandal, which was itself a partial by-
product of ministers’ choice to avoid de-reimbursement in the low political insulation 
environment. The chapter thus argues that ministers’ considerations of the political costs that 
a policy decision might trigger, and hence the magnitude of the blame the minister might 
receive for making a negative decision  continues to plays a role even after the advent of the 
French “regulatory health care state” (Hassentefel and Palier 2007).   
With regard to the overall argument of the thesis, the present chapter thus shows how low 
political insulation enabled elected politicians to prevent an unpopular decision from being 
made. By anticipating its likely political impacts, in a setting with low political insulation 
ministers can use their decision-making powers to avoid making an unpopular policy choice.   
The chapter draws on diverse cases of drug assessment made by the Transparency 
Committee. It uses variation across different attributes of a drug in terms of the losses that a 
decision to de-reimburse it can impose on drug companies and on consumers; it also makes a 
before-after comparison of organisational changes like the creation of the HAS and specific 
events like a drug scandal. Through these cross-sectional and temporal comparisons, the 
chapter considers when a health minister chooses to override experts’ judgement and keep 
making a drug reimbursable. Based on these case studies, it then discusses the role of political 
costs in ministers’ policy decisions in the context of low political insulation.  
 
1.  The pattern of drug assessment 
The Transparency Committee evaluates all the drugs, both new and existing, to issue its 
opinion. As noted in Chapter 3, it gives a drug one of four SMR ratings in accordance with the 
drugs’ actual clinical benefit, namely “Substantial”, “Moderate”, “Low”, and “Insufficient”. 
In its 1999 decree, the Jospin government defined SMR as the criteria for drug 
reimbursement.455 The decree also provided that drugs with insufficient clinical benefit would 
not be reimbursed. After the Transparency Committee issues a positive opinion on a drug, the 
health minister has the power to include the drug on the reimbursement list through a 
ministerial order.  
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In practice, the Committee relatively rarely gave a negative opinion. The overwhelming 
majority of its opinions on new drugs and new indications for existing drugs judged that drugs 
had a “substantial” actual clinical benefit (Table 6.1). The drugs were usually then reimbursed 
at 65%. By contrast, each year, 10-20% of opinions that it gave fell under the categories of 
either “low” or “insufficient” SMR. The negative opinions for new drugs attracted neither 
public attention nor controversy. General newspapers rarely reported them, and little evidence 
suggests that public debates erupted over the non-admission of these drugs. The decisions to 
refuse adding new drugs to the list are hence largely invisible. The dominance of “substantial” 
SMR reflected HAS’s assessment criteria based on actual clinical benefit; unlike England, 
cost-effectiveness was not used to inform reimbursement decisions.  
 
                        Year 
SMR                 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Substantial 275 208 207 176 192 
Moderate 33 22 24 17 34 
Low  15 11 21 6 12 
Insufficient 17 19 31 15 23 
Total 325 260 283 214 235 
 
Table 6.1 The Transparency Committee’s opinions on drugs for primary and extended 
indications 
 
                                                    Year 
The type of demand 
2011 2012 2013 
Initial inclusion 219 216 169 
The extension of indication 22 32 31 
Renewal and re-evaluation (incl. 
referral and self-referral) 
557 459 276 
Others  194 163 144 
Total  992 870 620 
 
Table 6.2 The number of demands that the Transparency Committee processed 
Source: Ibid. 







Yet, the picture is different when one takes into account the re-evaluation of existing drugs 
on the list. After admission to the reimbursement list, the Committee looks into the dossier to 
renew the inclusion every five years; the Committee can also conduct re-evaluations in an ad 
hoc manner based on the minister’s referral or its own self-referral. Outputs of the committee 
include substantial amounts of these renewals and re-evaluations (Table 6.2). As we shall see 
in the next section, in contrast to new drugs the process is much more political and 
controversial, as the Committee’s re-evaluation and the minister’s decision on “de-
reimbursement” – the removal of a drug from the reimbursement list -- takes place under the 
cross-cutting pressures of different interests.  
 
2. The politics of de-reimbursement  
This section examines policy decisions about de-reimbursement. It considers when 
politicians choose to de-reimburse a drug after the Transparency Committee has recommended 
doing so. This section compares policy decisions about diverse cases of drugs taken at different 
times to ensure both variation across drugs and over time. Longitudinal variation enables us 
to examine the effects of organisational change, such as the creation of HAS, and specific 
events, like a drug scandal, on policy choice. It also allows us to look at other factors that are 
commonly discussed in the literature and might be affecting policy choices, such as parties in 
government. In addition, looking closely at the process of the politics of re-evaluation over 
time has a methodological merit in assessing the evolution of policies and institutions. A 
comparison between different drugs that belong to different periods may raise a question of 
whether the observed variations in policy decisions are attributable to differences in the nature 
of drugs or activities of the regulator. This is especially the case given the magnitude of 
changes in medical technologies over the past decades: a drug launched in 1990 can be very 
different in its complexity from a drug launched in 2010. By contrast, a longitudinal 
comparison across regulatory activities for the renewal and revaluation of the same drug at 
different times, by keeping the drug to be evaluated constant, enables us to consider how 
experts evaluated the same drug differently over time and how the actor configuration might 
affect policy choices.  
A de-reimbursement decision can impose visible costs on different types of actors. 
Politicians may consider these costs, and weigh them against the benefits of following experts’ 






may not choose to follow experts’ opinion and avoid de-reimbursement. Table 6.3 describes 
different stakes and political costs associated with de-reimbursement decisions.  
 
 






High (a) de-reimbursement plan e.g. 
vasodilators 











(d) Alzheimer’s disease drugs 
 
 
Most of the new drugs with low 
SMR 
 
Table 6.3 Different political costs of a de-reimbursement decision  
 
 
The Y-axis of the table denotes the political costs of de-reimbursement imposed on 
domestic manufacturers. A de-reimbursement decision can impose a serious drop in sales on 
the manufacturer of a drug. It may even threaten the survival of the firm if the turnover of the 
drug accounts for a large part of the company’s revenue, which was often the case for small 
and medium-sized manufacturers in France. Politicians may well be concerned about the 
impacts of negative decisions on the company given its contribution to the local and national 
economy. This axis can also indicate the possibility of lobbying by domestic firms. In France, 
anecdotes abound on how domestic drug companies are connected with political elites inside 
the government. It is hard to empirically detect whether such a network advantage of domestic 
firms affects ministers’ considerations, but we can still expect that they may have better access 
to decision-makers and hence be able to bring politicians’ attention to the costs associated with 
de-reimbursement.  
For its part, the X-axis implies political costs on consumers by removing drugs from the 
reimbursement list. Several factors could affect the political costs in this dimension. First, the 
extent of the use of the product may affect the political costs on consumers. As the literature 
on welfare state retrenchment has pointed out, because the existing benefits of the welfare state 






removal of the drug (Pierson 1994). Hence generally speaking, other things being equal, 
products that are widely used may have higher costs than products that are not yet reimbursed 
or prescribed a lot. The lack of public debates about decisions not to include new drugs with 
an insufficient SMR rating on the reimbursement list mentioned above (the south-east quadrant 
of the table), in contrast to the mobilisation against removal of drugs already on the list that 
we shall see later, may reflect this variation. Second, and related to this, the magnitude of the 
opposition of beneficiary groups can also vary depending on the profile of beneficiaries. If de-
reimbursement is imposed on well-resourced tightly connected groups in the population, it can 
generate a greater counter-mobilisation against the decision. Political costs may thus depend 
on the mobilisation of patient groups and doctors who are against de-reimbursement. Third, 
inherited policy goals and government programmes also affect the political importance of 
maintaining a drug on the list. The government can prioritise certain diseases that they consider 
politically important over others. In France, this prioritisation takes the forms of specific 
disease-based plans and of the exemption from co-payments of certain chronic disease patients. 
Finally, significant concerns over a drug’s safety may lower the perceived benefits of keeping 
it on the list. It is hard to measure and include such concern; yet, for instance, warnings issued 
on the side effects of a drug may discount the political costs of removing it from the list.  
This section considers diverse cases of policy decision that vary in their political costs. It 
allows us to explore how elected officials’ considerations of different political costs attached 
with de-reimbursement of drugs affect political dynamics and policy decisions. 
 
(a) The re-evaluation plan, 1999-2012  
In 1999, Socialist Employment Minister Martine Aubry ordered the Transparency 
Committee to re-evaluate 4,490 medicines reimbursed by the Sickness Fund.456 At the same 
time, Aubry’s 1999 decree formally changed the criteria of reimbursement, explicitly 
codifying the SMR rating. The underling idea was to establish a greater coherence between 
therapeutic effectiveness, based on scientific evaluation, and reimbursement status, given by 
the Social Security. Experts from the committee concluded that while 840 drugs had “moderate” 
or “low” SMR, 835 drugs (18.3%) were judged to have “insufficient” clinical benefit.457 
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However, the de-reimbursement of the products with insufficient clinical benefit turned out to 
be difficult for Aubry. In addition to resistance from the industry, the industry minister 
Christian Pierret pressured her not to remove the products by emphasising the negative impacts 
on employment.458 In the end, Aubry did not resort to immediate de-reimbursement, and 
instead called for price reductions. An arrêté (ministerial order) in August 2000 laid down that 
the prices of 658 drugs with insufficient SMR would be reduced by up to 20% for three 
years,459 while the reimbursement rate of 60 drugs (vasodilators) would be reduced from 65% 
to 35%. The government claimed that this measure was just a first step towards total de-
reimbursement; it emphasised that products with insufficient SMR would be removed from 
the list in three years. Firms thus avoided the worst-case scenario of outright de-reimbursement 
of their products.  
Reactions of pharmaceutical companies to the plan varied significantly within the sector. 
On the one hand, somewhat surprising support came from foreign manufacturers. In July 2000, 
shortly before Aubry’s reform was announced, the LIR (Laboratoires internationaux de 
recherche), an organisation representing 14 international companies operating in France, such 
as GlaxoWellcome, Bayer, and AstraZeneca, among others, pressured the government by 
complaining that no concrete measures were yet taken.460 De-reimbursement would, according 
to them, allow “freeing up a space for innovation and new treatments for diseases”. On the 
other hand, French firms resisted the measures. In particular, those affected most were some 
200 family-owned small and medium-sized companies (so-called “independent” firms) that 
relied on a few products. Among them, firms with more capacity (e.g. Servier, Ipsen, Pierre 
Fabre, and Fournier) attempted to accelerate strategies for overseas alliances and merger and 
acquisitions.461 According to their criticism, the de-reimbursement policies would not lead to 
cost containment; on the contrary, as prescriptions would be switched to “more expensive and 
even more dangerous” products, it would lead to an increase in the healthcare cost.462 
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Similar dynamics were repeated after Élisabeth Guigou replaced Aubry in 2000. Once the 
final results of the evaluation were released in 2001, they opened up inter-ministerial battles.463 
As the 2002 Presidential election was approaching, the government was not willing to move 
on to de-reimbursement. Guigou did not make profound reforms and kept piecemeal 
adjustments such as a gradual reduction of prices. In July 2001, she announced a 2-19% price 
reduction, which would generate a saving of 900 million euros.464 Price negotiation resulted 
in an 8% reduction for drugs as a whole. In contrast with the domestic-international divide in 
the industry over the de-reimbursement plan, Guigou’s price-reduction agenda faced the united 
front between the LIR and the domestic pharmaceutical industry’s association, the Syndicat 
national de l'industrie pharmaceutique (SNIP), as this time the drugs subject to price reduction 
included those essential for certain pathologies. The LIR called the plan “a dramatic signal for 
discouragement to innovation, and hence research”.465  
Aubry’s and Guigou’s plans resulted in court battles. After Servier filed a legal appeal 
against de-reimbursement of its product, in June 2003 the Conseil d’Etat ordered annulment 
of the reduction of the reimbursement rate from 65 to 35% for its two vasodilators.466 It was 
followed by another ruling to annul the reduction for another 10 drugs, as it considered that 
the Committee’s advice was not sufficiently reasoned. 467  The annulment prompted the 
minister to reorganise the Transparency Committee. Facing a significant setback in the de-
reimbursement plan, Health Minister Jean-François Mattei stressed the reinforcement of the 
process’ “transparency and rigour”, with more emphasis on clinical expertise, and with more 
precise criteria to be applied.468 The organisational change of the Transparency Committee to 
reinforce its scientific profile was thus a result of this event. 
After the May 2002 Presidential election put an end to the Cohabitation, newly-appointed 
health minister Jean-François Mattei (UMP) set out agendas for healthcare reforms. Based on 
the perception that attempts at spending controls since the 1990s had failed, he placed a greater 
emphasis on patients’ responsibility in healthcare. The underlying notion was that the health 
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budget deficit was caused by medical consumerism as a form of patients’ moral hazard. The 
emphasis on the patient’s responsibility were reflected in agendas such as raising the fees for 
physicians’ home visits, the increase of patients’ co-payments (ticket modérateur) for 
treatments and drugs, and the alignment of the reimbursement rate with available generic 
medicines. The last agenda was announced in April 2003, in which from October 172 drugs’ 
reimbursement prices would be fixed at their generic price. The measure was expected to save 
100 million euros every year. To encourage sales of generics, the government set the profit 
margins for generic sales for pharmacies at 10% against 3% for branded medicines.469 These 
agendas fuelled considerable controversies. For instance, patient co-payment was later 
negatively regarded by the HCAAM (Haut Conseil pour l’Avenir de l’Assurance Maladie), in 
the course of preparing agendas for the Douste-Blazy healthcare reform in 2004, as “it results 
in a form of insidious rationing of care, therefore it gives up taking on advances of science and 
medical technologies”.470 
 The idea that moral hazard hinders cost containment also embodied drug reimbursement 
policy. In terms of the de-reimbursement plan, therefore, Mattei further pushed agendas 
inherited from his predecessors. In April 2003, Mattei announced a ministerial decree in which 
the reimbursement rate for 617 drugs with moderate or low SMR would be reduced from 65% 
to 35%. The announcement was issued without prior consultation with medical unions and 
mutual funds. It provoked considerable criticism, as these drugs included medicines that were 
widely prescribed.471 The Mutualité (the federation of complementary health insurance bodies, 
which cover co-payment) opposed the change in the reimbursement rate. The largest generalist 
association, the CSMF, also claimed that while they were in favour of de-reimbursement of 
drugs with an insufficient SMR, it was against the change in reimbursement rate, arguing that 
drugs should be either reimbursed if they were useful, or de-reimbursed if not.472 With regard 
to the drugs with insufficient SMR, Mattei had earlier begun the consultation process for de-
reimbursement.473 In July 2003, Mattei announced that 650 out of the 835 drugs that were 
judged as having insufficient SMR in Aubry’s re-evaluation plan should be totally removed 
from the list. The measure was estimated to achieve a saving of 1.4 billion euros. He declared 
his commitment to implementing the first wave of operations in October 2003, which applied 
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to 84 drugs. These were mainly traditional medicines, some of which were considered 
dangerous. Mattei also planned another two waves to complete the de-reimbursement, which 
was taken over by his successors, following the adoption of the 2004 healthcare reform.    
Yet, even after the establishment of HAS in the 2004 Douste-Blazy reform, an evaluation 
by an expert committee did not make imposition of de-reimbursement easy. The second wave 
of the de-reimbursement agenda arose in 2005. In September, HAS recommended de-
reimbursement of 221 products with insufficient SMR. It argued that the withdrawal of the 
reimbursement of these products had no proven negative impact on the quality of care, and it 
emphasised the necessity of ensuring national solidarity and providing access to the most 
effective treatments.474 As a commentator maintained, as the new independent agency’s first 
evaluation, this recommendation was expected to be “symbolically strong but easy to defend 
because of no possible scientific debate”.475 However, the government preferred not to remove 
the products from the list; instead, it proposed to create a new class with a reimbursement rate 
of 15%. Among the de-reimbursement targets, the new class was applied to veintonics, a 
treatment for heavy legs. HAS disagreed with the new reimbursement rate. It claimed that the 
products in question had been removed in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Luxemburg by 2004. It 
also pointed out that a French patient consumed eight times more products with an insufficient 
SMR than a Canadian or British patient, which cannot be explained by demographic and 
pathophysiological structures.476  Health Minister Xavier Bertrand nevertheless decided to 
keep 62 veintonics reimbursed at 15% until January 2008 before they were removed. 477 
Another 156 drugs (282 branded pharmaceuticals) were removed from the list in March 
2006.478 
The subsequent wave of de-reimbursement shows a similar open conflict between the 
agency and the minister. In October 2006, HAS issued a recommendation for the third wave 
of de-reimbursement measures. A major difference between this wave and the previous ones 
is that this time it targeted prescription-only drugs. It recommended that 145 drugs judged to 
have insufficient SMR ratings, accounting for 575 million euros (among which 345 million 
euros were covered by the obligatory health insurance), should be removed from the list. The 
primary share of the de-reimbursement comprised vasodilators used for multiple indications. 
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As for the drugs whose benefits were judged as insufficient in some indications but not in 
others, HAS advised their removal from the list for the former indications.  
However, Health Minister Xavier Bertrand announced that he would not follow HAS’s 
opinion. He justified this decision by maintaining that his role was “to take into account the 
social reality” as opposed to HAS’s “scientific assessment”.479 The minister emphasised the 
consideration of the existence of alternative treatments, especially for old people. Thus, 48 of 
the 89 drugs (mainly vasodilators) would maintain the same reimbursement rate of 35% while 
reducing their prices up to 20%; the other 41 drugs would be removed from the reimbursement 
list from January 2008, after a one year transition period during which the reimbursement rate 
would be reduced to 15%. 480  The Mutualité regretted the decision. It suggested that its 
subsidiaries should no longer pay for the drugs reimbursed at 15%. For its part, Les Entreprises 
du médicament (LEEM) (the pharmaceutical industry’s association, formerly named SNIP) 
criticised the “massive” price reduction. 
Successive ministers continued to adopt de-reimbursement measures. For the 2010 Social 
Security Financing Law, Health Minister Roselyne Bachelot decided to create a 
reimbursement rate of 15% for drugs with low and insufficient SMR. Based on this new 
reimbursement rate, an additional wave of de-reimbursement measures took place in 2010 
based on HAS’ 2006 evaluation, where the reimbursement rate for 150 products with low or 
insufficient SMR was reduced from 35% to 15%.481 The creation of the new reimbursement 
rate, however, meant that these products with insufficient clinical benefits again avoided total 
de-reimbursement.  
Yet, ministers’ reluctance to implement total de-reimbursement was subsequently reversed. 
In January 2011, Health Minister Xavier Bertrand announced that 126 products with 
insufficient SMR would be de-reimbursed.482 According to the Cour des comptes’ report that 
year, the minister planned to de-reimburse all drugs presenting insufficient SMR. Bertrand’s 
announcement was also backed by President Nicholas Sarkozy, who clarified that a product 
must be de-reimbursed if it is not effective.483  
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Why was the same minister, who repeatedly refused to follow experts’ advice in the 
previous rounds of re-evaluation, eager to de-reimburse all the drugs with insufficient SMR?  
The timing of the decisions suggests that this was to do with an ongoing drug scandal. In late 
2010, the minister ordered the IGAS (Inspection générale des affaires sociales) to investigate 
Mediator, a diabetes drug manufacturer by Servier. Having obtained approval for diabetes but 
widely prescribed for controlling appetite, Mediator was alleged to have caused between 500 
and 2,000 deaths since 1976, until it was withdrawn from the market in 2009. As the 
Transparency Committee had judged Mediator’s SMR insufficient in 1999 but the drug had 
nevertheless remained reimbursable throughout successive de-reimbursement plans, the 
scandal was not only seen as a significant blow to the drug safety regulatory regime but also 
to pricing and reimbursement, and in fact to policies related to the pharmaceutical sector as a 
whole. In that autumn the Cour des comptes deplored that the measure for de-reimbursement 
had not been implanted. It criticised the lack of transparency in the reimbursement decision by 
emphasising that ministerial decisions contradicted experts’ opinion.484 In the meantime, a 
further re-evaluation by HAS was progressing, and it was decided that at least some of the 
drugs were to be de-reimbursed in early 2012.  
In short, the agenda for de-reimbursement based on experts’ evaluation took a decade-long 
process to implement after Aubry’s plan in 1999. Ipsen’s Tanakan, a drug based on gingko for 
old-age memory problems may exemplify this incrementalism of de-reimbursement measures. 
As already noted, the threat of de-reimbursement would be felt especially severely by a family-
owned company such as Ipsen, since Tanakan was its second best-selling drug (11% of the 
company’s turnover), the 54th most prescribed drug in France, representing 55 million euros 
in reimbursement payments in 2006. 485  Tanakan had been put on the list of drugs with 
insufficient SMR in Aubry’s 1999 plan. The reimbursement rate was reduced from 65% to 
35% in 2001, which was annulled subsequently by the 2003 ruling of the Conseil d’Etat.486 
HAS included Tanakan on the de-reimbursement list again in 2006, based on the re-evaluation 
that its SMR rate was “insufficient”. Yet, like another 47 drugs, it was not withdrawn from the 
reimbursement list immediately and was still reimbursed at 35%; instead, the government 
decided to reduce the price. Meanwhile, Ipsen launched additional clinical trials involving 
2,800 patients, which continued until 2010, trying to demonstrate Tanakan’s effectiveness in 
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the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease.487 This sort of “buying -time” tactics might have helped 
Ipsen to prepare for the expected loss of Tanakan’s turnover; it was reported to have boosted 
research and development and improved production capacity, especially looking to expand its 
presence in overseas markets.488 In 2010, Tanakan’s reimbursement rate was reduced further 
to 15%.489 In the following year, HAS again judged that Tanakan had an insufficient SMR and 
would not be reimbursable, recommending withdrawal from the list.490 Tanakan was finally 
removed from the list in February 2012491. 
The case of the re-evaluation plan shows that political costs on both the domestic producers 
and consumers played a role in decisions. On the one hand, domestic French firms, which were 
the main expected losers of the decision, mobilised against de-reimbursement, which 
successfully shaped the minister’s policy choice. The mobilisation was transmitted through 
either the rival ministries’ intervention, as shown in Aubry’s and Guigou’s plans, or direct 
lobbying. Consideration of the loss imposed on the domestic industry was also confirmed in 
interviews. A senior civil servant who was involved in Gigou’s plan mentioned a meeting with 
a group of independent firms including Servier, Pierre Fabre, Ipsen and others, which claimed 
that thanks to their new research several new drugs were in the pipeline and asked the minister 
to wait. “We need a bit of time, we can’t murder the French industry”.492 On the other hand, 
in some cases doctors protested against de-reimbursement. A former member of HAS said that 
“some front-line doctors” protested when HAS conducted the 2005 re-evaluation, as they were 
blamed by patients for prescribing useless drugs.493 As a result of pressure from both interests, 
ministers were reluctant to impose de-reimbursement.  
 
(b) Osteoarthritis drugs  
 Another case that involved considerable stakes for both patients and French domestic firms 
was drugs for osteoarthritis. Osteoarthritis is said to affect 9-10 million people in France, 
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especially people older than their 40s.494 In 2008, the Transparency Committee judged that the 
actual clinical benefit of Pierre Fabre’s Structum for the treatment of hips and knees was 
insufficient. The drug remained reimbursed at 15%, but it was de-reimbursed in December 
2011. Pierre Fabre complained, in particular, that whereas Structum was judged insufficient, 
its competitors were judged as having low SMR. It claimed that instead of saving expenditure 
de-reimbursement of Structum would cost the health insurance more, because the prescription 
would be transferred to its more expensive competitors.495 It appealed to the Conseil d’Etat 
but was not successful.496 
But the fate of Structum’s competitors turned out to be unkind too. In January 2013, HAS 
published an opinion recommending the de-reimbursement of several anti-inflammatories, 
symptomatic slow-acting drugs for the treatment of osteoarthritis (drugs based on glucosamine, 
chondroitin, diacerein, and avocado and fish oils), including Chondrosulf (manufactured by 
Génévrier), ART 50 (by Negma), Piascledine (by Expansience) and Zondar (by Niverpharma) 
– the drugs named as the main competitors for Pierre Fabre’s Structum. This recommendation, 
itself followed several rounds of re-evaluation. In 2002, several of the nine drugs were judged 
as low SMR based on re-evaluation, which led to reimbursement at 35%. In the 2008 re-
evaluation of the drug the committee also judged them as low SMR, though the committee 
gave the manufacturer the condition of a two-year study to examine their effects on reducing 
the consumption of anti-inflammatory steroids. The reimbursement rate was reduced to 15% 
following the creation of this new reimbursement rate in 2010. In September 2011, the Director 
of Social Security further referred them to the Transparency Committee, and the conclusion 
of the committee reiterated that it would re-evaluate the drugs once the results of the trial came 
out.497 Based on the re-evaluation in January 2013, the Committee issued a negative opinion 
about the inclusion of the drugs in the reimbursement list. The Health Minister moved on to 
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issue a ministerial order in May removing the drugs from the list. In July, however, the Conseil 
d’Etat suspended the order on the grounds that HAS had not re-evaluated all the specialities 
of the same class of drugs, including some other glucosamine-based products, as required in 
the Code of Social Security. Meanwhile, in November, based on the ANSM’s re-evaluation of 
the risk/benefit ratio of the drugs, the EMA’s Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee 
recommended suspension of drugs containing diacerein (among the drugs mentioned above, 
ART 50, Zondar and their generics) due to the side effects of severe diarrhoea and potential 
liver damage. 498  After the Transparency Committee judged that other glucosamine-based 
products had insufficient SMR, in January and March 2015 the Health Minister removed all 
the drugs mentioned above as well as the other glucosamine-based products that HAS judged 
to have insufficient clinical benefit. 
The decision had a severe impact on the manufacturers, as they were all small and medium-
sized firms and osteoarthritis drugs accounted for significant part of their sales. Facing the risk 
of de-reimbursement, one of the manufacturers, Expanscience, was reported to have axed 119 
positions from their 750 employers.499 After de-reimbursement of its drug, Génévrier shifted 
its resources to its biotechnology subsidiary to survive.500  
Patient groups and rheumatologists mobilised against the decision. The patient group Aflar 
(L'Association française de lutte antirhumatismale) claimed that although the drugs only had 
low-to-moderate therapeutic effectiveness they improved patients’ quality of lives. It launched 
a major campaign to protest against de-reimbursement, including sending open letters to 
Health Minister Marisol Touraine and President François Hollande and running petitions, the 
latter of which gathered more than 160,000 signatures. 501  Overall, however, these 
mobilisations did not seem to affect the results. 
 
After Mediator  
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(c) Multaq  
Sanofi-Aventis’s drug Mutaq, an antiarrhythmic medication for the treatment of atrial 
fibrillation (irregular rhythms in the heartbeat), provides an interesting case to illustrate how 
the government reacted to the heightened salience of drug safety in a crisis situation. 
Manufactured by the national flagship company, Multaq was seen as a potential “future 
blockbuster” while it was developed. As a number of its medicines’ patents were to expire by 
2012, Sanofi-Aventis considered Mulaq strategically important. One estimate indicated that 
the drug’s sales would be $1.4 billion in 2014.502  We would hence expect the producer 
interest’s stakes over Multaq to be high. Multaq was approved for marketing authorisation in 
November 2009. 
Multaq was launched on the French market in October 2010. The Transparency 
Committee’s assessment disappointed Sanofi-Aventis. In March, it was reported that the 
Committee initially judged that the drug had only a moderate SMR; it also gave an ASMR of 
5 (no improvement). These results implied that the drug would be reimbursed at 35%, and the 
price negotiation was unlikely to be in favour of the manufacturer as the drug was unlikely to 
be given a generous price compared to its competitor – a drug produced in 1967, with an 
expired patent.503 The leadership of Sanofi-Aventis urged the committee to hold a hearing, and 
as a result the final version of the opinion gave a substantial SMR.504 The new drug was hence 
reimbursed at 65%. The company had to accept a very much lower price than in other 
European countries.  
In January 2011, however, it was reported that according to the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in very rare cases the drug caused severe liver damage, and in two cases 
patients treated by Mulaq required liver transplantation.505 Following the FDA notice, the 
EMA recommended a warning and precautions about the drug. In particular, it recommended 
the examination of the liver function of the patient before and over the course of the treatment 
and discontinuation of the treatment in case of signs of liver damage. It also launched a re-
examination of the drug’s risk-benefit ratio.506 
This safety warning coincided with the “storm” of the Mediator scandal. The IGAS 
investigation report on Mediator had just come out on 15 January. During the same week, as 
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part of the response to the scandal, Minister Bertrand ordered the Afssaps to publish the list of 
76 drugs currently subject to follow-up examination in national pharmacovigilance by the end 
of the month. In practice, the list meant drugs were put under reinforced surveillance within 
the risk management plan, which became obligatory for all new molecules after a major drug 
scandal took place in the United States in 2004 involving Vioxx, an arteritis drug. The Afssaps 
director reassured the public that the list was not a “black list” of dangerous drugs and it would 
not affect patients currently taking them. The minister’s order to publish the list may hence 
indicate his attempt at managing the public reaction after the Mediator scandal. Multaq was 
also put on the published list. 
Faced with the EMA alert, HAS’ Transparency Committee decided to re-evaluate Multaq. 
In June the committee judged that it did not have sufficient clinical benefit. Minister Xavier 
Bertrand did not oppose the experts’ advice; in July he stated that he had “decided to change 
the rules: if opinions are made by the scientists, the minister will be bound to follow the 
opinion, unless [s/he] wants to oppose [it] with a reasoned opinion”.507 The decision to remove 
Multaq did not surprise the press; a month earlier the minister stated at the press conference 
for the reform of pharmacovigilance in response to the Mediator scandal that he would follow 
experts’ advice “without hesitation nor trembling”. Bertrand also ordered the Afssaps to 
reinforce the surveillance of Multaq. In November, Multaq was de-reimbursed. Following its 
re-evaluation, the EMA, for its part, confirmed in September that Multaq had a positive 
risk/benefit ratio. The drug was hence not withdrawn, but the EMA also recommended 
restricted use of Multaq after consideration of alternative treatments.  
 
 (d) Alzheimer’s disease drugs  
The 2011 and 2016 re-evaluations of four drugs for the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease, 
including Aricept (manufactured by Eisai), Ebixa (by Lundbeck), Exelon (by Novartis), and 
Reminyl (by Janssen-Cilag), provide another case of the post-Mediator dynamics over drug 
de-reimbursement. It also illuminates the role of inherited policy programmes in politicians’ 
consideration of de-reimbursement’s political costs.  
Alzheimer’s disease is a highly important disease area from a political perspective, and the 
drugs in question occupied an important place within the therapeutic strategy. The stake for 
                                                     






patients of the drugs was high -- among 800,000 patients of Alzheimer disease in France about 
300,000 patients were estimated to be prescribed one of the four drugs, with an annual cost of 
260 million euros covered by the Sickness Fund.508 Successive governments had prioritised 
combatting Alzheimer’s disease. Alzheimer’s disease was one of the chronic diseases included 
in the Affections longue durée (ALD), which exempted certain chronic disease patients from 
co-payment for treatments. For patients admitted to the ALD the drugs were reimbursed at 
100%. Moreover, Alzheimer’s disease was also one of the few areas for which the government 
had introduced disease-based national “plans”, alongside cancer and palliative care. During 
the 2008 Presidential election Sarkozy pledged to create a plan for Alzheimer’s disease, which 
was launched after the election. The plan set out a comprehensive strategy ranging from 
research and development, and clinical guidelines to disease management. Costs imposed on 
consumers by excluding drugs from the list can hence be very high. At the same time, none of 
the drugs in question were produced by domestic firms. Although the Alzheimer’s disease plan 
was pledged in part as a response to domestic firms’ campaign during the 2008 Presidential 
election, the grand research and development projects associated with the plan would not be 
themselves affected by de-reimbursement of these drugs. Few comments were made by 
domestic firms or LEEM in the wake of public debates over the potential de-reimbursement 
of the drugs.  
The case of Alzheimer’s disease drugs suggests attempts by the regulator to act 
autonomously in response to the crisis situation. In 2011, HAS launched a re-evaluation of 
four existing Alzheimer’s disease drugs on the market. The re-evaluation was based on a “self-
referral” (une autosaisine), which allowed HAS to re-evaluate the drug based on its own 
agenda. This agenda reflected its response to the Conseil d’Etat’s annulment of the earlier 
guidelines due to undeclared conflicts of interests. The re-evaluation’s timing was perhaps also 
related to the context of the Mediator scandal. Given these hostile situations for the regulatory 
agency’s credibility, HAS attempted to restore its reputation through the re-evaluation agenda.  
These four drugs were given “substantial” SMR in the previous evaluation in 2007, and 
were covered at 100% for ALD patients. Several studies had questioned the therapeutic 
efficacy of the drugs in slowing the progression of the disease. Moreover, there was a concern 
                                                     






about side effects associated with them. An independent pharmaceutical journal, Prescrire, 
had reported increased risk of cardiac side effects and sometimes deaths.509 
The re-evaluation process became salient, as a leaked document from HAS’ working group 
revealed the possibility of de-reimbursement: some of the assessors recommended judging the 
drugs of “insufficient” SMR, while others considered the drugs “low” in their clinical 
benefit. 510  Patient groups, including French Alzheimer’s Society, and specialist doctors 
advocated for not removing the drugs. Before the conclusion was announced, Health Minister 
Xavier Bertrand reassured the public that the drugs would not be removed, and that they would 
keep being reimbursed at 100% for ALD patients.511 The HAS concluded that the four drugs 
were evaluated as “low” SMR and ASMR 5 (no improvement). 512  As a result, the 
reimbursement rate for the four drugs was reduced from 65% to 15%; ALD patients they were 
still reimbursed at 100%. HAS director Haroussou deplored the “interference” and “pressures” 
during the consultation. He publicly criticised “these grand neurologists, of whom you could 
wonder if they are influenced by pharmaceutical companies, and who had better care about 
scientific impact of medicines rather than looking for mediagenic impacts”.513 
Five years later, another round of HAS’s re-evaluations in 2016 provoked yet another 
controversy. Once again, the Transparency Committee judged that actual clinical benefit of 
the drugs was “insufficient”. Health Minister Marisol Touraine (PS), however, decided to not 
to follow the committee’s opinion and to maintain the drugs on the list. She explained the 
decision by maintaining that since the disease did not have an available cure she first wanted 
to establish the “care protocol”. 
These decisions not to de-reimburse the drugs were made despite mobilisation and 
campaigns for de-reimbursement. There was considerable criticism and mobilisation among 
consumer interests and generalist doctors against the decision. Not only a group of doctors 
who were critical of pharmaceutical policy, such as those around the journal Préscrire, but 
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also major medical associations mobilised against maintaining the reimbursement of the drug. 
Together with the Préscrire, one of the generalist associations, MG France, had campaigned 
for de-reimbursement of the drugs since 2011, emphasising their cardiac risk. The largest 
generalist union, CSMF, was also against the minister’s decision. In April 2017 when the 
government announced its intention to raise fees for neurology consultations, it claimed that 
the announcement was to avoid deciding on the issue of de-reimbursement of the Alzheimer’s 
disease drugs. They stated: “We regretted that the minister limits herself to a pre-electoral 
political communication, thus delaying making a decision on a certain sensitive and very 
worrying subject”.514  
The case of Alzheimer’s disease drugs thus shows how the existing policy programmes that 
reflect policy priorities affect elected officials’ policy choices. The result is somewhat 
surprising, as even after the Mediator scandal, when the public might have become more 
sensitive to safety concerns, and despite worries expressed by both doctors and groups of 
consumers about the drugs’ risk, considerations of anticipated political costs imposed on 
domestic programme beneficiaries alone can override such concerns.   
     
3. Discussions 
Comparisons across different episodes concerning drugs yield insights into determinants 
of the minister’s de-reimbursement decisions (for a summary of the cases, see Table 6.4). First, 
both types of political cost –on domestic industry and on consumers – informed ministers’ 
behaviours. The effect is by no means deterministic. There is some evidence that consideration 
of domestic producers had substantial impact on the minister’s decisions in re-evaluation plans, 
but even in the absence of the domestic business aspect, as in the case of Alzheimer’s disease 
drugs, with a very high level of costs on consumers, the minister did not choose to de-
reimburse a drug.  
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High  High No No Martine Aubry (PS) Avoid immediate de-reimbursement 
Price reduction 
60 vasodilators: 65% -->35% 
2001 
(a) 
Drugs w/ insufficient 
SMR 




(a) 617 drugs 
w/moderate/low SMR  
(b) 84 old drugs w/ 
insufficient SMR 
(diverse) 
High Generalists against 
the reduction of the 
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High No No Jean-François Mattei 
(UMP)  







High Doctors against de-
reimbursement 
High No No Xavier Bertrand (UMP) Override the Transparency Committee (CT) 
advice: 
Creation of 15% for veintonics until 2008 
De-reimburse 156 drugs  
2006 
(a) 
221 products w/ 
insufficient SMR 
(eg vasodilators) 
High Doctors against de-
reimbursement 
High No No Xavier Bertrand (UMP) Override CT advice: 
48 drugs: reimburse at 35%; price reduction 
41 drugs: reimburse at 15% before de-
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9 osteoarthritis drugs High Patient groups 
against de-
reimbursement 
High No Yes (some 
of the 
drugs) 








Multaq (for atrial 
fibrillation) 
High N/A Low No Yes (EMA 
warning) 
Xavier Bertrand (UMP) Follow CT advice: de-reimburse 
2011 
(d) 
4 Alzheimer’s disease 
drugs 




- Generalists for de-
reimbursement 
High Yes Yes (no 
official 
warning) 
Xavier Bertrand (UMP) Override CT advice 
2016 
(d) 
4 Alzheimer’s disease 
drugs 




- Generalists for de-
reimbursement 
High Yes Yes (no 
official 
warning) 
Marisol Touraine (PS) Override CT advice 
 
*1) Alphabet denotes case groupings used in Table 3: (a) re-evaluation (b) osteoarthritis drugs (c) Multaq (d) Alzheimer’s disease drugs  
*2) Reported opposition appeared in more than 3 independent sources among general newspapers during the studied period  
*3) Yes/No means safety concerns specific to the particular specialities. Bold cells are under a high level of public attention to drug safety in general 
immediately after the Mediator scandal 
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For each dimension of political costs, we also see some more nuanced pictures. On the one 
hand, comparison of the re-evaluation plan and osteoarthritis drugs suggests the necessity of 
a further investigation into more specific effects of the domestic industry. In both cases, the 
firms affected were all domestic independent firms and the drugs were of a similar type – high 
volume ones with insufficient clinical benefits. They also involved counter-mobilisation by 
doctors and patient groups. However, firms were more successful in shaping the minister’s 
choice in the re-evaluation plan than in the case of osteoarthritis drugs. One possible 
interpretation is that in the former, it involved much larger number of drugs and the industry 
association formed a more united front to defend their interests, whereas in the latter case 
firms were competing with each other within one disease area. Another possibility is that after 
the Mediator scandal, with increased public attention to safety concerns on drugs and a more 
critical view of the existing regulatory regime, elected politicians were becoming more 
cautious about whether not to follow experts’ opinions; they might give a greater consideration 
to the risk of getting the blame for refusing experts’ outputs, which might lead to negative 
consequences like Mediator. This somewhat optimistic speculation of the impact of a scandal 
might be the case, especially because at least two of the osteoarthritis drugs had reported safety 
concerns. Yet, the available evidence does not allow us to make conclusive claims. 
On the other hand, in terms of political costs on consumers, doctors and patient groups’ 
mobilisation against de-reimbursement at least played a role in the re-evaluation plan, though 
in the case of osteoarthritis drugs it did not seem to have significant effects in stopping 
ministers from de-reimbursing the drugs. Yet perhaps the clearest impacts of costs upon 
consumers are shown in the case of Alzheimer’s disease drugs, where the drugs conveyed 
significant political importance and policy priority due to inherited policy programmes. 
Conversely, the effects of consumer groups’ and doctors’ criticism against keeping 
reimbursing drugs were limited at best, even in the post-Mediator period. Even if we take the 
optimistic hypothesis about public criticism on the existing regime mentioned above – that 
ministers were generally more cautious in choosing not to follow experts’ outputs in the post-
Mediator period – the perceived political importance of keeping the Alzheimer’s disease drugs 
on the list was still great enough for the minister to override experts’ outputs.   
Second, in terms of ministers’ blame-avoidance strategies, ministers used various tactics 
to avoid politically costly choices. They delayed implementation of de-reimbursement; they 
incrementally reduced the reimbursement rate of drugs instead of choosing to remove them; 






price reduction as an alternative to de-reimbursement shows how existing institutional 
structures in the policy sector gave a range of available policy instruments and options that 
policymakers could use; it also suggests the continued role of the state in policy-making that 
we see in other French policy sectors. 
Third, concerns on drug safety issues had substantial impacts on politicians’ behaviours at 
least during the period of intense public salience immediately after the investigation into the 
Mediator scandal. In the de-reimbursement decisions in 2011 over drugs with insufficient 
SMR and of Multaq, the minister, who was trying to turn the blame on the government for the 
scandal to his own credit by reforming the system, attempted to address the issue of clinically 
ineffective drugs. By contrast, only a few months later, the same minister chose not to remove 
Alzheimer’s disease drugs from the reimbursement list, despite the risks highlighted by 
consumer groups and medical associations. To be sure, unlike the Multaq case, there was no 
official EMA warning. Yet, the minister could have been sensitive about safety matters given 
his earlier commitment after the scandal, and given -- as the next chapter shall show – his own 
initiatives for ongoing policy debates over reforming pharmaceutical regulation. Thus the 
overwhelming political importance of drugs in existing programmes overshadowed the 
Alzheimer’s disease drugs’ safety risk.  
Fourth, cross-case comparisons show that some of the conventional accounts of the welfare 
state reform, such as partisanship, played little role in the politics of de-reimbursement. Both 
ministers from left- and right-wing parties were extremely reluctant to de-reimburse the same 
Alzheimer’s disease drugs. Parliamentary debates during the re-evaluation plan also indicate 
that both parties, while in opposition, criticised de-reimbursement, and when they were in 
power, they kept putting de-reimbursement on the agenda but were reluctant to actually 
implement them. This confirms the idea that the politics of drug de-reimbursement is the 
politics of blame-avoidance, where partisanship played a less important role (cf. Pierson 1994). 
In addition to cross-case comparison, longitudinal comparisons of the same drugs across 
different occasions of re-evaluation show how an independent regulator tried to develop 
autonomy. Generally speaking, each re-evaluation of the same drugs was becoming “tougher” 
than the previous round of evaluation. As several cases show, since the establishment of HAS 
it openly challenged the minister, or at least did not hesitate to disagree with them. To be sure, 
after drugs have been on the market for a while more evidence is available to assess their 






with the evolution of the Committee’s use of SMR. In rating a drug’s clinical benefit, the 
Transparency Committee’s assessment hinges greatly on two factors including the severity of 
the pathology and the place of the drug in the therapeutic strategy. According to the then chair 
of the Committee, over time assessment placed increasing emphasis on the latter. Whereas 
traditionally a drug for serious diseases was almost certainly recommended for reimbursement, 
this was no longer the case. With the arrival of new drugs since the 1990s the Committee 
looked more into the intrinsic value of the drug rather than the disease area (Bevenot 2011). 
Yet, in addition to drugs being on the market and the evolution of the committee’s criteria, the 
case studies here highlight the agency’s autonomy-seeking behaviours. In an attempt at setting 
its own agendas, the Committee used instruments such as self-referral (the cases of 
Alzheimer’s disease drugs, Multaq) and conditions attached with reimbursement (the case of 
osteoarthritis drugs). Attempts at autonomous actions were even clearer after the Mediator 
scandal and the annulment of earlier guidelines due to conflicts of interests. To restore 
confidence, the agency attempted to set its own agendas, which resulted in open disagreements 
with ministers in the case of Alzheimer’s disease drugs. 
However, while such an autonomy-seeking behaviour of the agency might have affected 
public debates, as the cases of the re-evaluation plan and the Alzheimer’s disease drug show 
most vividly, they did not necessarily result in changing the minister’s decisions, especially 
when these involve greater political costs of de-reimbursement. Minister’s decisions were 
shaped more by avoiding the blame for de-reimbursement, and the blame was felt more 
heavily when the decision was expected to impose significant costs on different beneficiaries. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter examined how low political insulation reduced the occurrence of an unpopular 
policy choice such as explicit drug rationing. Where elected officials had the final decision-
making powers over drug funding, they could choose whether to follow the expert body’s 
outputs. They were able to selectively override the experts’ outputs by looking at the political 
costs that a decision was likely to generate. Drawing on different cases of the politics of drug 
assessment, the chapter considered when health ministers chose to override the Transparency 
Committee’s judgement to make a drug available. It found that elected politicians took into 
account anticipated negative impacts of their policy choice on both the domestic 






significant enough to induce elected officials to engage in blame-avoiding behaviour, 
choosing not to follow the Committee’s judgement. To avoid total de-reimbursement of the 
drugs that the Transparency Committee judged clinically ineffective, elected politicians used 
a number of alternative tactics, including partial and incremental reduction of reimbursement 
rates, price reductions, and the creation of a new reimbursement rate. While the creation of 
HAS gave the Transparency Committee a greater formal independence from the health 
minister, it did not fundamentally alter this dynamic. Although HAS did not shy away from 
openly disagreeing with health ministers, as long as the latter had the decision-making powers, 
their considerations of political costs still have crucial impacts on policy decisions. Likewise, 
the increasing public concerns about drug safety following the Mediator scandal had at best 
only a limited impact on politicians’ considerations behind their policy choices. The outbreak 
of the scandal indeed prompted elected politicians’ reactions, making them de-reimburse the 
drugs with insufficient clinical benefit -- as shown in the cases of the 2011 wave of de-
reimbursement measures and Multaq. However, even after the scandal the consideration of 
the risk of blame for removing a politically important drug – like drugs for Alzherimer’s 
disease -- alone could still overwhelm political calculation. Overall, these findings highlight 
the role of elected officials’ anticipated blame-avoidance strategies in preventing unpopular 
policy choices in a less-insulated setting. Such a strategy continued to be crucial for policy 
even after the reform that created the regulatory state institutions.     
One caveat of the present chapter’s analysis is that I examined the cases where the 
Transparency Committee issued a negative opinion, and hence treated the Committee’s 
opinion as given. But as Table 6.1 showed, negative opinion is rather rare – 80-85% of the 
time the Committee gave “substantial” SMR ratings. The relative lack of selectivity in SMR 
rating – especially compared to the English counterpart we saw in Chapter 4 – was at least 
partly due to the fact that, unlike NICE, the Transparency Committee evaluates clinical 
effectiveness but not cost-effectiveness of a drug. Especially since the mid-2000s, as the 
pressure to rationalise spending and the arrival of expensive new drugs continued, debates 
over changing the criteria for HAS’ evaluations emerged among elite political actors; the next 
chapter will examine these political struggles. As the chapter shall show, the lack of rule 
change, together with the absence of unpopular decisions for individual drugs demonstrated 







Chapter 7 Rationalisation without rationing: France, 2004-2016 
 
French drug funding policy has been marked by continuity despite changes in external 
circumstances. As the previous chapter demonstrated, health ministers selectively refused to 
follow the HAS expert committee’s judgement about a drug’s clinical effectiveness to avoid 
an unpopular policy choice such as explicit rationing. By limiting the occurrence of explicit 
rationing, the ministers’ policy choice over individual drugs’ funding contributed to policy 
continuity. But the battles over drug rationing took place not only at the level of decisions over 
individual drugs but also at the level of rules that guide these decisions. As the government 
addressed healthcare costs and the arrival of expensive new drugs, especially since the mid-
2000s HAS’ evaluation criteria that underpinned reimbursement decisions were increasingly 
debated among elite political actors. As this chapter shall show, however, the existing 
evaluation criteria, which allowed funding of the overwhelming majority of drugs, largely 
persisted. In terms of both policy practices over individual drug and rules that guide the 
practices, drug funding policy thus exhibited continuity, with limited occurrence of an explicit 
rationing strategy. 
This chapter explores the politics of changing rules. It considers why there has been little 
change in the reimbursement rules, despite the pressure on the healthcare budget driven by 
expensive drugs, focusing events that sparked policy debates, and the periodic rise of a policy 
agenda put forward by its proponents – seemingly a perfect recipe for policy change. In 
addition to the bureaucratic politics and turf battles, the chapter proposes that elected 
politicians’ blame-avoidance, linked with low political insulation, contributed to policy 
continuity. Given their decision-making powers and accompanying political responsibility for 
explicit rationing, elected officials were reluctant to adopt a reform that may lead to taking the 
blame for rationing decisions. As a result of their inaction, policy responses to drug 
expenditure largely took place through existing institutionalised arenas and instruments. In the 
absence of conflict expansion to outside actors, the policy reactions kept the power balance 
between coalitions intact despite changes in the external environment. 
The chapter first briefly revisits the existing pricing and reimbursement regime 
consolidated by the mid-2000s, where the pricing control and price-volume agreement 
established themselves as a key mechanism of resource allocation and the state’s control over 






notably the initiatives to incorporate medico-economic evaluations in drug funding decisions. 
It shows how, despite favourable conditions for policy change, the bureaucratic politics as 
well as the lack of incentives for the minister to enact a reform, both stemming from the low 
political insulation of the locus of drug funding decisions, limited expansion of the role of 
such evaluations. The chapter then turns to the consequences of the lack of fundamental 
reforms, especially by looking at the policy response to the arrival of expensive drugs.   
    
1.  Controlling drug spending through pricing 
Before examining the efforts to reform reimbursement rules, it is useful to revisit key 
features of the pricing and reimbursement system at around the time when HAS was 
established. If the reimbursement decision-making powers held by the minister based on 
HAS’s opinion was one pillar of the process, the other was the role of the inter-ministerial 
committee CEPS in pricing negotiation. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the CEPS negotiates drug 
prices with the manufacturer, using the HAS’s evaluation of the drug’s improvement in 
clinical benefit indicated in the ASMR rating from I (major improvement) to V (no 
improvement). It is important to note, in this regard, that the CEPS was not only the 
interlocutor with the industry to set the price but also came to play a major role in controlling 
drug spending and resource allocation.  
The Committee’s role in controlling spending was played through its price-volume 
agreement with the industry. The framework agreement, which was negotiated between the 
CEPS and the pharmaceutical industry’s association LEEM every 5 years, defined the terms 
of repayments that companies had to make. From 1999 the government’s annual repayments 
under the framework agreement became aligned with the ONDAM (L'objectif national des 
dépenses d'assurance maladie), the national target for health insurance fund expenditure. 
Established in 1996 by Juppé’s healthcare reform plan, under the ONDAM each year the 
parliaments voted on the target spending growth for Social Security. If drug sales exceeded 
the target growth rate of spending corresponding to ONDAM, known as the L rate, then the 
company had to give rebates on them.  
The Committee steered the balance between the health policy and the industrial policy goal. 
Through its collegial structure among different ministries, and led by the Chair held by a senior 






term framework agreements, enabled the Committee to send more credible signals to 
companies investing in the French market. From the industry’s perspective, while the 
framework agreements imposed tight control, they provided stability and certainty in terms of 
the industry’s production strategy.515 Moreover, the Committee set up measures explicitly 
designed to incentivise companies and reward their investments. Hence, from the 2003 
framework agreement onwards, “innovative” drugs with ASMR I-III were given a “European” 
price, which was set in reference to other European countries. This price hence contrasted with 
traditional pricing control, which was often criticised for setting prices lower than other 
countries’. Conversely, for the overwhelming majority of the drugs, which fell in ASMR IV 
or V, the price was kept under tighter control. 516   The Committee hence rewarded the 
producers of innovative drugs while supressing spending on the vast majority of drugs. 
Clawback credits under the CSIS (Conseil stratégique des industries de santé) were another 
example of the government’s attempt at using the CEPS as a vehicle of industrial policy 
measures. The business-government forum established in 2004 was based on an initiative by 
the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Cour des Mines, which had proposed a forum 
similar to the Pharmaceutical Industry Task Force in Britain (see Chapter 4).517 Among other 
agendas for stimulating R&D through public-private partnership and other instruments the 
CSIS set tax credits distributed through the CEPS. Awarded to companies investing in 
European countries, these provided tax exemption from the price-volume agreement rebate.  
In sum, the CEPS not only set the prices of individual drugs but also played a key role in 
the government’s control over drug resource allocation, especially through its framework 
agreement with drug companies. It provided a major channel of negotiation between the 
industry and the government, reconciling different policy goals associated with funding drugs. 
Through the operation of these spending controls, the CESP consolidated and reinforced its 
institutional status within the state.518 
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The Committee’s price-volume agreement the was a powerful tool of spending control, 
and the government managed to meet overall spending policy goals intended to be achieved 
through pricing instruments. Over the second half of the 2000s, drug spending growth was 
coming into line with the allowed spending growth target that they set out in ONDAM (see 
Figure 7.1). Price reduction remained powerful throughout the 2000s. As the Cour des 
comptes pointed out in its 2011 report, measures targeting clinicians and pharmacists were 
less successful, including diffusion of generic drugs.519 The Cour also pointed out that the 
government was even less successful in controlling hospital drugs, the majority of which 
CEPS did not have direct control over (see Section 3). The relative success in supressing 
spending through price-volume agreements set a precondition within which policy debates 
over changing rules for drug pricing and reimbursement took place.  
 
Figure 7.1 The annual growth of turnover in outpatient drugs and the ONDAM growth 
target 
Source: Adapted from LEEM’s website, added English labels. (https://www.leem.org/chiffre-
daffaires) 
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2. The limits of the bureaucrat-led attempts at policy change: Policy debates over 
reimbursement rules and the use of medico-economic evaluation 
 
The French criteria for drug reimbursement and pricing were the subject of policy debates 
among elite actors inside and outside the state, especially since the mid-2000s. While the 
existing criteria based on SMR (actual clinical benefit) enabled generosity in patients’ access 
to new technologies, the budgetary implication of unlimited access alarmed policymakers who 
were closer to the payer’s position. In particular, from the perspective of rational spending, 
the lack of information on cost-effectiveness and its missing linkages with decisions on prices 
or funding of drugs were considered problematic. Economic expertise also played only a 
secondary role in medical evaluation and clinical guidelines at ANAES, which emphasised 
“medicalised” control and clinical expertise (see Chapter 3).   
Political actors located in different parts of the state supplied policy ideas about reforms 
on assessment based on SMR and ASMR, especially whether, often explicitly referring to 
NICE, France should incorporate some form of economic evaluation in drug pricing and 
reimbursement; the Cour des Comptes, for instance, was a long-term critic in this respect. In 
its 2004 report on Social Security it complained that “neither the transparency committee, 
refocused on its mission of the medical expertise, nor the CEPS, whose mission is to regulate 
prices, at present undertake the crosscutting mission of medico-economic analysis of this 
sector, which involves evaluating cost-effectiveness ratio of drug candidates for 
reimbursement”. 520  In its 2007 report, the Cour further recommended the reform of 
reimbursement criteria and a more regular revision of the reimbursement list, both of which 
should take into account medico-economic evaluation.521   
Politicians in the legislative branch also periodically paid attention to this issue. After the 
ONDAM gave budgetary control of Social Security to the parliaments, they set up a committee 
called les missions d'évaluation et de contrôle de la Sécurité sociale (MECSS) as a routine 
monitoring device for social spending. The committee was hence sympathetic with the idea 
of rationalising resources through changing pricing and reimbursement rules. For instance, in 
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2008 the Senate MECSS report expressed concerns about the high level of drug consumption 
and recommended a greater selectivity in SMR based on the criterion of public health 
interest.522 Besides routine attention to budgetary issues through institutionalised procedures, 
focusing events involving a drug scandal further drew legislators’ attention to drug 
reimbursement. For instance, when the Senate committee discussed the pharmaceuticals 
market in response to the 2004 Vioxx affair, alongside other issues concerning expertise and 
autonomy, the report also quoted the Cour des Comptes’ remark about the lack of medico-
economic assessment.523 Perhaps more importantly, in the 2011 report on the Mediator scandal 
the Senate rapporteur proposed radically reforming the pricing and reimbursement system. It 
proposed abolishing the SMR, recommended transferring the formal powers for 
reimbursement decisions from the minister to the Transparency Committee, and suggested 
CEPS incorporate medico-economic evaluation into pricing by transferring HAS’s mission on 
medico-economic evaluation to CEPS. 524  Little evidence indicated that any of the 
recommendations significantly changed the government’s course of action regarding its policy 
agendas. The non-legislative information reports, which were intended to help senators to 
monitor the government’s activities, remained toothless. A more direct attempt by the Senate 
to control the agenda was made through the use of legislative powers concerning the Social 
Security Financing Law (LFSS). For instance, the Senate rapporteur proposed an amendment 
to the LFSS for 2011, which would make the CEPS take into account medico-economic 
evaluation in 2010; it was subsequently withdrawn when the health minister objected.525 The 
executive government’s dominant power vis-à-vis the parliaments implies that, apart from 
transmitting public attention to the issue to the incumbent government during crisis moments 
or being cited later to justify claims made in various executive branch reports, the Senate 
proposals little affected the government’s policy agendas.  
A more likely actor to initiate changes in drug pricing and reimbursement rules was the 
executive government, in particular the bureaucracies in charge of the sector. The role of 
senior Ministry of Health bureaucrats, especially those from the Directorate of the Social 
Security, is worth mentioning. These bureaucrats invested their careers in specialising in 
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health policy and moved around the Ministry, and  together with the ministerial cabinet and 
relevant Grand Cours, such as the IGAS (Inspection générale des affaires sociales) and the 
Cour des Comptes, played a key role in the government’s agenda-setting forums like the Haut 
Conseil pour l’Avenir de l’Assurance Maladie (Hcaam).526 Thus for instance, the 2006 report 
by Hcaam mentioned the necessity of examining the economic approach in more detail.527 The 
following year’s report argued that “the issue of health economics expertise, its institutional 
and legal framework as well as the development of its resources, has not been sufficiently 
addressed in the context of reforms”. 528  These diagnoses expressed in the forums were 
followed by the government’s agenda in the context of the Social Security Financing Law for 
2008. Regretting that HAS’s recommendations did not establish the care priorities, it proposed 
broadening HAS’s expertise to medico-economic evaluation; explicitly referring to other 
countries’ experiences, including England and Germany, the government stressed that HAS 
acquiring an analytical capacity would lead to “a greater selectivity in care”.529   
The call for medico-economic evaluation favoured payers -- the obligatory and 
complementary insurance bodies -- who had a natural interest in optimising social spending. 
For instance, the UNCAM/CNAMTS director Frédéric Van Roekeghem -- a position served 
by a senior official – had long called for taking into account medico-economic evaluation.530 
The CNAMTS also suggested that a possible means of reform was to give UNCAM the right 
to refuse products that failed to demonstrate cost-effectiveness.531  
At around the same time, another group of bureaucratic actors advocating the use of 
medico-economic evaluation was also emerging within HAS. In 2006, HAS set up an internal 
working group for economic evaluation, the Commission for the Evaluation of Health 
Strategies, with the appointment of Lise Rochaix, the only health economist among the 
Board’s members. Health economists and pharmaco-epidemiologists within HAS actively 
sought to address non-clinical dimensions of evaluating health technologies. Their early 
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efforts included conceptual work related to “public health interest”, a criterion included in the 
SMR by the 1999 decree, whereby the Committee sought to broaden the concept to take into 
account “collective and societal dimensions” in assessing benefit of drugs.532 
The Social Security Financing Law for 2008 provided that HAS would issue “medico-
economic recommendations and opinions on the most efficient strategies for treatment, 
prescription or care management”.533 HAS set up the Commission Evaluation Economique et 
de Santé Publique (CEESP) in charge of the mission, which succeeded the Commission for 
the Evaluation of Health Strategies. In contrast to the Transparency Committee dominated by 
clinicians, the 25 members of the CEESP consisted of economists and academics from other 
diverse disciplines in social sciences and humanities, including sociologists, and ethicists, 
among others, as well as a patient representative. The HAS Board Chair Degos justified such 
a multi-disciplinary composition of the committee by emphasising that evaluations must be 
made not only of therapeutic efficacy but also economic, sociological and ethical aspects.534 
Having got official backing as a HAS mission, the CEESP’s effort to promote medico-
economic evaluation was set in motion.535 The broad provision for this mission within the 
LFSS remained relatively ambiguous in terms of how evaluation was conducted and for what 
purpose; the Committee took advantage of this to expand their activities. Notably, CEESP 
Chair Lise Rochaix took a leadership role in “building bridges with different people”.536 Such 
efforts for coalition building were made on several fronts. Through medical evaluation and 
public health recommendations made for different clients in the government, it demonstrated 
the usefulness of medico-economic evaluation to different policymakers.537 The Committee 
also leveraged the network of comparable agencies in other countries to reinforce its analytical 
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capacity by facilitating information exchange. At the European Network for Health 
Technology Assessment, the regulatory network of HTA agencies across European countries, 
HAS took a lead role in the working group for the development of the Relative Effectiveness 
Assessment, which addressed joint development of methods of drug evaluation. There was 
also “unexpected” support from the new Board Chair of HAS Jean-Luc Harousseau, who 
arrived in 2011 and was sympathetic to the use of medico-economic evaluation despite being 
a physician an oncologist.538  
The CEESP’s attempts at capacity and coalition building can also been seen in its 
development of methods. In October 2011, the CEESP issued its methodological guide to 
medico-economic evaluation. 539  The elaboration of the guidance document was itself a 
product of their efforts to promote their work through consultation with different stakeholders 
as well as public consultation. Its methods shared some key features with those of NICE, 
including the use of QALY to measure impacts of health intervention and the EQ-5D 
questionnaire to measure quality of life. Through its activities, health economists within HAS 
thus sought to push the role of medico-economic evaluation further.   
Different political actors’ efforts to introduce changes in the drug pricing and 
reimbursement rules gained momentum following the Mediator scandal. The heightened 
public attention to pharmaceutical regulation opened up conflicts over the pricing and 
reimbursement rules in the public arena. In the wake of the scandal, the government was 
exposed to intense public pressure that blamed the government. This prompted the 
government to take visible action addressing pharmaceutical policy that could appeal to the 
public. Notably, Health Minister Xavier Bertrand attempted to turn the blame on the 
government to his credit, by actively taking an initiative for large-scale reforms in the 
pharmaceutical sector.540  In February 2011, he launched the National Drug Forums (Les 
assises national du médicament), large-scale consultations involving different stakeholders, 
which discussed agendas for reforming diverse aspects of pharmaceutical regulation. In the 
subsequent months, a plethora of reports were presented by different political actors, who tried 
to make their voices heard during the intense public scrutiny of the issue. Those who 
advocated changing pricing and reimbursement rules pushed their agendas. As already 
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mentioned, the Senate proposal involved radical organisational changes including the transfer 
of decision-making powers for reimbursement from the government to the Transparency 
Committee and the use of medico-economic evaluation in pricing decisions; for its part, the 
Mutualité proposed amending the decree implementing medico-economic evaluation to 
increase the selectivity over the admission to reimbursement.541 
 The HAS also used this opportunity to push for the use of medico-economic evaluation 
for pricing and reimbursement decisions. In its submission to the Drug Forums, it proposed 
reinforcing consideration of “nonclinical criteria in the framework of public health interest”, 
especially by introducing “the criteria of efficiency” in its opinion used for pricing and 
reimbursement decisions. Highlighting that the public authorities’ referrals to HAS on 
medico-economic evaluation had so far not been focused on conditions for reimbursement but 
on support for “medicalised” control through clinical guidelines, it argued that “HAS is ready 
for such an evolution that involves strengthening its advice given to the decision makers 
through a medico-economic dimension”.542 
This time, however, in addition to the actors who had promoted agendas for reforming drug 
funding during the pre-scandal period, the IGAS pushed HAS’s advocacy for medico-
economic evaluation and changes in the pricing and reimbursement systems. In the wake of 
the Mediator scandal, the IGAS produced a number of reports and investigations into aspects 
of pharmaceutical policy. In its report on experts in health issued in spring 2011, IGAS 
recommended that the government should strengthen medico-economic evaluation at HAS.543 
Furthermore, in its report on proposals for reforming the pharmacovigilance system in 
response to the Mediator scandal, the IGAS proposed far-reaching institutional reforms of the 
pharmaceutical regulatory regime as a whole. The report involved not only reforms on drug 
approval and post-marketing surveillance but also radical organisational changes in the pricing 
and reimbursement regime. Criticising the “opacity” of price-setting by the CEPS and the lack 
of collaboration between the CEPS and HAS, the report proposed merging CEPS with HAS 
to create “NICE à la française” 544 , which would be in charge of both pricing and 
reimbursement; it recommended the new HAS to integrate medico-economic evaluation into 
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reimbursement criteria, replacing SMR and ASMR. The minister would still retain the 
decision-making powers, but would have to explicitly explain to the public the reasoning 
behind not following the evaluation.545  
Yet, in the subsequent bill proposed by minister Xavier Bertrand, which became the so-
called Bertrand law, otherwise extensive measures to reinforce the Afssaps’s independence 
from the industry, regulation of conflicts of interests and physicians-pharmaceutical industry 
relations, and pharmacovigilance systems, did not touch on the pricing and reimbursement 
regime.  
Political actors who advocated medico-economic evaluation yet sought to achieve their 
agenda via the LFSS bill.546 The LFSSS for 2012 gave a legal basis to the CEESP as a 
regulatory committee. In the following year, the ministerial order set out the CEESP’s roles 
and the usage of medico-economic evaluation in decision-making. The CEESP was tasked to 
produce medico-economic evaluations for drugs, which would inform pricing negotiations. 
The subjects of evaluation were drugs with ASMR I-III (so-called “innovative drugs”) and 
drugs with significant impact on the healthcare budget, and the CEESP were to produce 
evaluation of the drugs’ cost-effectiveness. In a process separated from the Transparency 
Committee’s work on opinions on drugs, the CEESP’s advice was to be sent to the CEPS. 
Thus, in contrast to the far-reaching institutional reforms that the IGAS envisioned, and a 
greater role on medico-economic evaluation therein, changes in organisational and procedural 
arrangements for drug funding after the Mediator scandals were limited. The CEESP’s 
medico-economic evaluation was given some limited roles in drug pricing but none in 
reimbursement; and installing the new evaluation in the process involved little change in 
existing organisational arrangements, with the expectation that the medico-economic 
evaluation would be designed to operate within the existing institutional framework centred 
on price-volume agreement rather than altering it. Despite the very favourable conditions for 
those advocating policy change – bureaucrats seeking to achieve policy innovation, a major 
scandal as a focusing event, and a credit-claiming minister who want to introduce high-profile 
reforms in pharmaceutical policy – the reform did not lead to a rupture in existing institutions 
and policy. 
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To understand the timing and the limits of the bureaucrat-led attempt at policy change, it 
is useful to look at the constraints the bureaucrats faced. These partly lay in bureaucratic 
politics. First, there was said to be rivalry between the Transparency Committee and the 
CEESP. The rivalry was based not only on disciplinary differences between the “scientific” – 
meaning clinical in the French pharmaceutical policy –and “economic” approaches to 
evaluation but also on their organisational turfs.547 Assessments by the two committees were 
conducted in parallel as separate processes, whereby the two committee did not collaborate 
with each other. The Transparency Committee, dominated by clinicians, was reluctant to 
accept the expanding role of medico-economic evaluation. It did not see CEESP’s initiatives, 
such as those related to public health interest, favourably.548 Building supporting coalitions 
inside and outside HAS, including the newly-appointed Board Chair Harousseau, was hence 
crucial for those who advocating medico-economic evaluation to overcome the internal 
political hurdle within HAS.  
For a long time, the CEPS was also against the use of medico-economic evaluation for 
pricing and reimbursement decisions. For instance, when the government set out HAS’s role 
in medico-economic evaluation in 2008, Noël Renaudin, who served as the CEPS Chair for 
more than a decade from 1999, pointed out in an interview with a trade journal that while the 
method of the medico-economic analysis was universal, its usage would differ depending on 
“the culture of care”. He hence argued, explicitly referring to NICE, that refusing treatments 
because their cost per QALY was too high “would not be acceptable to French society” – the 
latter instead considered care albeit with expensive medicines as an important part of 
“collective solidarity”. 549  For him, medico-economic evaluation could be useful for 
therapeutic strategy and hence a tool to control demand-side costs, such as doctors’ 
prescriptions, but not supply-side ones, such as pricing. Yet, such a cultural and normative 
justification seems to go hand in hand with the motivation of defending CEPS’s organisational 
turf. After the Mediator scandal, Renaudin was replaced by Gilles Johanet, a former CNAMTS 
director who underwrote the Jospin government’s healthcare reforms. Johanet was more 
sympathetic to medico-economic evaluation, considering that one cannot set prices without 
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taking QALY into account.550 If such a shift in the ideational acceptance allowed HAS and 
allied interests to surmount the political barrier, in contrast to IGAS’ reform proposal, the use 
of medico-economic evaluation was still operating within the institutional arrangements, 
rather than upsetting CEPS’ role as the sole negotiator and decision-maker for drug pricing.551 
One would expect that the CEPS would oppose measures constraining the discretion it enjoyed, 
let alone the ones like the above-mentioned proposal by the IGAS to abolish it. 
What about ministers in charge of reimbursement decisions? They appeared to distance 
themselves from the possibility of a fuller use of medico-economic evaluations in 
reimbursement decisions, especially those like NICE’s.552 For instance, during the National 
Assembly debates leading up to the adoption of the 2008 LFSS that expanded HAS’s missions 
to medico-economic evaluation, health minister Roselyne Bachelot explicitly noted that “I am 
against integrating the concept of quality-adjusting life-years into the indicators of medico-
economic efficiency, like NICE,” because “it does not match the culture that HAS draws 
inspiration from”.553 This reluctance did not change during the dramatic moment following 
the Mediator scandal. In a stark contrast with widely publicised actions for radical reforms in 
drug approval and surveillance, Bertrand did not appear to visibly push medico-economic 
evaluation agendas.  
If ministers were not keen on the use of medico-economic evaluations for reimbursement, 
HAS also set itself boundaries for its pursuit of the agenda. While promoting the use of 
medico-economic evaluation for drug pricing and reimbursement, leaders of the agency never 
sought to gain decision-making powers; nor did they want to establish an explicit cost-
effectiveness threshold, as in England, where outputs of medico-economic evaluation became 
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the critical reimbursement decision criteria. On the contrary, they attempted to differentiate 
themselves from the English model by trying to dispel negative connotations associated with 
rationing that were especially inspired by the experience of NICE. Hence, in introducing 
medico-economic evaluation, HAS President Laurent Degos argued that the “French way” of 
medico-economic evaluation would not lead to rationing, by contrasting it with NICE:  
“Other countries, like the United Kingdom, have chosen to define thresholds beyond 
which an expenditure is no longer considered to be collectively justified. At HAS, we 
consider that it is not for us to decide what our society is willing to spend on the health 
of its members. The independent economic evaluation we will carry out will concern 
the service that a certain product or act of health renders to the community, and then it 
is up to the politician to decide on the merits of the expenditure in relation to the service 
rendered.”554  
He emphasised in the same interview that the aim of medico-economic evaluation was to 
“rationalise but not to ration”, as if anticipating the prevailing negative reactions and 
attempting to reassure the public and the industry. Likewise, while Degos’s successor, 
Harousseau, strongly supported the CEESP’s effort to incorporate medico-economic 
evaluation, he also carefully tried to differentiate HAS’s image from that of NICE as a 
rationing body. In 2013, when the CEESP’s assessment was about to start operating, at an 
industry-led conference sponsored by the business newspaper Les Echos, Harousseau 
emphasised the differences between French medico-economic evaluation and that of NICE. 
He argued that it was “out of question” to make decisions based on the threshold of cost per 
QALY, because “it would be contrary to the French tradition of broad access to therapeutic 
innovation”.555 Even Lise Rochaix, the CEESP Chair, in an interview with the trade journal 
Pharmaceutiques, ruled out the possibility of using the explicit cost-effectiveness threshold 
for a decision; cost per QALY would instead be “useful information for clarifying a decision” 
that took place in “open discussion”.556 The decision-making powers with explicit criteria that 
NICE represented was thus seen as neither politically feasible nor normatively justifiable.  
How can we understand both the ministers’ and HAS’s unwillingness to use medico-
economic evaluation for reimbursement decisions? With the decision-making powers in their 
hands, one would expect that elected politicians may not be keen on enacting a change in rules 
that could lead to more controversial decisions. Unlike drug safety surveillance rules and 
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conflicts of interest with high visibility and a wide appeal to the public in the post-Mediator 
context, changing pricing and reimbursement was unlikely to generate credit for the minister 
to claim. On the contrary, as long as the minister held the political responsibility for 
reimbursement decisions, they would be the one getting the blame for a negative decision. 
When the political costs of negative decisions are high, a minister would prefer a negotiated 
settlement to refuse a drug rather than a blunt decision which may lead to a public backlash. 
Even though they only have an advisory status, changing the reimbursement rules used by 
HAS could lead to constraints on the minister’s room for manoeuvre. At the same time, a 
minister would be reluctant to delegate the decision-making powers to the agency either, 
because it would mean losing the powers for budgetary control of the healthcare system. 
This ministerial responsibility for rationing decisions, in turn, set the boundary about what 
the independent agency pursued. From the agency’s perspective, the institutional 
arrangements within which the minister had the decision-making powers allowed the agency 
to build analytical capacity, while leaving political decisions to the minister. The ongoing 
controversies over NICE further strengthened such views. Given the unpopularity of rationing 
and a system with formal and political responsibility of the minister, there was little incentive 
for the agency to challenge the existing institutional order to take up the decision-making 
powers.  
The trajectory of HAS’s proposal for reforming the method of drug assessment in the 
subsequent years further illustrates how the bureaucratic politics and lack of ministerial efforts 
obstructed attempts at policy change. Based on the initiatives of the CEESP’s health 
economists, in early 2012 HAS proposed replacing the SMR/ASMR ratings-based pricing and 
reimbursement criteria with a more integrated method. The proposed new criteria, called ITR 
(Index Thérapeutique Relatif), would inform both pricing and reimbursement decisions. 
Unlike SMR, it provided a fuller comparative assessment among different drugs using 
medico-economic evaluation on real-world data. The ITR was proposed to be legislated for in 
late 2012 for the 2013 Social Security Financing Law bill. 
 However, the agenda did not materialise as HAS envisioned and subsequently disappeared 
from the public radar. The IGAS report on ITR in 2013, which was not made public until 2015, 
concluded that reform was “not urgent and must not be brutal”, and instead recommended that 
HAS should take “a reform trajectory” to keep discussing the methods. One of the major 






appears rather ‘technocratic’”, the report pointed out, “the process appears more directive … 
leaving little room for debate and nuances”.557 Such a criticism of “automatism” mirrored 
debates over the use of cost per QALY for reimbursement decisions. There was little sign of 
the initiative being subsequently taken up by the minister. During debates inside the 
government, neither the health minister nor the Transparency Committee supported ITR.558 
The Transparency Committee was reluctant to change its method. According to one 
participant of the discussions, the Committee members claimed that it should not be the 
“scientific” Transparency Committee but the “political” minister who took reimbursement 
decisions.559 
In the subsequent years, policy debates over reimbursement rules were periodically brought 
back to the minister’s attention as the arrival of expensive drugs put the existing regime’s 
heavy reliance on pricing negotiation under strain. Again, heightened attention to drug prices 
related to a specific drug created such a momentum. In 2014, the arrival of a new Hepatitis C 
drug, Sovaldi (sofosbuvir), captured national headlines across European countries. The drug, 
developed by the American manufacturer Gilead, was widely seen as a breakthrough treatment 
for Hepatitis C, and was said to have 90% cure rate. However, in the US it cost $84,000 for 
12 weeks’ treatment. Unlike the controversy over expensive cancer drugs targeting a narrow 
specific subpopulation of patients, Sovaldi could treat a wide population of Hepatitis C 
patients and would result in an even more serious budgetary impact; Hepatitis C affected 
200,000 people in France. The government consulted a group of experts about the treatment 
strategy; they recommended that patients with a severer stage, as well as specific 
subpopulations of patients (such as pregnant women) should be prioritised. HAS’ 
Transparency Committee gave the drug “substantial” SMR and ASMR II ratings (except for 
patients infected with a specific type of virus, for which it was rated ASMR III).560 The drug 
was initially put through the Temporal Authorisation (ATU) outside the usual drug approval 
and pricing and reimbursement regime. Under the terms of ATU it was approved for patients 
with severe conditions. The CEPS negotiations with Gilead managed to achieve the lowest 
price in Europe, at 56,000 euros. In the meantime, the government set out a specialised 
contribution scheme, which would tax the producer when the drug sales exceeded the 
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budgetary ceiling. The rebate ceiling was initially set at 450 million euros for the 2014 year 
and 700 million euros after that. After the ATU period ended, health minister Marisol Touraine 
decided to expand Sovaldi’s use. The initial authorisation for restricted access was criticised 
for rationing. As the Polton report (see below) put it, “it was the first time that a curative 
medicine was rationed because of its price”.561  
HAS’s effort to push the agenda for changing assessment methods had been continuing in 
the intervening years. HAS Board Chair Harousseau, who argued that “SMR becomes 
obsolete”, sought to revive the agenda for ITR. Regretting that the item was not included in 
Touraine’s health law proposal, he attempted to incorporate it in the bill for the 2015 LFSS.562 
In November 2014, during the LFSS debate the Senate proposed an amendment to replace 
SMR and ASMR with ITR. The health minister opposed it; she emphasised that, during the 
test phase of the new mechanism, “consensus” had been reached among actors, including HAS, 
that ITR was not suitable. She was countered by senators, who argued that Harrouseau 
wholeheartedly supported the amendment.563 The amendment passed the Senate but did not 
survive the National Assembly.   
Yet the arrival of innovative and expensive drugs like Sovaldi posed a clear challenge to 
policymakers. While defending her position against ITR at the Senate, Touraine admitted the 
necessity to reconsider the reimbursement criteria. She mentioned an ongoing IGAS mission 
on medico-economic evaluation, while noting that she would ask relevant public bodies such 
as ANSM, HAS, and CEPS as well as health insurance bodies to make concrete proposals for 
reforming assessment methods. The IGAS report, issued in December 2014, recommended 
the use of medico-economic evaluations not only for pricing but also for reimbursement 
decisions, while avoiding the establishment of an explicit cost-effectiveness threshold.564 In 
the following year, the health minister asked CNAM (Caisse nationale de l’assurance maladie) 
director Dominique Polton to review methods of evaluation in the drug reimbursement system. 
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As the minster wrote in the letter of mission, “if it is important to ensure the access to future 
therapeutic innovation for all the patients who need it, it is equally essential for the public 
authority to ensure the long-term sustainability of solidarity-based financing of health 
expenditure. The arrival of new treatments of Hepatitis C has perfectly illustrated, in the past 
months, the difficulty to find a balance between these two imperatives.” 565 
The Polton report, published in autumn 2015, proposed a reform of the reimbursement rate, 
among other items. It pointed out a number of difficulties arising from the complexity of the 
SMR and ASMR ratings, calling for their simplification; and while it recognised medico-
economic evaluation, it argued that its current use was not sufficiently developed to meet its 
objective of judging cost-effectiveness. As one scenario of reform, it recommended setting 
out a unique reimbursement rate of 50-60% instead of the current reimbursement rates of 65%, 
30%, and 15%. She also suggested, similar to the idea behind ITR, a single indicator based on 
comparative evaluation called VTR (valeur thérapeutique relative) that would replace ASMR 
and SMR. Minister Touraine quickly dismissed the former possibility, as she found abolishing 
the reimbursement rate of 15%, which was, as noted in the previous chapter, created to avoid 
the total de-reimbursement of ineffective drugs, “too sensitive”. 566  She preferred de-
reimbursement on a case-by-case basis. Subsequently, despite the Senate’s call for reform and 
the support for VTR expressed by Harousseau’s replacement as the Board Chair of HAS,567 
the Socialist government never took up the proposal again during its tenure.  
Thus, regarding the allocation of decision-making powers politicians dared not take up a 
blame-gathering reform like changes in reimbursement rules. The lack of incentives for 
politicians, combined with the bureaucratic politics of actors and agencies defending their 
turfs, helped reproduce existing institutions and policies. Limited opportunities for conflict 
expansion to broaden reform coalitions, apart from extraordinary moments like a drug scandal, 
meant that the reform effort was not driven by public pressure or politicians’ responsiveness 
to issues. As soon as public attention waned, vested interests entrenched in the existing 
institutions took over the political struggle to obstruct a reform, while elected officials had 
little incentive to overcome the political blockages. As the case of Sovaldi has shown, one of 
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the consequences of such institutional reproduction and inaction, despite technological 
advances, can be seen in policy responses to expensive new drugs, to which the chapter now 
turns. 
 
3. The consequences: Policy continuity despite the arrival of expensive drugs 
The inaction of the government over changing the reimbursement rules had major 
implications for its policy strategies to tackle healthcare costs. A consequence of the absence 
of reforms and sustained conflict expansion to outside actors was that the government kept 
relying on the existing price-volume agreement where it had a strong lever. While the arrival 
of expensive new drugs meant the issue of their pricing was increasingly debated in the mid-
2010s, the government tried to tackle the issue within the institutionalised framework of 
existing measures. Overall, it attempted to rationalise resources through existing instruments, 
especially the price-volume agreement, without resorting to explicit rationing. 
The reimbursement status of expensive medicines in France, such as those for cancer, 
multiple sclerosis and others, contrasts sharply with those in England. Most cancer drugs 
judged as not cost-effective by NICE are rated “substantial” in actual benefit in France; as 
hospital medicines prescribed for chronic disease patients they were usually reimbursed at 
100%. In spite of the arrival of expensive drugs and the resulting pressure on healthcare 
expenditure, policymakers were extremely reluctant to set out drastic reforms to the pricing 
and reimbursement system. Hence, policy debates over expensive drugs, including for cancer 
on the “liste en sus” (a supplementary list) further illustrates how, in the absence of radical 
reforms that might lead to explicit rationing, policymakers attempted to adapt to these 
budgetary pressures. 
The government made considerable efforts to ensure access to cancer care. Like in England, 
cancer occupied a special place within the government’s programmatic priorities. An apparent 
reflection of such a priority was the creation of disease-based plans. Before the 2002 
Presidential Election, Jacque Chirac proposed launching a “cancer plan”, which constituted a 
comprehensive plan related to clinical research, prevention, diagnosis and care.  It would set 
up the Institut National du Cancer, an agency tasked to coordinate strategies ranging from 
management of care to funding of research. The cancer plan, started in 2003, was expanded 






rather critical of the “explosion” in drug expenditure and volume, pointing out the “absence 
of economic pilotage”.568 Similarly, the National Assembly Finance Committee’s report in 
2006 criticised the “exponential” increase in costs: a 54.7% increase in the expenditure on 
cancer funded by the Sickness Fund between 2003 and 2005.569 
The government’s prioritisation of cancer drug access was also reflected in hospital drug 
pricing reform. The pricing and reimbursement of hospital drugs were regulated under a 
different framework from ambulatory care; their pricing was liberalised and unregulated 
between 1987 and 2003. The 2004 Douste-Bulazy hospital sector reform introduced a new 
payment framework called the tarification à l'activité (T2A) based on the Diagnosis Related 
Group, which was further elaborated and implemented by the Hospital Plan in 2007. The T2A 
framework allocated resources based on the grouping of drugs into similar therapeutic classes, 
regardless of individual drug specialities, thereby incentivising physicians to prescribe 
cheaper medicines in the same group. However, to ensure patients’ access, orphan drugs and 
particular costly drugs put on the list issued by the Ministry of Health were exempted from 
the T2A framework, called the “liste en sus”. 
 
Categories Pricing 
Outpatient drugs CEPS-company negotiation 
Hospital drugs included in T2A Liberalised (1987-2003);  pricing based on 
T2A (2004-)  
Hospital drugs exempted from T2A 
(“liste en sus”) 
CEPS-company negotiation (2004-) 
 
Table 7.1 Different pricing methods for different types of drugs 
Source: Adapted from Grandfils (2008)  
 
The creation of the liste favoured cancer drug access. A report by the IGAS pointed out 
that the spending on the liste was particularly concentrated on cancer: five cancer drugs 
accounted for about 50% of the liste paid in a sample region in the first half of 2011.570 
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Moreover, it drew attention to the fact that, in terms of spending, about a half of drugs on the 
liste en sus were evaluated by HAS as of little or no therapeutic improvement (ASMR IV or 
V).571 Furthermore, it was reported that CEPS’ prices for these particular drugs were more 
expensive than those in England, where pricing was freely set by the pharmaceutical industry 
under the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme. Accordingly, the IGAS criticised the drug 
pricing policy’s inconsistency , claiming that “public policy to foster drug innovation, 
particularly with regard to cancer, appears excessively favourable to pharmaceutical 
companies”.572 Likewise, in his report for the 3rd wave of the cancer plan, the oncologist Jean-
Paul Vernant warned the health minister about the extremely high prices of new treatments, 
calling for measuring the economic impact of the innovative medicines.573 
Policy reactions to the arrival of expensive drugs largely relied on existing instruments 
under the price-volume agreement framework. Spending growth on drugs was negative in 
2012 and 2013 for the first time in history (see Figure 7.1). In Autumn 2014, through the 
Social Security Financing Law for 2015 –  when the issue of drug prices triggered by Sovaldi 
was highlighted -- the government expected the price reduction of drugs would yield 900 
million euros of savings; the permitted growth rate of sales used for rebate scheme would be 
kept as low as -0.1% for three years; and, while the application of the growth rate had formerly 
been limited to ambulatory care drugs, it was now expanded to hospital drugs on the liste en 
sus and given temporal authorisation, the latter measure being adopted in response to Sovaldi. 
As Prime Minister Manuel Valls recognised earlier that year, “price reduction has been very 
strong. We reach its limits”.574 He considered generic policy as a margin of manoeuvre -- a 
claim that resonated with the Cour des comptes’s repeated diagnosis, which highlighted the 
persisting lags in the penetration of generics in France behind other European countries.575  
Vigorous control through drug pricing was made despite the resistance of the 
pharmaceutical industry. It argued that the consumption level was already becoming the same 
as in other European countries, emphasising that France was no longer an exception.576 In 
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April 2014, when Marisol Touraine unveiled her plan to save 3.5 billion euros of drug 
spending over the next three years, LEEM, backed by the employer’s federation Mouvement 
des entreprises de France, attempted to protest. LEEM temporally suspended its participation 
in the CSIS.577   
If Sovaldi triggered political attention to the issue of pricing expensive drugs, the 
continuous arrival of other expensive drugs alarmed policymakers. The CNAM 2015 annual 
report warned that “The advent of new treatments for hepatitis C has provoked a shock wave 
in all health systems. For the first time, the question of access to drug innovation has arisen 
not for developing or emerging countries, but for the richest countries”.578 Among other 
proposals, the CNAM recommended a “cleaning work” of liste en sus. In that autumn, the 
Social Security Financing Law for 2016 included a saving measure through the removal of 
drugs from the liste. The following March health minister Touraine issued a decree, setting 
out the terms for removing drugs. It specified that 1) drugs other than those rated “major” or 
“substantial” SMR or 2) drugs rated ASMR V, and some of drugs rated ASMR IV, were 
subject to removal.579 Cancer patient groups, such as the Ligue contre de cancer, and cancer 
specialists denounced the decision, but they also blamed the industry for overly expensive 
“unfair” drug prices. Before the decree was issued, 110 oncologists sent an open letter to the 
minister, arguing that the new cancer drugs’ excessively high prices threatened patients’ 
equality of access to treatments.580 Based on the re-evaluation of SMR and ASMR by HAS, 5 
drugs were removed from the list in August 2016, which was expected to save 205 million 
euros in 2016.  
Thus, apart from a covert form of rationing such as removal from the liste en sus, policy 
adjustments took place in a piecemeal manner, often strengthening budgetary control over the 
industry. The Social Security Financing Law for 2017 showed continuation of this trend. It set 
out stricter mechanisms, including regulation of the contribution from rebates, a new 
budgetary ceiling for temporal authorisations, and others. The industry denounced the 
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measures that targeted it, claiming that of the savings of 10 billion euros achieved in the health 
insurance during the last three years, 5 billion euros had come from the pharmaceutical 
industry.581 As a policy more favourable to the industry, the government established the Fonds 
pour le Financement de l'Innovation Pharmaceutique. With an initial reserve of 876 million 
euros per year and a relatively generous allowance of a 5% annual increase, the fund would 
specifically cover particularly expensive drugs, such as hospital drugs on the liste en sus, drugs 
with temporal authorisation, and the retrocession of hospital drugs in ambulatory care, so that 
it stabilised expenditure.582  
In sum, the government attempted to tackle the arrival of expensive drugs largely through 
existing instruments. It managed to maintain the existing regime’s features, which allowed 
access to expensive new drugs without explicit rationing. Moreover, vigorous operation of the 
price-volume agreement further diminished incentives for elected politicians to set a 
fundamental reform in pricing and reimbursement criteria that might lead to limiting access. 
While episodes of the individual expensive drugs still alarmed policymakers, who enabled 
piecemeal adjustment, the lack of sustained exposure to salient public debates enabling 
conflict expansion and mobilisation of political actors advocating more far-reaching reforms 
meant that the policy adjustment occurred within the existing regime, anchored by the existing 
power balance within the institutional arrangements. At the same time, however, this 
continuation of high level of access to drugs does not necessarily mean that the pharmaceutical 
industry won the behind-closed-doors political negotiations. Ironically, the industries often 
lost out when facing strong control through pricing instruments. The industry did not have 
effective means to counter-mobilise through expanding their coalition, as long as the 
negotiations took place through existing organised channels exclusively comprising of drug 
companies and the government. Overall, through making adjustments largely through the 
existing channel the state held a strong grip over the negotiations with the industry. 
 
4. Conclusion 
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The trajectory of the battles over rule changes in French drug funding policy showed 
several “near-miss” events that may have led to more drastic change. We saw the emergence 
of different policy elites willing to introduce a greater role of medico-economic evaluation, 
while we witnessed a major drug scandal and episodes related to specific drugs as focusing 
events that could have given an impetus to reform. Yet, the existing institutions and policies 
demonstrated persistence and adaptability in the face of these forces. The present chapter 
showed that a key to understanding the surprising lack of reform was the absence of conflict 
expansion. Without such an expansion, which leads to a changing coalitional balance, the 
existing institutions’ structures preserve the power balance of their defenders. Limited 
opportunities to expand the conflict in a sustained manner meant that policy adjustment was 
through negotiated settlement among different political actors entrenched in the existing 
institutions – among different bureaucratic organisations and policy elites inside and outside 
the state and between the state and the pharmaceutical industry. Such a piecemeal adjustment 
largely operated through existing organised channels of politics, not through public or 
electoral arenas.  
Where did this lack of shifts in coalitional balance come from, then? The present chapter 
proposed a possibility that the low level of political insulation limited the opportunity for 
conflict expansion and coalitional shifts. It did so by showing that ministers did not attempt to 
enact a reform that might generate blame on them without any clear credit to claim. When 
combined with the findings of the last chapter, the present study offers a perspective on how 
low political insulation affected policy persistence through shaping ministers’ behaviours. At 
the level of policy choices about individual drugs, as Chapter 6 explored, the low political 
insulation enabled ministers to avoid making politically costly decisions when experts issued 
negative opinions. The present chapter showed that impacts of the low political insulation on 
ministers’ behaviour can also operate at the level of the rules defining the policy choices. The 
low insulation discouraged ministers from taking up a rule change that was likely to generate 
more negative opinions by experts and increase the chances of politically costly decisions. 
Both contributed to policy persistence, preventing the government from committing explicit 
rationing. In the process, politicians managed to contain conflicts in the existing institutional 
channels.  
The findings of the chapter also highlight regulatory agencies’ behaviours under different 
levels of political insulation. Health economists at HAS pushing medico-economic evaluation 






coalitions among different audiences, and they sought for autonomy and bureaucracy-induced 
policy innovation. Yet, against an oft-made assumption that bureaucrats would seek to gain 
greater authority, HAS did not push further to gain reimbursement decision-making powers. 
Whilst the existing institutional structures conferred to ministers the unpopular decisions of 
explicit rationing, the bureaucrats did not dare to challenge the existing institutional structure 
to expand their own powers. The existing institutional structure hence also limited the 
magnitude of bureaucracy-led policy change.   
The persistence of existing institutions does not necessarily mean that they did not adapt 
in the face of changing external environments. On the contrary, the French case showed 
elasticity in its policy adjustment using existing institutionalised instruments. With the lack of 
fundamental reforms, the policymakers tackled the arrival of expensive medicines largely 
through existing instruments such as pricing control, without resorting to explicit rationing. 
The functioning of the existing institutions, even when facing expensive drugs, in turn, 
deprived of a further factor that may have led to changes in the pricing and reimbursement 
rules: the focusing event that would have alerted political actors to the urgency of reforms.    
French policy adjustment generated substantial redistributive consequences; the partial de-
reimbursement led to a distributive transfer whereby complementary insurance (and patients) 
on drug companies had to bear the cost of policy adjustment, whereas the burden of price 
reduction was borne by the industry; but blame-avoidance and a gradual reduction of 
reimbursement rates meant that the imposition of costs on companies was gradual and on a 
negotiated basis. In the process, conflicts between payers’ and producers’ coalitions were 







Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
This study, based on the study of explicit drug rationing policies, examined policy 
development after reforms to create regulatory agencies. The proliferation of regulatory 
agencies and other non-majoritarian institutions in Europe has attracted much attention in the 
past few decades. Notwithstanding the regulatory state thesis’s claim that sees this 
proliferation as a sign of the transformation of state-society relations, however, insufficient 
attention has been paid so far to the trajectories after the creation of agencies. The thesis takes 
up drug funding policies as an example of the regulatory policies where, in line with the 
regulatory state thesis, the reforms to create agencies may disrupt the existing governance 
structure and their unpopularity may create moves both towards and against non-majoritarian 
institutions. By comparing the divergent trajectories of drug funding policy in England and 
France, this study examined endogenous sources of policy development in the post-reform 
period.  
This study argues that a source of the divergent trajectories lies in the locus of decision-
making over drug funding. Specifically, it contends that political insulation, namely, the 
degree to which elected politicians are excluded from decision-making has important 
implications for the post-reform political dynamics and policy development. A high political 
insulation generates self-undermining dynamics whereby unpopular policy choices create 
generate counter-mobilisations that expand conflicts to outside actors. By contrast, a low 
political insulation limits opportunities for such conflict expansion, contributing to policy 
continuity.   
This concluding chapter brings together the main findings from the case studies laid out in 
the preceding chapters to provide the thesis’s main arguments. First, it synthesises the key 
findings from the comparative case studies, summarising the trajectories after regulatory 
reform. Second, it discusses the underlying mechanisms behind the trajectories. Third, based 
on these discussions, it considers the study’s broader implications for the scholarship of 
regulatory politics and historical institutionalism. The thesis ends by reflecting on the study’s 
implications for debates on the regulatory state and depoliticisation. 
 






Through comparative analyses of drug rationing policies in England and France since the 
late 1980s, this study shows: (i) that in the two countries policymakers used different 
institutional and policy strategies in tackling a loss-imposing policy choice such as drug 
rationing – the strategies that can be found in the  two countries’ low versus high political 
insulation in decision-making process; (ii) and that the different degrees of political insulation 
identified above endogenously structured their own political dynamics, shaping distinct post-
reform trajectories. 
Two blame-avoidance strategies 
Government policies often involve decisions that impose significant visible losses on 
different societal actors. In making such a policy, which is likely to generate blame on the 
incumbent government, policymakers devise different strategies. Through the study of drug 
rationing policies in England and France, the thesis identified two such strategies that 
policymakers could use that involve non-majoritarian institutions. On the one hand, 
policymakers can create a highly insulated locus of decision-making where powers are 
delegated to non-majoritarian institutions. The high political insulation enables elected 
politicians to shift the blame for the outcomes of unpopular decisions to the regulatory 
agencies. On the other hand, policymakers can design a less-insulated locus of decision-
making where elected officials retain powers in their own hands. Such a setting enabled 
ministers to block regulatory agencies’ outputs when they felt following the outputs would 
entail too much political cost; the low political insulation hence prevented unpopular decision 
from taking place. These two distinct strategies to deal with blame-gathering policy choices 
were thus both institutional and policy strategies in that they rested on the particular 
institutional structures, which in turn shaped policymakers’ practices in their policy choice.            
Chapters 2 and 3 described the emergence of these distinct strategies that were found in 
the countries’ sectoral institutional arrangements. In both countries, the history of explicit 
rationing strategies triggered salient loss in electoral terms, generating strong incentives for 
incumbent politicians to avoid the blame for explicit rationing decisions. Such electoral 
incentives hence would constitute a background condition for institutional reforms. When it 
comes to designing the decision-making process, however, elected politicians in the two 
countries preferred remarkably divergent strategies. In England, incumbent politicians, both 
Conservative and Labour, repeatedly refused to address the national government’s 






minister but the agency who assumed authority over whether the NHS would fund the new 
drugs subjected to NICE’s appraisal. The subsequent rule modification further minimised the 
room for manoeuvre after NICE issued its guidance; ministers hence had few powers in their 
hands to affect policy outputs. By contrast, in debating the designs of the French decision-
making process both left- and right-wing incumbent politicians tried to draw a clear 
demarcation line between regulatory agencies’ “scientific” role, to make assessments, and 
“political” decisions, to include drugs on the reimbursement list, the latter of which they 
claimed could only be made by health ministers. In both the cases of the Medicine Agency 
and the inter-ministerial pricing committee, CEM in the 1990s and HAS in the 2000s 
demonstrated that, time and time again, ministers claimed the powers and final responsibility 
for reimbursement decisions. Even if HAS and the Transparency Committee were granted 
strong formal independence from the health minister, the locus of decision-making remained 
largely intact. It always remained the ministers who had the powers to make the final decision 
over whether the national health insurance funded a drug. 
In most instances covered in this study the incumbent governments in both countries played 
a crucial role in establishing regulatory agencies and designing the different insulation of the 
drug funding decision-making locus. The two countries’ national institutional structures, with 
a strong executive branch vis-à-vis both the legislative branch and societal actors, meant that 
the incumbent government was largely able to impose its preferences on the design of the 
regulatory reforms.583 Thus in France, when the Mutualité proposed an independent agency in 
the area of health, it envisioned a greater participation of societal actors and retreat of the state 
from important decisions such as drug de-reimbursement as a form of explicit rationing 
strategy. Yet, when the government took up the proposal and translated it into a concrete 
agenda for HAS, far from state retreat and a participatory mechanism, it maintained or even 
reinforced the executive government’s powers at the expense of societal actors. Likewise, in 
England, while the opposition parties (Labour under the Major Conservative government and 
Conservatives under the Blair Labour government) and generalist doctors demanded the 
incumbent national government to address its responsibility for rationing, the Blair 
                                                     
583 Perhaps a major exception was the French Socialist government’s proposal in 1991 where the 
minority government was not able to pass its bill for an inter-ministerial pricing committee and was 
forced to withdraw it when confronting the opposition-controlled legislative branch; the successive 
Gaullist government (Balladur in 1994 and Juppé in 1996) restored virtually the same agenda for the 






government designed a highly-insulated setting by creating NICE; the feature of high political 
insulation was further reinforced during the agency’s early years of operation through the 
mandatory funding of NICE-recommended technologies.  
 
Trajectories after regulatory reforms 
The findings of this study suggest how institutional arrangements with varying degrees of 
political insulation guided divergent policy choices for drug reimbursement. As Chapter 6 
showed, the low level of political insulation in decision-making in France, where ministers 
held the final responsibility for reimbursement, allowed ministers not to follow the 
Transparency Committee’s conclusions if they found de-reimbursement of the given drug too 
politically costly. This remained unchanged after the establishment of HAS. By contrast, in 
England, Chapter 4 demonstrated that without the powers to overturn NICE’s technology 
appraisal outputs the highly insulated decision-making process in the 2000s enabled otherwise 
politically costly decisions.   
But the different policy choices in the two countries generated distinct political dynamics 
in the post-reform period. By shaping the forms of political conflicts between payers and 
producers and by changing the coalitional balance, policy choices affected policy development. 
Generated from their different policy choices, the two countries differed in their form of 
political conflict in that they involved political actors who used distinct mobilisation strategies 
that were consequential to policy change and the arenas by which the conflicts were mediated. 
Over time, the different forms of conflict led the English and French drug funding policies to 
follow divergent trajectories.  
The policy trajectory in England involved salient political battles channelled by the public 
and electoral arenas that were consequential to a partial policy change. The highly-insulated 
decision-making over reimbursement made NICE’s outputs the final policy decisions for the 
NHS. Despite the reputation and the credibility that NICE’s technology appraisals enjoyed, 
however, policy decisions generated counter-mobilisation once negative policy decisions had 
accumulated. Drug companies and patient groups broadened their coalitional base of counter-
mobilisation, calling on support from citizens and politicians by drawing public attention to 
the losses imposed by the policy decisions. Chapter 4 demonstrated how the rise of public 






measures to improve NHS drug availability such as the Single Technology Appraisals, risk-
sharing scheme, End-of-Life criteria, and the Cancer Drugs Fund; it also highlighted that these 
rule changes were a product of pressures emerged from outside the insulated decision-making 
process for reimbursement. Starting from the mid-2000s under the Labour government, these 
measures specifically targeted high-cost drugs for particular areas, especially cancer, where 
the counter-mobilisation through the public arena was greatest. The Conservative Party’s 
Cancer Drugs Fund agenda in the 2010 general election was largely built on this coalition for 
counter-mobilisation formed during the Labour period.  
While the electoral mandate enabled the Coalition government to achieve a partial policy 
reversal through the Cancer Drug Fund, it did not end up achieving the full-scale reversal as 
envisioned in its value-based pricing agenda. Ironically, as Chapter 5 showed, the Coalition 
government was less successful in navigating the organisational realm of politics than the 
politics via public and electoral arenas like the Cancer Drugs Fund, partly due to the positive 
feedback that the existing policy created in relation to drug companies and doctors. Both drug 
companies and doctors had adapted to the existing structure whereby NICE took the central 
responsibility for rationing of new expensive drugs. Doctors were freed from their rationing 
responsibility while aided by NICE’s expertise; drug companies shifted their resources to clear 
the regulatory hurdle set by NICE. Both actors, therefore, opposed value-based pricing, which 
attempted to shift the accountability (and the blame) for explicit rationing decisions from 
NICE to doctors and drug companies. Moreover, the Cancer Drugs Fund was also subject to 
the momentum for re-reform through its own operation. With its weak fiscal monitoring and 
inflationary spending underlined by its political logic, the Fund invited counter-mobilisation 
from the payers’ side, whose coalition expanded to other actors inside the government such as 
the National Audit Office. The re-reform led to a compromise that put the Fund under the 
management of NICE. In the end, endogenous forces limited the Coalition government’s 
agenda for shifting away from NICE-centred rationing decisions.  
In France, by contrast, policy choices in a low political insulation setting prevented 
unpopular policy choices. In the absence of policy-triggered conflict expansion to outside 
actors, the government-led negotiations with organised interests contributed to policy 
continuity. As Chapter 6 showed, low political insulation allowed ministers, who anticipated 
the political costs entailed, to selectively de-reimburse the drugs that the Transparency 
Committee judged as insufficient in clinical benefit. To avoid total de-reimbursement, 






reimbursement rate, or lowering the prices of drugs with insufficient clinical benefit. Through 
such soft-landing tactics based on partial or selective de-reimbursement, elected politicians 
sought to deflect the blame that a total de-reimbursement decision would have evoked, while 
lessoning negative impacts on domestic firms and constituencies. The public controversy 
triggered by the Mediator scandal opened the possibility of coalition expansion to outside 
actors through the public arena, but the effect was only temporary. Soon after the scandal 
ministers, both left and right, returned to the existing strategies for de-reimbursement and 
rationing, despite even generalist doctors becoming less sympathetic to the producers’ 
coalition.  
Another effect of the low political insulation concerned the policy debates over changing 
drug funding rules, as Chapter 7 examined. While some bureaucrats within the Ministry of 
Health and health economists within HAS repeatedly attempted to incorporate medico-
economic evaluation to HAS’ assessment, and despite allied voices of actors outside the 
sector-specific policy process, such as the Cour des Comptes, the self-reinforcing dynamic of 
existing criteria, emphasising clinical rather than economic expertise, meant that attempts at 
introducing economic criteria had to confront hurdles inside the government and the clinician-
dominated HAS. Even if the proponents of reform managed to surmount these organisational 
hurdles, especially aided by the temporary conflict expansion after the Mediator scandal, the 
low political insulation whereby the final decision-making powers laid with the minister meant 
that ministers had a stronger incentive not to create political controversies surrounding HAS’s 
evaluation and reimbursement decisions. Any changes in criteria that would increase the 
agency’s political responsibility and make a difference to policy outputs thus entailed 
resistance from ministers and civil servants, while clinicians inside HAS continued to resist 
taking on such a responsibility. 
 All in all, the incumbent politicians in France managed to reduce the potential conflicts 
that could arise as a result of explicit rationing strategies. By doing so, they confined the 
policymaking process to existing government-business relations. But this avoidance of “noisy 
politics” and blame-generating policies does not mean that the industry was the winner of the 
drug rationing battles. On the contrary, the same government strategy to minimise conflict 
implied that, by reducing the possibility to expand the producer coalition, drug companies 
were deprived of the ability to mobilise against the government-imposed policy measures. In 
an attempt at controlling healthcare expenditure, instead of resorting to explicit rationing, the 






drug companies. The institutionalised price-volume negotiations, which largely limited actors’ 
access to only drug companies and the pricing committee, CEPS, meant that the drug firms 
had a limited capacity to overturn its existing weak position by allying with other actors. 
 
2. Drivers of post-reform trajectories 
By tracing policy trajectories over time, I examined how institutional arrangements for 
drug funding endogenously shaped subsequent development by creating their own political 
dynamics. This section discusses mechanisms linking the institutional arrangements to the 
post-reform period trajectories, including politicians’ consideration of political cost, counter-
mobilisation through different arenas, and mobilisation in support of policy continuity.  
Before considering the mechanisms driving the trajectories, it is worth noting that any 
arguments that can be developed from a comparative study of the two countries within a single 
sector, like the present one, has obvious limitations. This study is largely a theory-building 
rather than a theory-testing exercise, with analytical priorities being placed on identifying 
mechanisms rather than delineating their scope conditions. The nature of the research design 
and the evidence collected for this study do not allow me to fully develop conditions under 
which the mechanisms affect policy development, which can be a task for future research. 
But the key claims and findings of this study – that regulatory reforms endogenously create 
divergent trajectories, and that policymakers’ different blame-avoidance strategies anchored 
by different degrees of political insulation affect these trajectories in an important way – may 
operate in different terrains in the two countries and beyond. In France, Bezes (2008; see also 
Bezes et al. 2013)’s study on administrative reform shows that elected politicians and central 
government civil servants resisted delegating political and economic powers – a finding that 
is similar to this study’s observation of the emergence of low political insulation. Such low 
political insulation can also be found in many areas of “risk” regulation in France and other 
continental European countries as well as at EU level, with the form of separating roles 
between “risk assessment”, which is seen as a task for a “scientific” regulator, and “risk 
management”, which is considered the government’s role (e.g. Vogel 2003). Borraz et al. 
(2006)’s study on food safety regulation in France likewise documents open disagreements 
between the independent agency and ministers, and the latter’s reluctance to implement 






political insulation for subsequent policy choices we saw in Chapter 6. For its part, high 
political insulation also appeared to create its own dynamics in different areas. In England, 
Heims and Lodge (2018) highlighted widespread discontent against the regulatory state in 
economic regulation, where regulation has a command-and-control style with direct, 
hierarchical enforcement by regulatory agencies. Considering further scope conditions of the 
present study and the origins of different institutions and blame-avoidance strategies –given 
the similar dynamics found in other sectors—can be a future research agenda. 
 
Political costs and the post-reform political dynamics 
This study emphasised the role of political insulation in shaping different policy choices 
and trajectories over time. The varying degrees of political insulation guided different policy 
choices, which created the distinct political dynamics that led to divergent policy development 
over time. A key factor that conditions the chain of events linking political insulation to policy 
development is (both anticipated and real) political costs of the policy decision over rationing. 
As Chapter 6 showed, in France, where the institutional arrangements had low political 
insulation, the anticipated political cost guided ministers’ policy choices about whether to 
follow the Transparency Committee’s opinion to exclude a drug with insufficient clinical 
benefit from the reimbursement list. It shows that anticipated losses, on both consumers and 
domestic manufacturers, informed politicians’ calculation of political cost. It suggests such 
considerations played an important role in ministers’ policy choices. The effect of anticipated 
political cost remained significant even after the creation of HAS, with its greater 
independence from the minister, and the Mediator scandal, the latter of which temporarily 
made ministers more sensitive to drug safety risks. 
Political costs also played an important role in shaping post-reform trajectories in the 
institutional arrangements with high political insulation. The effects took place by 
conditioning how policy choices, which high political insulation enabled, created political 
conflicts. Chapter 4 showed how the societal distribution of political costs affects the 
magnitude of counter-mobilisation triggered by the policy choice over explicit rationing. It 
shows that, with its greater concentration of groups affected by the decisions and time-
intensive “focusing events” that decisions can trigger, cancer generated the greatest counter-






across disease areas shaped variation in policy changes, where measures to improve drug 
availability specifically applied to cancer drugs but not others.    
It is worth noting that in both countries, the blame-avoidance strategies anchored by 
consideration of political costs seemed to operate across different parties in government. In 
England, both the Conservatives and Labour accused the incumbent national government of 
refusing to take responsibility for healthcare rationing when they were in opposition. However, 
once in power both parties were reluctant to address the rationing debates, while expanding 
the programme of expert Health Technology Assessment. There were indeed some differences 
between the two parties in terms of their preferred institutional arrangements involving 
experts: the Conservative governments in the 1990s and 2010s preferred local decision-
making and clinical guideline development, whereas Labour in the 1990s and 2000s 
emphasised expert guidance by a national-level agency such as NICE. Yet, the arrangements 
endorsed by the two parties do share one crucial feature: that politicians tried to delegate 
decision-making to others, either to local-level managers and doctors (in the case of the 
Conservatives) or the national-level agency (in the case of Labour), thereby freeing themselves 
from taking politically-costly decisions. The longitudinal analyses of the study also found how 
policy legacies in the Labour period affected the Coalition government’s agenda for the 
Cancer Drugs Fund and value-based pricing. Indeed, the partial policy reversal to improve the 
availability of drugs began during the closing years of the Labour government, especially 
through the introduction of End-of-Life criteria. Rather than creating it from scratch, the 
Conservative party exploited the existing electoral coalition for counter-mobilisation, 
generalising the policy measures largely built in the Labour period.  
In France, both the Gaullist and Socialist parties committed to de-reimbursement plans 
while in government, but criticising the same plans when they were not. For instance, although 
it was the Socialist Jospin government who launched drug re-evaluations by the Transparency 
Committee in 1999 and committed to de-reimbursing drugs with insufficient clinical benefit, 
the succeeding Gaullist government in the 2000s took over the de-reimbursement plan and 
continued its commitment in the successive waves. Along the way, health ministers from both 
parties tried to avoid total de-reimbursement; they selectively de-reimbursed drugs that the 
Transparency Committee judged as not clinically effective. A similar example of both left- 
and right-wing governments refusing to follow experts’ advice and thus keeping treatments 
available includes Alzheimer’s disease drugs. Despite the mobilisation for de-reimbursement 






drugs deeming them not sufficiently effective, ministers’ concerns about the anticipated 
political costs of de-reimbursement, driven by the disease’s electoral significance and existing 
government programme policy priorities, overrode the Committee’s opinion. As a result, both 
Gaullist and Socialist ministers chose to keep the drugs reimbursed. 
All in all, throughout the study I have emphasised the role of elected officials’ political and 
electoral incentives, anchored by different institutional arrangements, in shaping the executive 
government’s strategies for explicit rationing. Regardless of the incumbent government’s 
ideological and socio-electoral base, these political incentives guided elected officials’ 
consideration of loss-imposition when deploying explicit rationing strategy. And the way in 
which elected officials can offset such anticipated political losses that an explicit rationing 
decision would be likely to provoke differed more across countries than across partisanship 
within a country. The thesis suggested the variety of such blame-avoidance strategies used by 
elected officials: in England, it was expert decisions in the highly insulated locus of decision-
making, and in France it was ministers’ avoidance of politically costly decisions. 
  
Counter-mobilisation, coalition expansion and endogenous policy change 
The present study argues that different levels of political insulation affect the forms of 
political conflicts, including the possibility of conflict expansion and the arenas by which the 
conflicts are mediated. The different forms of conflicts, in turn, play an important role in 
shaping post-reform trajectories as they change the coalitional balance between producers and 
payers. Specifically, the preceding chapters showed how producer coalition actors attempted 
to expand their base of mobilisation against explicit rationing policies through conflict 
expansion in the public and electoral arenas, and how the counter-mobilisation affected policy 
development. 
By emphasising the role of coalition expansion in policy change, this study suggested a 
mechanism of change that differs from the often-invoked account of policy change via 
business’s lobbying. A long-standing approach in political economy has emphasised 
business’s power to shape policy-makers’ choices behind closed doors, evoking such images 
as the “iron triangle” (cf. Lowi 1979). Recent works have revived this interest in business 
power through direct lobbying. Culpepper (2010) has stressed that business can exert 






Likewise, the prominent “regulatory capture” literature argues that regulations are prone to 
benefit the regulated industry’s interest at the expense of the public’s (Stigler 1971; Carpenter 
and Moss 2014). These research programmes share a common image of the mechanisms 
behind policy change: business should be able to transmit its preferences on policy process 
effectively through closed venues, such as bureaucracy, regulatory agencies, and specialised 
legislative committees; the process of policy and rule changes in regulation should occur from 
within, where captured policymakers create or change rules in business interests’ favour, 
without the involvement of the actors outside the “closed circle”, such as diffused interests 
with less mobilising capacity and access to policymakers. Given the both academic and 
popular image of the powerful “Big Pharma” lobby, one might expect that the pharmaceutical 
sector should represent an “easy” case of policy change through direct lobbying. 
In fact, the narratives of the two countries were replete with lobbying activities by drug 
companies, who attempted to change the rationing policy. As a major cost bearer of the 
government’s explicit rationing strategies, the pharmaceutical industry actively sought to 
counteract both individual regulatory decisions and overall policy orientations by lobbying 
policymakers. In some cases, drug companies reached sympathetic ears inside the government. 
Perhaps the clearest products of the pharmaceutical industry’s tactic of allying with 
sympathisers within the government were the government-business fora. In both countries, 
drug companies’ counter-mobilisation against the explicit rationing strategy resulted in the 
creation of favourable forums exclusive to the government and the industry. In addition to 
actively promoting the industrial policy, which may offset the political costs imposed by 
rationing and other loss-imposing policies, through such forums the government actors 
sympathetic to the industry actively sought to change the overall direction of drug pricing and 
reimbursement policy in the industry’s favour. Examples of such attempts include repeated 
criticism by British business-government fora, such as the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Competitiveness Task Force and Bioscience Innovation & Growth Team, against NICE’s 
technology appraisals, and their recommendation for an inquiry into NICE; and R&D credits 
which were distributed through the CEPS as a result of the French business-government forum 
CSIS. Given the lobbying literature’s emphasis on “arena shifting”, i.e. shifting the locus of 
policy-making to an arena favourable to business influence, as a mechanism of business’s 
power over public policy (cf. Culpepper 2010; Baumgartner and Jones 2010), the business-
government fora in the two countries might reinforce the expectation that policy development 






Yet, the experiences of policy development in England and France showed several limits 
to the pharmaceutical industry’s counter-mobilisation through such “inside lobbying” tactics. 
In both countries, business-government fora sympathetic to drug companies did not lead to 
major policy changes in drug rationing. In England, the result was at best modest; although 
the 2009 Kennedy inquiry into NICE recommended a pilot project on the role of innovation 
in NICE appraisals, overall it affirmed the existing criteria based on cost-per-QALY and 
recommended that the agency should not consider wider societal benefits (Chapter 4). And as 
Chapter 5 documented, although the innovation criterion was indeed incorporated in the 
subsequent agenda for value based-pricing, it did not materialise as the industry had wished 
and was later abandoned. In France, the pharmaceutical industry’s capacity to change the 
course of policy through lobbying was even more limited. Throughout the period examined, 
the industry often lost in the business-government negotiations over price-volume agreements. 
Despite its discontent at bearing the burden of healthcare spending control, the industry was 
largely unable to overturn its existing weak position through negotiation.  
The policy development narratives suggested mechanisms that limited the impacts of 
business’s attempt to policy change through lobbying. One mechanism was expertise 
independent from the industry (cf. McCarty 2014). Both the business power and regulatory 
capture theories tend to assume the industry’s superior expertise and a resulting information 
asymmetry between industry and government as a source of the former’s dominance 
(Culpepper 2010; Dal Bó 2006). But the information asymmetry could be attenuated when the 
industry’s claim was countered by other providers of knowledge. By providing knowledge 
and expertise to counteract the industry’s claims, experts who are more sympathetic to the 
payer’s side could counteract elite level policy debates, helping the incumbent government to 
justify the existing policies. Hence, for instance, the attempts by business-government fora to 
change NICE appraisals by calling for an inquiry were unsuccessful because the NICE-
appointed rapporteur made a positive conclusion about NICE’s technology appraisal methods 
(Chapter 4).  
Another mechanism, which is also related to such elite-level policy debates, can be found 
in the policy process’ procedural rules (cf. Moss and Carpenter 2014). Administrative 
requirements, such as impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis, limited the range of policy 
options that the government was able to deploy; like counter-expertise to the industry, they 
also helped the government to justify its policies in elite-level debates. For instance, impact 






Pricing, which failed to meet the industry’s demands (Chapter 5). In contrast, when significant 
and immediate electoral credit was involved, such as the Cancer Drugs Fund, politicians were 
able to override impact assessment results (see Chapter 4). The contrasting experiences of the 
Coalition government’s two policy agendas hence again indicate the importance of electoral 
and political factors, and of building a broader coalitional base involving public and politicians 
as an alternative strategy for mobilisation against an explicit rationing policy.  
Indeed, even if the industry was not successful in the lobbying battles with elite 
policymakers, its efforts to counter-mobilise against drug rationing policy still resulted in 
policy change at times, especially when it expanded its societal coalitional base. 584  This 
coalition expansion involved both other organised interests, such as clinicians, and actors in 
the public arena, such as the public and politicians. On the first front – medical professionals 
– in some cases drug companies allied with clinicians in their counter-mobilisation. For 
example, in England, industries were more successful in their opposition against the 1985 
Limited List, when doctors also opposed it, than the 1992 Limited List, when doctors’ 
resistance had waned (see Chapter 2). And the possibility of successful alliance-building for 
counter-mobilisation partially depended on government strategies themselves. In the latter 
case, the government took more accommodationist strategies with doctors from the beginning, 
thereby successfully taming their potential resistance to its agendas.  
Another, perhaps more consequential, coalition strategy for counter-mobilisation involved 
the public and electoral arenas. The producer’s coalition – drug companies and disease-based 
patient groups – were successful in counter-mobilisation when it gained political and electoral 
currency. It did so by raising public attention to the issue and widening its political base by 
bringing politicians into the coalition. In England, as Chapter 4 showed, NICE’s decisions on 
cancer drugs triggered a much greater magnitude of counter-mobilisation than any other areas. 
                                                     
584 Stating this does not mean that coalition expansion is a superior or more effective tactic of drug 
companies to influence policy than direct lobbying. The thesis does not examine relations between 
different lobbying tactics. What this study can say at most is that even when attempts at direct lobbying 
were not successful the industry may have indirect means to counter-mobilise against policy through 
coalition expansion. Theoretically, if we follow Schattschneider (1960)’s framework, coalition 
expansion is a tactic that a losing side of the battle may use. Yet the thesis did not test or develop this 
claim fully. To do so we need a more systematic process tracing of the strategies of the industry’s side 
and its interaction with policymakers. Hence the relationship between different counter-mobilisation 
strategies that the drug company can use – e.g. how different strategies such as inside and outside 
lobbying interact with each other – requires further research. For an explicit treatment of the superiority 
of institutional access to coalition strategy in interest group mobilisation, see Grzymała-Busse (2015) 






It is important to reiterate the finding that the rising public attention to NICE’s activities on 
cancer drugs appeared endogenous to NICE’s guidance. As the pressure through the public 
arena increased, elected officials adjusted their positions, introducing policy change to 
improve the availability of drugs. In France, among the drugs the Transparency Committee 
judged as insufficient in clinical benefit, ministers tended to be more reluctant to take de-
reimbursement decisions when the disease area was of higher programmatic and political 
priority -- such as Alzheimer’s disease. The reluctance was somewhat surprising, given that 
after the Mediator scandal elected officials would have been more cautious about keeping 
drugs with insufficient benefit on the reimbursement list, and also that not only an independent 
pharmaceutical journal, which had long been critical of the government’s policies, but also 
major generalist doctors’ associations were against keeping the drugs on the list. In both 
countries, the alliance-building in organised interest politics, such as clinicians mentioned 
above, was an integral part of these episodes of counter-mobilisation, because in these battles, 
in addition to patient groups, some specialist doctors sympathetic to drug companies played a 
key role by acting as authoritative “experts” to raise public awareness of the issue and to affect 
policy debates in public arenas, amplifying the magnitude of the counter-mobilisation.  
The study’s emphasis on the role in policy change played by coalition expansions in the 
society means that, instead of originating from inside the policy process captured by business, 
policy changes took place from outside the existing drug rationing decision-making process. 
Chapter 4 showed that a partial policy reversal in England, such as End-of-Life criteria, was 
less to do with the agency-drug company interaction or the agency’s anticipated reaction than 
with the rising public pressures on elected politicians. In a losing battle over elite-level policy 
debates and regulatory decisions, actors from the producer coalition could still counteract 
when they managed to steer debates and build broader coalitions in the public and electoral 
arenas. 
In sum, different arenas in the political system played important roles in mediating and 
expanding political conflicts to outside actors. It is worth highlighting here that the 
opportunities for conflict expansion that would be consequential to policy change depended 
on the existing institutional arrangements, notably the degree of political insulation. In France, 
ministers’ responsibility for reimbursement decisions enabled them to prevent unpopular 
policy decisions. The prevention of costly policy decisions that would later trigger conflict 
expansion in the public and electoral arenas – the dynamic that we saw in England – meant 






orientation. As we shall see, this lack of opportunities for coalition expansion is further 
compounded by the institutions’ feedback effects on different organised actors in both the 
state and society, such as bureaucracies and agencies, drug companies and doctors.  
 
The bureaucracy, policy feedback, and the endogenous policy continuity  
If endogenous forces that undermine existing policies through conflict expansion are a key 
mechanism that this study has advanced, it also identified endogenous forces that contributed 
to the persistence of existing policies. Specifically, this study showed how the activities of 
bureaucratic actors, through their operation, generate self-reinforcing feedback. Bureaucratic 
actors, such as regulatory agencies, ministerial departments, and inter-ministerial committees, 
contributed to policy continuity in several ways. First, at the most general level, bureaucratic 
actors maintained a certain extent of organisational and personnel continuation across 
different governments.  
Second and perhaps more importantly, policy continuity was a product of regulatory 
agencies’ own actions. A regulatory agency does not stand still after its creation; through its 
day-to-day functioning it produces policy outputs to fulfil its core tasks, while deploying 
experts and expertise to justify the outputs. The study documented the feedback effects from 
regulatory agencies to their experts, expertise, and their rule-making behaviours; it showed 
how these effects helped institutional defence against counter-mobilisation, thereby 
contributing to policy continuity. One such mechanism was regulators’ codification of rules 
to both justify their decisions and make them decisions consistent. This was especially the 
case for NICE, which, with its highly insulated setting, was positioned at the forefront of 
explicit rationing decisions. Once it began operating, NICE confronted criticisms from 
different societal actors against its policy decisions. In response, NICE deployed its own 
expert network to develop elaborated rules and doctrines, including the cost-effectiveness 
threshold, based on its operational practices. NICE also actively participated in elite-level 
policy debates to explain the rationales behind its guidance (Chapter 4).   
 NICE’s elaboration and justification of its policy decisions was coupled with a related 
feedback mechanism concerning the reproduction of experts and expertise. In both countries, 
different regulatory criteria underlined distinct experts and expertise that they deployed. NICE 






At HAS, its criteria for pricing and reimbursement relied on clinical expertise were both 
reinforced by, and reinforced, its clinician-dominated composition. When HAS’s health 
economists attempted to incorporate medico-economic evaluation within the agency’s drug 
assessment, they hence confronted an internal organisational barrier in the clinician-
dominated HAS (Chapter 7). Thus in both countries, the self-reinforcing dynamics of 
regulatory rules and expertise limited attempts at policy change.  
But at the same time, the agencies’ actions were bounded by the existing institutional 
structures that organised relations among actors. The boundary of agencies’ organisational 
development set by the institutionalised power balance was at times further justified by 
normative or doctrinal claims. In France, such a justification took the form of the demarcation 
between scientific regulators and politicians, and the refusal of medico-economic evaluation 
for reimbursement criteria based on a cultural or normative claim – an argument that prevailed 
among ministers, civil servants, and HAS. The argument to refuse the use of medico-economic 
evaluation for reimbursement decisions was as much normative as political in that it 
contributed to organisational defence of vested interests, such as the CEPS and ministers, 
which enabled them to prevent politically costly decisions, following the example of NICE 
(Chapter 7).  
The activities of regulatory agencies generated further feedback effects on societal actors 
through their regulatory interactions. Where the regulator became a substantial hurdle to drug 
access, such as NICE, we observed the societal actors’ adaptive behaviour. Such a feedback 
effect through the interaction of the regulator with societal actors generated forces in favour 
of policy continuity, as it led clinicians and drug companies to oppose the value-based pricing 
agenda (Chapter 5). In France, by contrast, such effects of the regulatory agency’s activities 
on societal actors’ adaptive behaviour did not appear to be as prominent in the episodes of 
policymaking as in the English counterpart. This absence underscores the possibility that the 
ability of regulatory activities to encourage societal actors’ adaptation to the existing policies 
might be conditioned by its significance as a regulatory hurdle.   
Finally, in a complex regulatory space, such as drug pricing and reimbursement, involving 
multiple actors and organisations, neighbouring institutions can affect actors’ positions 
(Pierson 1996, 2004; Hall 2016). In France, the CEPS’s powerful spending control through 
price-volume agreements with the industry meant that a minister had even less incentives to 






(Chapter 7). In England, where the drug companies perceived a benefit from the existing 
pricing regime through the PPRS, they opposed the value-based pricing agenda, which was 
considered to deprive them favourable conditions they had enjoyed for decades (Chapter 5). 
 
3. Theoretical implications  
The thesis brought together the regulatory politics and historical institutionalism literatures 
to develop arguments about the post-reform trajectories. With regard to the regulatory politics 
literature, I engaged with a prominent but empirically underexplored claim of the regulatory 
state thesis that the creation of regulatory agencies in Europe represents a key part of the 
transformation of state-society relations. In terms of the historical institutionalist literature, I 
built on its approach to endogenous change, notably its emphasis on institutions’ coalitional 
underpinnings. I also drew on the literature’s focus on policy feedback and the mediating role 
of arenas to analyse the impacts of past policy choices on policy development. By drawing on 
these two bodies of literature, which had remained largely separate, this study sought to enrich 
both areas of inquiry. 
Scholars of regulatory politics have extensively examined sources of delegating decisions 
and the independence of a regulator. This study has focused on a different aspect, that is, the 
effects of non-majoritarian bodies on subsequent policy development. It widened the 
institutional scope of analysis by looking at a broader set of political battles that are not limited 
to regulator-politician or regulator-regulatee relations; it expanded the temporal scope of the 
analysis by tracing mid-term policy development that goes beyond individual regulatory 
rulemaking. By expanding both the institutional and temporal horizons of the analysis, this 
study has sought to advance research on regulatory politics and endogenous change on several 
fronts. 
First, it advances the notion of political insulation and its impacts on subsequent policy 
development. The regulatory politics literature has paid much attention to the political 
independence of regulatory agencies (cf. Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002; Gilardi 2009). This 
is an undoubtedly important dimension, especially given the scholars’ major concern about 
democratic accountability of non-majoritarian institutions. But in seeking to understand the 
implications of regulatory agencies for post-reform dynamics, we run the risk of drawing 






allocate powers among actors – who is in charge and how they share regulatory space during 
the policy process. Indeed, HAS enjoyed a greater formal independence from the health 
minister than NICE. In contrast to the health minister’s predominance to NICE in its 
appointment rules and its legal foundation, the HAS Board was appointed by the President 
and the legislative branch – hence it had at least an equal footing to the health minister. But 
that greater independence did not translate itself into the agency’s responsibility in 
policymaking. Instead, what played a crucial role in the trajectories were the rules about 
allocation of powers that actors sharing the regulatory space should follow in a given decision-
making process. It was these day-to-day interactions in the regulatory space that generated 
significant feedback effects, both positive and negative, on subsequent counter-mobilisations 
or mobilisations of actors, which affected policy development. In generating momentums for 
undermine or reinforcing the existing policies, the varying degrees of political insulation have 
resulted in far-reaching distributive consequences among different political actors. This 
attention to the organised relations among political actors throughout the decision-making 
process broadly resonates with a classic idea of interdependence of actors sharing “regulatory 
space” – an idea that different European national traditions have shaped distinct allocations of 
powers and ways of interdependence among the state and organised interests (Hancher and 
Moran 1989; cf. Crouch 1986). The findings of the thesis suggest the analytical merits of not 
only focusing narrowly on regulatory agencies but also looking at the broader decision-making 
process and power relations between different organisational actors therein.  
A second and related lesson from looking at the decision-making process and how actors 
share the political space throughout it is about the role and the capacity of the state in public 
policy. This study’s coalition-based institutional approach showed how political actors within 
the state attempt to impose costly decisions on its citizens and organised interests, and what 
shapes different political strategies for loss-imposition. Examining different actors within the 
state – such as ministers, regulatory agencies, ministerial bureaucracies – and their strategies 
for linking up with different societal actors with different policy goals enabled me to examine 
the role of shifting conflicts and political coalitions in shaping the trajectories; and how the 
conflicts and coalitions are themselves a product of sectoral institutional structures that 
allocate powers among actors in the decision-making process. In doing so, this study joins the 
recent call for analytically disaggregating the state into different organisational entities and 
their roles in policymaking (Morgan and Orloff 2016). The long-standing tradition of state-






looks at how different linkages between the state and organised interests affect governments’ 
distinct policy strategies (Katzenstein 1976; Weir and Skocpol 1985; Hall 1986).  
The present study further extends this line of thinking about the relations between the state 
and societal actors to the different actors within the state and their linkages with societal 
interests. Conceptualising actors within the state in this way and examining their role in 
policymaking entailed some surprising findings that are otherwise not well captured. For 
example, the narrative of the thesis highlighted how the French government attempted to steer 
different goals through its policy strategies, and along the way how the domestic industry 
often lost out through the government’s imposition of those strategies. The resource allocation 
role of government-led pricing control, and the weak power of business to overturn the 
existing policy orientation, meant that the government shifted the costs of economic 
adjustments onto the industry by using pricing mechanisms. This finding may run counter to 
the established image of the “strong” French state as an active promoter of its domestic 
industry (cf. Cohen 1992; Hayward 1995). The apparent paradox can be resolved once one 
differentiates the capacity of the state from its preferences or policy goals and examines how 
the latter can vary among different actors within the state. The French state was indeed 
powerful vis-à-vis societal actors, but it could use its power for different societal purposes. 
And these different purposes are shaped by how coalitional balance between the different state 
actors linking up with societal actors, which is at least partially constrained by the existing 
sectoral institutional structures. The different actors within the state played a pivotal role 
throughout this coalition management in that their act of balancing different, often 
contradictory, policy goals that the different actors from the government-private coalitions 
carried shaped the orientation and changes of policy.  
Policymakers’ shifting attempts at balancing coalitions were also seen in the English case. 
The regulatory state, with its highly insulated decision-making, yielded the capacity of 
policymakers to impose politically costly decisions on the industry as well as citizens; but as 
an unintended consequence of such loss-imposition, later policymakers had to confront greater 
political pressures channelled through public and electoral arenas. Such conflict expansions 
and changing coalitional balances prompted ministers to shift positions in terms of the 
prioritisation of different policy goals and changes in their own coalitional base; it also 
empowered some actors within the state while discouraging others, as the Cancer Drugs Fund 
temporary showed. In the end, however, the rebalancing of coalitions did not mean one policy 






failed attempts at value-based pricing and the re-reform of the Cancer Drugs Fund shows, 
existing institutions shaped changes in policy orientations. As societal actors such as drug 
companies and doctors adapted to the existing process, their support for it obstructed a policy 
reversal; likewise, the government actors and procedures built in the existing institutions 
constrained the policy swing, including the Department of Health’s draft agenda for widening 
societal values in drug evaluation that failed to meet the industry’s wishes, and the National 
Audit Office’s inquiry into the Cancer Drugs Fund. Along the way, different actors within the 
state, responding to ongoing political dynamics, created a particular balance of different policy 
orientations in the government policy strategies at a particular time. In sum, looking at how 
the different actors within the state, whose power balance was a product of the allocation of 
institutionalised decision-making powers, create and maintain coalitions with different 
societal actors can enable us to capture the capacity, as well as policy strategies, of the state 
to impose costly decisions.   
Finally, this study advances a coalition-based account of endogenous development 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010). It shows how policymakers’ blame-avoidance strategies, linked 
with political insulation, shape endogenous development – a mechanism of endogenous 
change that has been underexplored in the literature. Through its inquiry into the battles over 
drug rationing across different arenas, the study broadly resonates with the recent call by 
historical institutionalist scholars to look beyond major legislative battles and the adoption of 
bills that political scientists tend to be preoccupied with (Hacker et al 2015; Hacker and 
Pierson 2010) In their recent conceptual work on endogenous change, Hacker et al. (2015) 
encourage scholars to examine “hidden” changes. Inquiries into mechanisms of endogenous 
hidden changes such as “drift”, i.e. institutional stasis in a changing environment, and 
“conversion”, i.e. altering the purpose of institutions without changing rules, they argue, 
“expand our range of vision by prompting us to adjust not just what kind of changes we are 
looking for but where we are looking for it and whom we expect to produce it” (204). By 
paying attention not only to salient legislative and electoral battles but also to bureaucracies 
and courts, and by examining how organised interests induce changes through these arenas, 
which are less publicly visible, they call for a research programme that integrates institutional 
changes with studies of public policy and administration, law and courts – studies that have 
tended to be separate from inquiries in comparative politics. This study broadly shares its 
interests with this line of analytical endeavour in that it examines multiple institutional 






time. It also shares the underlying idea of a coalition-based account of institutions: that 
institutional or policy continuity requires ongoing mobilisation of political support and that 
gradual institutional changes are often driven by shifts in its coalitional base -- an underlying 
structure on which institutions can have a “partially bite” (cf. Capoccia 2016, 1100).  
At the same time, however, the study highlights a mechanism that differs from the image 
of hidden changes that the scholarship on endogenous change is advancing. By examining 
how a particular feature of sectoral structures, such as political insulation, creates distinct 
blame-avoidance strategies, it shows how policy arenas such as bureaucracy and regulatory 
agencies can expand or constrain the coalitional base of political mobilisation through 
different politics channels. In contrast to the image of hidden changes where organised 
interests alter institutions through regulatory agencies and other channels within elite-level 
politics, the mechanisms that the present study proposes are based on the interaction between 
different arenas involving both elite and mass politics. The salient battles and coalition 
expansion through public and electoral arenas in England contributed to policy change; the 
absence of the opportunities for such conflict expansion contributed to policy continuity in 
France.     
An analytical lesson for the scholarship on endogenous change is that in examining 
endogenous sources of change, we need to look at both hidden “quiet” and “noisy” visible 
politics in order to fully understand policy changes that involve bureaucratic enforcement, in 
particular how the different arenas of politics, with their varying degrees of electoral 
involvement, interact with each other. This claim that the thesis has developed here hence has 
a broader implication for a classic and ongoing debate in comparative political economy over 
the relative roles of organised interest politics versus electoral politics in distributive issues 
(Beramenti et al. 2014; Hacker and Pierson 2010). This study shows, despite remaining a 
comparative study in a single sector, how policymaking in the realm of the former – the 
interaction of state organisations, such as regulatory agencies and bureaucracies, with 
organised interests in drug pricing and reimbursement – can shape whether conflicts are 
contained within organised interest politics or spill over into the parliamentary-electoral 
channel of politics. This last point concerning the roles of different channels in politics in post-
reform dynamics brings us back to the opening question about the consequences of the 








4. A final note: The regulatory state, depoliticisation, and democratic politics 
This study was motivated by the question of the trajectories following regulatory reforms 
to create non-majoritarian institutions. Notwithstanding the regulatory state and 
depoliticisation theses’ claims that non-majoritarian institutions can disrupt the existing 
governance structure and undermine party democracy in Europe, empirical work on post-
reform trajectories has remained underdeveloped. This study uses explicit drug rationing 
policies as a window into the post-reform political dynamics, studying endogenous drivers of 
policy development.  
The study’s conclusion casts doubt about a teleological understanding of the history of the 
regulatory state. When referring to the regulatory state as a disruptive, institutional innovation 
to the existing state-society relations, both the theorists of the regulatory state and 
depoliticisation appeared to assume a linear trajectory of reinforcing the policies that 
accompanied the creation of non-majoritarian institutions. The findings of the thesis challenge 
such an assumption. It argues that under certain conditions, far from strengthening its 
depoliticised mode of governance, a non-majoritarian institution can itself become a source of 
greater politicisation, generating self-undermining dynamics. This study identified political 
insulation as a factor that conditioned such a dynamic, arguing that high political insulation 
creates a distinct form of political conflicts involving counter-mobilisation through public and 
electoral arenas. Against the assumed linear post-regulatory reform trajectories, it stressed 
divergent paths of regulatory policies through the endogenous political dynamics mediated by 
different arenas. 
To be sure, this study’s argument against a linear policy development and its findings on 
self-undermining forces are hardly novel. In his classic essay on public participation, 
Hirschman (1982) pointed out how disappointment and discontent generated by ongoing 
practices lead to turnabouts between private and public spheres of collective behaviours (see 
also Hood 1994, 15). In a way, through its examination of opportunities of conflict expansion 
this thesis identifies a more concrete mechanism that drives the endogenous forces behind the 
long-term cyclical movements that Hirschman once highlighted. The thesis shows that, as the 
English case demonstrated, an institutional arrangement for decision-making insulated from 
politics may pull itself into the public sphere, leading to conflicts and instability. Conversely, 






decision-making remained largely contained in elite-level political bargains that took into 
account decisions’ likely political and electoral costs, contributing to policy continuity.  
These divergent paths of both the post-regulatory-reform politics and policy in drug 
rationing thus highlight tensions between non-majoritarian institutions and the political 
dynamics in public and electoral arenas. As Hall (2013) has argued in his recent essay on the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU, governing not only involves choosing a policy option among 
several but also entails “mobilizing consent for the choices among those affected by the policy” 
(432).585 For Hall, the problem of the EU – another paradigmatic case of the regulatory state 
thesis -- is that, while it has developed a capacity to create compromises through 
institutionalised channels, for its increasingly political tasks involving profound distributional 
implications among its citizens it has failed to create compromises and obtain the political 
consent of those affected through democratic arenas. More generally, governments are 
engaged in coalition-building and mobilisation of consent among societal actors through 
different, organised and electoral, political arenas. Sometimes, the imperative of coalition-
building in one arena may give rise to contradictory forces in the other (see Hall 1986, 273).  
As a policy choice that deeply affects citizens’ well-being and the state’s resource 
allocation, the case of explicit drug rationing policies thus represents a challenge to coalition-
building in different arenas following the creation of regulatory institutions. A highly-
insulated, regulator-led decision, while making a difficult policy choice possible, can be 
susceptible to political discontent. But a politician-led decision can also create its own 
consequences for resource allocation and well-being of citizens, by prioritising some patients 
or constituents over others based on political and electoral consideration and downplaying 
experts’ evidence-based opinions. The different consequences of regulatory reform thus pose 
a political dilemma involving difficult policy choices for post-reform regulatory politics.  
  
                                                     
585 Hall’s claim here was based on Beer (1969)’s classic conceptualisation of mobilisation of political 






Appendix:   List of Interviewees 
 
England 
Senior Economic Advisor, Department of Health    18/04/2018 
Former Senior Official, NICE     30/04/2018 
Health economist; Former member, NICE Appraisal Committee  03/05/2018  
Former Senior Official, NICE     04/05/2018 
Economist, the Office of Health Economics think tank  10/05/2018 
Officials, Department of Health     17/05/2018 
Senior Official, NICE       12/07/2018 
  
France 
Health policy scholar; Former member, HAS    30/09/2016 
Health economist; Member, HAS CEEPS    14/10/2016 
IGAS official; Member, Aubry’s cabinet    26/10/2016 
IGAS official        28/10/2016 
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